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Chapter 1
Academic Peer Effects with Different Group Assignment Rules:
Residential Tracking versus Random Assignment
1.1 Introduction
Group structures are ubiquitous in education and group composition may have important ef-
fects on education outcomes. Students in different classrooms, living environments, schools,
and social groups are exposed to different peer groups, receive different education inputs,
and face differential institutional environments. A growing body of empirical evidence shows
that students’ peer groups influence their education outcomes even when resource and in-
stitutional differences across groups are negligible. Peer effects have been documented on
students’ college GPAs (Sacerdote, 2001), standardized test scores (Hoxby, 2000), college
entrance examinations (Ding and Lehrer, 2007), study habits (Stinebrickner and Stinebrick-
ner, 2006), major choices (Di Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli, 2010), job search (Marmaros
and Sacerdote, 2002), and social networks (Marmaros and Sacerdote, 2006). Academic peer
effects play a role in both empirical and theoretical studies of classroom tracking (Arnott,
1987; Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer, 2011), neighborhood segregation (Benabou, 1996; Kling,
Liebman, and Katz, 2007), school choice and vouchers (Epple and Romano, 1998; Hsieh and
Urquiola, 2006), and school integration and busing policies (Angrist and Lang, 2004).1 The
majority of these studies focus on the effect of assignment to or selection into different peer
1These estimates may be sensitive to measurement of peer characteristics or peer groups. Administrative
data used to define peer groups may imperfectly measure the set of peers with whom students actually
interact, leading to biased estimates of peer effects (Foster, 2006). Different measures of peer characteristics
may also lead to different conclusions about the strength of peer effects: Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner
(2006) estimate much larger effects on college students’ GPAs from their roommates’ high school GPA than
SAT scores.
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groups for a given group assignment or selection process.
This paper asks a subtly different question: What are the effects of different policies for
assigning students to groups? This contributes to a small but growing empirical literature
on optimal group design. Comparison of different group assignment policies corresponds
to a clear social planning problem: How should students be assigned to groups in order
to maximize some measure of academic output, subject to a given distribution of student
characteristics? Different group assignment policies leave the marginal distribution of inputs
into the education production process unchanged. This raises the possibility of increasing
academic output without the pecuniary costs associated with most education interventions.
Such low cost education interventions are particularly attractive for developing country ed-
ucation systems that often face serious resource shortages. I study the relative effects of two
common policies for assigning college students to residential groups: random assignment
and academic tracking. Under random assignment, each residential group is approximately
representative of the entire population of students. Under tracking, each student is placed
in a residential group of peers with similar baseline academic proficiency. I use a natural
experiment in the dormitory system of the University of Cape Town in South Africa to show
that tracking substantially harms low-scoring students and has little effect on high-scoring
students. The net effect is a decrease in mean academic output and an increase in inequality
of academic output.
This cross-policy comparison is important because peer effects estimated under one as-
signment policy may not correctly predict the effects of a change in the assignment policy.
Such prediction requires strong assumptions about out-of-sample extrapolation, model spec-
ification, and economic behavior. For example, randomly assigning students to dormitories
allows researchers to identify the effect of residential peers’ academic proficiency on students’
academic outcomes. These “within-policy” estimates can predict how a student’s outcome
will change if the proportion of high ability students in her dormitory increases marginally,
for example from 40% to 60%. However, there is a low probability that random assignment
will generate “tracking-like” dormitories where the proportion of high ability students is
near 0 or 100%.2 Any attempt to predict the effect of tracking students into dormitories
2In contrast, random assignment to smaller groups such as roommate pairs may plausibly generate sub-
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thus relies on out-of-sample extrapolation. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that
model misspecification is a real danger in peer effects estimation. Students’ outcomes may
depend on many different features of the distribution of peers’ characteristics (mean, vari-
ance, order statistics, etc.) and models estimated under one assignment policy may lead
researchers to incorrect conclusions about which features of this distribution matter under
another assignment policy.
Even if the model is statistically correctly specified, there may be economic problems
with predicting the effects of changes in group assignment policies. Residential peer effects
may operate through two conceptually distinct channels: a direct channel, in which peers
exert influence through spatial proximity,3 and an indirect channel, in which spatial prox-
imity influences the formation of social and/or academic networks, which in turn influence
student outcomes. Most studies of peer effects under random assignment estimate a re-
duced form combination of these effects. However, changes in dormitory assignment policies
might change the relationship between spatial proximity and social networks, in which case
the indirect effect will not be policy-invariant. For example, students’ propensity to form
intra-dormitory social ties might be higher under tracking than random assignment, which
magnifies the indirect effect under tracking relative to random assignment. Estimates that
combine direct and indirect effects would then depend on assignment policies and so could
not reliably predict the effect of changes in these policies.
The empirical and methodological literature on this topic is sparse. Bhattacharya (2009)
and Graham, Imbens, and Ridder (2011) develop methods for predicting the effect of various
assignment policies using peer effects estimated under conditionally random assignment.
However, these approaches impose strong assumptions on the data generating process. For
example, Graham, Imbens, and Ridder (2011) limit their attention to cases where peer
types are binary, so the distribution of peer characteristics in a group is fully characterised
by the mean. Their model only applies to cases where out-of-sample extrapolation is not
stantial numbers of “high-high” and “low-low” pairs. These pairs could in principle be used to predict the
effect of changing the assignment policy to tracking, as in Bhattacharya (2009). I thank Todd Stinebrickner
for pointing out this distinction. The concern about policy-invariance still applies in this smaller group
setting.
3For example, noisy neighbors in the dormitory might impair students’ ability to study, even if no direct
interaction occurs between the students.
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required and they effectively assume that the policy sensitivity problem discussed above
does not apply. These papers still represent substantial methodological contributions – the
strong assumptions that they make merely reflect the difficulty of the cross-policy prediction
problem. Carrell, Sacerdote, and West (2012) and Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2011) provide
what appears to be the only direct empirical evidence regarding the effect of different policies
for creating peer groups. Both studies find that peer effects estimated under one assignment
policy do not predict the result of changing that assignment policy. The key advantage of my
study, and the work by Carrell, Sacerdote, and West (2012) and Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer
(2011), is that empirical cross-policy comparison avoids the need to estimate policy-invariant
and extrapolatable peer effects. Instead, I can estimate the relative effects of different policies
and then use these results to learn about the structure of the underlying peer effects.
A better understanding of how peer effects operate under different group assignment
policies may shed light on important policy debates in education. In particular, an extensive
empirical and theoretical literature has studied the effect of tracking students into classrooms
or schools (Betts, 2011). Most empirical studies estimate reduced form effects of tracking rel-
ative to other assignment policies but cannot separate the mechanisms driving their results.
The results may be driven by peer effects or by differences between tracked and untracked
groups in curricula, instruction, or other resources. A small number of papers use careful
data collection strategies to assess the relative importance of different mechanisms (Ding
and Lehrer, 2007; Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer, 2011; Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2012) but
the role of peer effects in academic tracking remains poorly understood. Group assignment
or selection processes also play potentially important roles in debates around school choice
(Epple and Romano, 1998; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006) and school integration (Angrist and
Lang, 2004).
This paper provides a bridge between the literatures on academic tracking and on opti-
mal design of peer groups. I study a natural experiment where students were assigned to
residential groups (dormitories) using tracking for several years and thereafter by random
assignment. I contrast the distribution of dormitory students’ academic outcomes under the
two policies and show that mean academic performance was lower and inequality higher un-
der tracking. I argue that baseline differences between the tracked and untracked students
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are small and show that the results are highly robust to accounting for these differences.
Specifically, I use non-dormitory students who live in private accommodation as a control
group to remove any time trends, flexibly control for differences in students’ baseline observed
characteristics, and use university admission policies to construct instrumental variables to
control for differences in students’ unobserved baseline characteristics. The results are highly
robust to these strategies and to several additional sensitivity analyses, including a placebo
test using data from before the policy change. My findings show that alternative peer group
assignment policies can have substantial effects on academic performance. In particular, the
distribution of outcomes under tracking is worse than under random assignment for most
plausible social welfare criteria in this setting. The tracked and untracked groups do not
experience different curricula, instruction or institutional environments. While there are dif-
ferences in physical facilities across dormitories, these are stable through time and so do not
differ between the tracked and untracked groups. The differences in academic performance
must thus be driven by peer effects, suggesting that a “pure peer effects” mechanism is an
important part of the effect of tracking in other settings.
I also explore the relationship between peer effects implied by the cross-policy results
and peer effects estimated under a given policy. In particular, random student assignment
to dormitories allows me to consistently estimate the effect of peers’ baseline characteristics
on students’ academic outcomes. These estimates confirm that students are affected by their
residential peers’ academic proficiency, measured by high school graduation test scores, and
that low-scoring students are substantially more affected than high-scoring students. This
pattern is qualitatively consistent with the results of the main cross-policy analysis but pre-
dicts far smaller effects of tracking than I observe. This may reflect out-of-sample prediction
problems or behavioral responses by students. I show evidence consistent with the former
explanation by documenting that the effect of peer characteristics on student outcomes is
much stronger when those peers are of the student’s own race group. This suggests that
spatial proximity generates peer effects but that the relationship is not mechanical. Instead,
students are influenced more by peers living near them if those peers are also socially proxi-
mate (crudely proxied by race, which is a salient feature of social networks in South Africa).
This suggests that the indirect channel (from spatial proximity to interaction to academic
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outcomes) is an important part of peer effects in this setting. Hence, peer effects estimated
under random assignment might fail to predict the effect of tracking because they cannot
capture changes in the strength of this indirect effect.
This paper’s substantive contribution is facilitated by several advanced econometric tech-
niques. Standard methods for comparing academic outcomes under two different policies
typically focus on the average treatment effect, for all students or for particular subgroups
of interest. This is informative but more can be learned by contrasting the full distributions
of outcomes. I therefore estimate the counterfactual distribution of academic outcomes that
tracked students would have achieved if tracking were not implemented, using the “nonlin-
ear difference-in-differences” model proposed by Athey and Imbens (2006). I also extend
the model to flexibly account for differences in the distribution of observed student char-
acteristics such as race and gender. Having constructed the full counterfactual distribution
of outcomes, I can estimate the full set of quantile treatment effects of tracking. I can
also calculate summary statistics of interest on the observed and counterfactual distribution
and so estimate the effect of tracking on various measures of academic inequality. I also
note that tracking may affect students’ academic mobility, measured by the probability that
low-ranked students in high school will become high-ranked in university and vice versa.
I develop the idea of a “mobility treatment effect” to quantify this effect and develop the
appropriate statistical theory in a companion paper (Garlick, 2012).
These findings suggest that group assignment policies may have substantial effects on
academic performance even when other education inputs are held constant. Such policy
changes impose few pecuniary costs and so offer policymakers an attractive method for
boosting academic performance. However, Pareto ranking of different policies may not be
possible, as different group assignment policies impose transfers across different groups of
students and academic outputs are not tradeable. In this setting, the large losses that
tracking imposes on low-scoring students are not accompanied by significant positive effects
on high-scoring students. Most social welfare criteria would thus prefer random assignment
to tracking but care should be taken in applying this result in other settings. For example,
the distribution of students’ academic proficiency at the University of Cape Town is wider
than in most tertiary institutions in developed countries. The university attracts many of the
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highest performing students in South Africa but also admits many academically promising
students from low-performing high schools with weak preparation for further study.4 These
are the students most affected by tracking, so my results are particularly relevant to policy
debates about how well academically underprepared students perform in tertiary education
(Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullainathan, 2010; Frisancho and Krishna, 2011).
Organization of the paper: Section 1.2 discusses the setting that I study and the two
assignment policies. Students were assigned to dormitories using a tracking policy up to
the 2005 academic year and randomly assigned to dormitories from the 2006 academic year
onward. I therefore employ a difference-in-differences design that compares the academic
outcomes of dormitory students under the two assignment policies, using non-dormitory
students to control for time trends in students’ academic outcomes. I briefly discuss some
potential threats to the validity of this design and show in the appendices that my results are
highly robust to such concerns. This section also quantifies the change in the distribution
of peer characteristics across groups, showing that the policy induced a large reallocation in
peer quality.
Section 1.3, which compares students’ outcomes across the tracking and random assign-
ment policies, is the main empirical component of the paper. I find that tracking reduces
mean GPA by approximately 0.12 standard deviations. This result is driven by a large neg-
ative effect on the students with low high school graduation test scores (up to 0.25 standard
deviations) and a small and imprecisely estimated positive effect on the upper tail. Quantile
treatment effects verify that tracking substantially lowers the left tail of the GPA distribu-
tion and has almost no effect on the right tail. In fact, the GPA distribution under tracking
is almost stochastically dominated by the counterfactual GPA distribution that would have
arisen in the absence of tracking. I show that this pattern of treatment effects implies sub-
stantial increases in standard measures of inequality, suggesting that tracking has negative
efficiency and equity effects. However, I find no effect of tracking on academic mobility,
measured by the probability that students change their rank in the distribution of academic
achievement from high school to university. This suggests that tracking disproportionately
4These students perform poorly in the standardized high school graduation tests that I use to measure
academic proficiency. This may reflect a combination of poor academic preparation and low ability, rather
than any one particular factor.
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reduces low scoring students’ level of GPA but leaves their rank largely unchanged.
Section 1.4 explores what could have been learned about peer effects without a policy
change, if I had only observed students during the random assignment period. I exploit the
fact that random assignment to dormitories balances peer group means only in expectation
and estimate the effect of random variation in dormitory-level measures of student character-
istics. I show that students’ GPAs are affected by the characteristics of their residential peers
and that students with low high school graduation test scores are more strongly affected. I
use empirical and theoretical arguments to highlight the difficulty of predicting the effects
of tracking using these results.
Section 1.5 explores the economic behavior driving the negative effect of tracking. I begin
by showing that peer effects operate mainly within race groups. I interpret this as evidence
that dormitory assignment influences student outcomes indirectly. Spatial proximity influ-
ences students’ interaction patterns but spatially proximate peers are more influential if they
are also socially proximate (crudely proxied by being members of the same race group). The
strength of this indirect peer effects channel may depend on the group assignment policy,
which reinforces the difficulty of cross-policy prediction. I then go on to show that peer ef-
fects are not stronger between students taking the same courses, which I interpret as evidence
that the relevant type of student interaction is not direct academic collaboration (completing
problem sets together, copying essays, etc.). Finally, I use an unusual feature of the timing
of assessment at the University of Cape Town to show that peer effects operate from early
in the semester, not just during exam periods.
Section 1.6 concludes and discusses the implications of these results. I argue that this
paper provides important and novel evidence on the academic effects of residential tracking,
which are driven entirely by differences in peer groups across dormitories. This finding is most
directly relevant to policymakers who assign students to residential groups. It also indicates
that a pure peer effect mechanism may be important in other group assignment problems.
For example, existing studies on academic tracking by classroom or school typically conflate
differences in peer group characteristics with differences in instructor behavior or school
resources. My results provide direct evidence regarding the importance of group composition
in evaluating the desirability of tracking policies. This result is also relevant to the literature
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on neighborhood segregation by family socioeconomic status (typically highly correlated with
academic proficiency measures used for tracking).
The appendices present a variety of robustness checks to show that the results in section
1.3 are not driven by violations of the identifying assumption underlying the difference-in-
differences design. This design assumes that the time trend in students’ academic outcomes
between the tracking and randomization periods would have been equal for dormitory stu-
dents (the treatment group) and non-dormitory students (the control group) if the policy
change had not occurred. Appendix 1.A.1 shows that the results are not driven by changes in
course-taking behavior between the two periods. Appendix 1.A.2 shows that the results are
not driven by students strategically selecting whether or not to live in the dormitory system.
I construct an instrument for treatment status using the university’s admissions policies and
show that the instrumental variables and least squares estimates are very similar. Appendix
1.A.3 shows that the trends in student outcomes and baseline characteristics were similar for
dormitory and non-dormitory students before the policy change. This placebo test provides
reassuring evidence that the results are not driven by different time trends in the treatment
and control groups. Appendix 1.A.4 presents a formal sensitivity analysis showing that an
implausibly large change in students’ unobserved characteristics would be needed to explain
the observed treatment effects. Finally, appendix 1.A.5 assumes that the treatment effects
have been correctly estimated and shows that inferences regarding these effects are robust
to alternative test procedures.
Appendix 1.B provides more detail regarding the nonlinear difference-in-differences model
employed in section 1.3. I present an intuitive explanation of the model’s identification results
and discuss how the identifying assumptions can be relaxed to accommodate differences in
students’ baseline observed characteristics.
Related literature: This paper relates to two literatures in the economics of education:
peer effects and academic tracking. I study the effect of tracking students into groups whose
only substantial difference is their composition. Unlike most studies of tracking, groups do
not face different instructors, curricula or resources. I therefore estimate a treatment effect
of tracking arising directly and exclusively from a shift in peer group composition and so
provide a bridge between the tracking literature and the recent peer effects literature on
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optimal group assignment. This section highlights some particularly relevant results from
these literatures. For more comprehensive reviews of the literature, see Epple and Romano
(2011) and Sacerdote (2011) on peer effects in education and Betts (2011) on academic
tracking.
Manski (1993) provides the first formal treatment of the methodological challenges in-
volved in estimating peer effects. He notes that in a linear regression of own academic
outcomes on peers’ baseline characteristics, a non-zero coefficient may arise for multiple rea-
sons. The coefficient may reflect a causal effect of peer characteristics on own outcomes
but may also reflect correlated unobserved characteristics due to endogeneous group for-
mation or correlated shocks because students are exposed to the same environmental and
institutional factors as their peers.5 Most empirical papers therefore study settings in which
students’ peer groups vary for reasons uncorrelated with their own unobserved characteris-
tics and include higher-level fixed effects to control for correlated shocks. The most directly
relevant set of papers study the effect of random assignment to roommates with different
SAT scores while using dormitory-level fixed effects to address correlated shocks (Sacerdote,
2001; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2006; Zimmerman, 2003).6 These studies typically
find small to moderate effects of peer characteristics on academic outcomes. Cooley (2010)
and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006) emphasize that estimates of peer effects may be
sensitive to how peer characteristics are measured. Hoxby and Weingarth (2006) and several
more recent papers argue that the functional form of reduced form estimating equations
have substantial simplications for interpretation of the results. Foster (2006) and Carrell,
Fullerton, and West (2009) note that administative units such as dormitories or classrooms
may be poor proxies for students’ true peer groups, which are typically unobserved by re-
searchers.7 I discuss the relevance of these considerations to this paper in sections 1.4 and
5Manski also draws a distinction between two types of causal peer effects: exogeneous effects, in which stu-
dents are influenced by their peers’ baseline characteristics, and endogeneous peer effects, in which students’
are influenced by their peers’ outcomes. I return to this distinction in section 1.4.
6Other studies estimate the effect of cohort-level variation within school-by-grade units in gender compo-
sition, race composition or test scores (Hanushek, Kain, Markman, and Rivkin, 2008; Hoxby, 2000; Lavy and
Schlosser, 2011) or the effect of approximately random assignment of students to classrooms (Ammermueller
and Pischke, 2009; Vigdor and Nechyba, 2007; Kang, 2007). Another literature uses natural experiments in
which students’ peer groups are changed by school integration policies (Angrist and Lang, 2004; Hoxby and
Weingarth, 2006) or natural disasters (Imberman, Kugler, and Sacerdote, 2012).
7Guryan, Jacob, Klopfer, and Groff (2008) is one the few papers that observes student interactions directly
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1.5.
This paper is closely related to Carrell, Sacerdote, and West (2012), which examines
the relative effects of two different policies for assigning freshmen to squadrons at the US
Air Force Academy. They find that randomly assigning students leads to higher average
GPAs than “mixing” students, so that some groups comprise only high and low ability
students, while others comprise only students of moderate ability. However, using peer effects
estimated across randomly created groups predicted that GPAs would be higher under the
latter policy than the former. This result highlights the danger of predicting the effects of
one policy using results estimated under another policy and underscores the value of papers
that explicitly compare outcomes across different policies.
The tracking literature can be divided into two broad strands: the first studies the
effect of tracking compared to other group assignment policies and the second studies the
effect of assignment to different tracks. Betts (2011) reviews the first literature, noting
that tracked and untracked groups often differ in curriculum, instructor characteristics, and
school resources. Few papers are able to disentangle the relative importance of these factors
and so cannot determine whether differences in the distribution of peer characteristics across
tracked and untracked groups lead to differences in outcomes. Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer
(2011) provide an important exception: they conduct a field experiment in which Kenyan
primary schools are randomly assigned to two groups, one of which tracks first graders into
classrooms and one of which randomly assigns them into classrooms. They find that tracking
increases test scores for both high- and low-track students relative to random assignment.
They also estimate that within the random assignment classrooms, assignment to a classroom
with marginally higher scoring peers raises students’ test scores. They reconcile these results
by arguing that students in the low track classrooms gained more from focused instruction
than they lost from weaker peer groups.
Papers in the second strand of the tracking literature typically estimate the effect of
assignment to a high instead of low track. Tracks often differ along multiple dimensions –
including peer characteristics, curriculum, and instructor characteristics – so these designs do
not directly test whether peers matter for academic outcomes. Some important exceptions
instead of proxying them with group assignment.
11
include Ding and Lehrer (2007) and Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2012) who study selective
high schools in China and Romania respectively. The former paper finds large effects of
attending selective schools and attributes much of this to measured teacher quality and a
small portion to peers. The latter paper finds large effects of attending selective schools
and selective tracks within schools but notes that qualification for higher tracks is associated
with substantial changes in instructor, parent, and student behavior measured by detailed
survey data.
This paper’s primary contribution is to the empirical literature but it also relates to a
rich theoretical literature relating to peer effects and tracking. The theoretical discussion
in section 1.4 builds off models of peer interaction discussed by Benabou (1996) and Epple
and Romano (2011). Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Ioannides (2011) and Brock and Durlauf
(2011) review the literature on social interactions models. They place particular emphasis
on models that attach a theoretical interpretation to the common estimands in the empirical
literature. Graham (2011) reviews the literature on econometric methods for identification
and estimation of such models.
The paper’s empirical methodology builds off a number of recent results in the hetero-
geneous treatment effects literature. I estimate quantile treatment effects of tracking using
a nonlinear difference-in-differences model that recovers the full counterfactual distribution
of GPAs that the tracked students would have obtained if they had instead been assigned
to dormitories using random assignment (Athey and Imbens, 2006). I also implement an
extension to the original Athey-Imbens models that incorporates changes in the distribution
of observed student characteristics and discuss this in detail in appendix 1.B. This extension
closely follows the reweighting methods proposed by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemiuex (1996)
and formalized by Hahn (1998) and Firpo (2007), amongst others. I use this counterfactual
distribution of GPAs to estimate the effect of tracking on inequality, following Firpo (2010).
The treatment effects of tracking on academic mobility that I present in section 1.3 are based
on identification and estimation results developed in a companion paper (Garlick, 2012).
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1.2 Experimental Setting and Research Design
Experimental setting: The policy experiment I study was carried out at the University
of Cape Town (UCT) in South Africa. UCT is a selective research university whose student
body is not representative of South Africa’s population. However, the student body is sub-
stantially more heterogeneous than in US universities in which much of the prior peer effects
literature is located. The university admits between 3500 and 4000 incoming students each
year. Approximately half of these students live in private accommodation and half live in
the 16 university dormitories, each of which accommodates between 35 and 237 students.8
The dormitories are similar to those found in many residential universities in the United
States – they provide students with accommodation, meals, organized social activities, and
some formal mentorship programs. Classes are not organized on dormitory lines, so students
from different dormitories attend the same lectures. Incoming students before the 2006
academic year were tracked into dormitories based on their performance in a standardized
high school graduation exam, with high-scoring students living in different dormitories to
low-scoring students. From 2006 onward, students were assigned to dormitories by a ran-
dom number generator. Under both policies, dormitory assignment did not directly affect
students’ courses or instruction. Students from all dormitories and non-dormitory students
were taught the same material in the same classes by the same instructors, so the dormitory
assignment effect operated solely through students’ living environments and spatial peer
groups. There is some variation in dormitories’ physical facilities and proximity to campus
and to leisure opportunities but controling for these differences using dormitory fixed effects
makes little difference to the results.
The policy change: Under the tracking policy, students were assigned to dormitories
based on their result in a standardized high school graduation examination, which was also
used for admissions decisions.9 There were, however, two deviations from a pure tracking
8The mean dormitory size over the study period is 123 students and the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles
are 50, 112 and 216 students. There are no substantial changes in dormitory size between the two periods.
Fourteen dormitories were open under both policies, one was open only under the tracking policy and one was
open only under the random assignment policy. My results are robust to using only the fourteen dormitories
open under both policies.
9The university’s admissions office converts international students’ results in A-level, International Bac-
calaureate (IB), and Higher International General Certificate in Secondary Education (HIGCSE) examina-
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assignment, in which dormitories partition the distribution of high school graduation test
scores. First, the assignment policy included an affirmative action component, so black stu-
dents required lower scores for assignment to high track dormitories than white students.10
Second, students who applied late to the university were waitlisted for places in the dormi-
tories and assigned when admitted students declined their admission offer or deregistered.
The student at the top of the waitlist was assigned to the first space that became available,
without regard to their high school graduation test scores. These exceptions increase within-
dormitory and decrease between-dormitory variation in baseline test scores relative to pure
tracking. This may attenuate the estimated treatment effect of tracking. Furthermore, the
race-specific thresholds and ad hoc assignment of late applicants mean that there is non-
trivial overlap in student’s high school graduation test scores across dormitories. There is
thus insufficient mass near the dormitory-specific thresholds to allow me to estimate the
effect of assignment to one dormitory or another by a regression discontinuity design.
Under the random assignment policy, students were assigned to dormitories using a race-
blind random number generator. The staff member responsible for assignments regularly
checked the racial composition of each dormitory and if he believed that one race group
was underrepresented, he manually assigned the next few applicants of the underrepresented
race to that dormitory. The criteria for determining “underrepresentation” were left to the
discretion of the staff member, who reported making “only a few” reassignments each year.
This raises the possible concern that students were able to manipulate their dormitory as-
signment by lobbying staff members involved in the assignment process. When interviewed,
the director of the admissions office acknowledged that this was a risk under both the track-
ing and random assigment regimes but stated that “everyone involved in the process was
instructed to present a united front ... that residence assignments were final.” Informal
discussion with both students and staff suggest that this policy was strictly enforced. Such
manipulation, if it took place, complicates interpretation of the empirical results but does
not affect the internal validity of my research design.
tions into equivalent results on the South African graduation examination.
10South Africa’s population was divided into four groups under apartheid ’s racial classification system:
black, coloured, Indian, and white. Given the ongoing salience of racial divisions, these distinctions are still
in widespread use in social science research, public discourse, and government policy.
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Under both the tracking and random assignment policies, 11 of the 16 dormitories were
single-sex. This meant that in the tracking period, male and female students with the same
high school graduation test scores in general lived in different dormitories. Under both
policies, students lived in dormitories for at most two years before moving into private ac-
commodation or university-owned apartments off campus. Hence, in 2006, the dormitory
system contained both randomly assigned first year students and tracked second year stu-
dents, who continued to live in the dormitory to which they were originally assigned. This
group of first year students were not, therefore, exposed to the same mixing policy as those
in 2007 and 2008 and so I omit 2006 from my main sample.11
Quantifying the extent of the policy change: Figure 1.1 depicts the change in
the composition of students’ peer groups induced by the change in dormitory assignment
policy. This figure shows the difference in mean peer group high school graduation test scores
between the tracking and random assignment periods, for students at each percentile of the
high school graduation test score distribution.12 Students in the bottom decile lived with
peers whose average high school graduation test scores were 0.5 standard deviations lower
under tracking than random assignment. Students in the top decile lived with peers whose
average high school graduation test scores were 0.4 standard deviations higher under tracking
than random assignment. This provides a simple measure of the change in peer group
academic proficiency (measured by high school graduation test scores) for different groups of
students. The fact that observationally similar students had very different peer groups under
the two policies provides the identifying variation I use to estimate the treatment effect of
tracking.13
11My results are robust to including this year in the random assignment period.
12I standardize graduation test scores to have a mean of zero and variance of one within each year in the
control group.
13I create the figure in four steps. First, I calculate the mean high school graduation test score in each
dormitory and assign this to each student as a measure of their peers’ baseline academic proficiency. Second,
I estimate a nonparametric regression of peers’ baseline proficiency against own high school graduation test
scores, separately for the tracking and random assignment period. I use a local linear regression with an
Epanechnikov kernel and a plug-in bandwidth following Fan and Gijbels (1996). I allow the bandwidth to
differ for the tracking and random assignment periods. Third, I calculate the vertical distance between the
two fitted curves at each percentile of the distribution of high school graduation test scores. Finally, I use
a nonparametric bootstrap to construct the 95% confidence intervals. The bootstrap resamples dormitory-
year clusters 1000 times, stratifying by tracking/random assignment period, orders the resultant bootstrap
estimates from smallest to largest and computes the confidence interval as the difference between the 25th
and 975th estimates. The ordering is implemented separately for each point on the curve so the confidence
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Figure 1.2 provides an alternative depiction of the effect of the policy on the distribu-
tion of student characteristics across dormitories. This figure shows the mean and standard
deviation of high school graduation test scores in each dormitory-year unit. The track-
ing policy more than doubled the range of dormitory means from (−0.2, 0.6) to (−0.8, 12).
The within-dormitory correlation coefficient rises from 0.12 under random assignment to
0.36 under tracking, which also emphasizes the substantial effect of the policy change on
the distribution of students across dormitories. The within-dormitory correlation coefficient
under tracking is still substantially less than one because of the ad hoc assignment of wait-
listed applicants, race-specific assignment thresholds, and long lower tail of the graduation
test score distribution (clearly visible in figure 1.3). This long tail creates a relatively high
within-dormitory variance in “low-track” dormitories.
The figure also highlights some of the departures from pure tracking. First, the dormitory
means under tracking are often relatively close together, because there are often “paired”
male and female dormitories with similar scores. Second, the four observations in the left
of the figure are clear outliers under both assignment policies. This is the university’s only
self-catering dormitory, in which students purchase and prepare their own food rather than
eating in communal dining halls. Students are permitted to request assignment to this
dormitory and pay approximately 40% lower fees than in other dormitories. In practice it
contains disproportionately many black students (who are likely to come from low-income
households) and students with low high school graduation test scores. My results are entirely
robust to excluding students in this dormitory, who make up only 1.4% of the sample.
Research design: My basic empirical strategy uses a linear difference-in-differences
model to compare the GPA of dormitory students under the tracking policy and the random
assignment policy, with non-dormitory students employed as a control group to remove
any time trends in student GPAs. This strategy identifies the average treatment effect
on the treated (ATT) of one policy relative to the other, assuming that the time trends
in student GPAs for the treatment group (dormitory students) and control group (non-
dormitory students) would have been identical in the absence of a policy change. I treat
random assignment as the default policy and so define the parameter of interest as the
intervals should be interpreted as providing only pointwise coverage.
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average treatment effect of tracking on the treated students:
∆ATT = E [GPA(1)|D = 1, T = 1, X]− E [GPA(0)|D = 1, T = 1, X]
= E [GPA(1)|D = 1, T = 1, X]− E [GPA(0)|D = 1, T = 0, X]
−
(




where GPA(1) and GPA(0) respectively denote GPA for students who are and are not
tracked, D = 1 for dormitory students, T = 1 for the period in which the tracking policy
was in place, and X is a vector of students’ demographic characteristics and high school
graduation test scores. The second equality follows from the assumption of identical trends.
I could alternatively define tracking as the default policy and estimate the treatment effect
of random assignment - the results are numerically invariant to this choice. Note that
difference-in-differences designs estimate “treatment on the treated” parameters, which are
valid only for the treatment group (dormitory students) and do not necessarily speak to the
effect that treatment would have on the control group (non-dormitory students).
I estimate ∆ATT in the following regression model
GPA = α + βD + γT + ∆TD + f(X) + ε (1.2)
where f(·) is a flexible function of the covariates. In practice, my results are robust to a
wide range of different specifications. ∆̂ is a consistent estimator of ∆ATT provided f(·)
is correctly specified14 and the mean change in unobserved determinants of GPA from the
random assignment to the tracking period is identical for dormitory and non-dormitory
students:
E [ε|D = 1, T = 1, X]−E [ε|D = 1, T = 0, X] = E [ε|D = 0, T = 1, X]−E [ε|D = 0, T = 0, X] .
(1.3)
This condition is not directly testable but I argue that it is plausible. The remainder of this
14I also estimate equation (1.2) adjusting for covariates using propensity score reweighting, following
Abadie (2005), and using both reweighting and regression. These estimators may be more robust to mis-
specification of f(·) than the “regression-only” estimator (Robins and Rotnitzky, 1995). The estimates using
regression, reweighting, and both regression and reweighting are all very similar.
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section presents four arguments in support of this assumption.
First, table 1.1 shows the results of testing the assumption of equal time trends in stu-
dents’ baseline academic and demographic characteristics. The first panel shows that the
time trends in mean high school graduation test scores are equal for dormitory and non-
dormitory students. The same condition holds for the proportion of students scoring mostly
As and mostly Ds in their high school graduation examinations. This rules out one a priori
plausible violation of the assumption in equation (1.3): that the dormitory system might
attract the more high achieving students in the tracking period than the random assignment
period. The second panel shows that the time trends in the race, gender, and nationality
composition of the student body were all approximately equal. The only characteristic that
clearly violates assumption (1.3) is language, as the proportion of English–speaking students
in the dormitories is higher in the tracking than the random assignment period.
Panel C shows that the probability of starting at the university in the random assignment
period (2007 or 2008) after finishing high school early enough (2005 or earlier) to start during
the tracking period is equal for dormitory and non-dormitory students. This suggests that
students do not strategically delay their entrance to the university in order to manipulate the
policy under which they are assigned. There is also no sign of such selection when restricting
the test only to students near the top or bottom of the distribution of high school graduation
test scores. These results show that the assumption of equal trends amongst treatment
and control groups holds for students’ observed characteristics and provides reassurance
that the assumption may also hold for students’ unobserved characteristics. I explore the
consequences of violations of this assumption in appendix 1.A.4.
Second, neither assignment policy was well-publicized and little public information was
made available about the policy change. The assignment policy in place at the time was
not stated in the application and promotion materials distributed to potential students.
Individual campus visits by prospective students are rare, so most students’ only interaction
with the university was through promotional materials, presentations by admissions staff
at their high school, or informal interaction with current students. The assignment policy
was available on the university’s website, but this was one brief part of a lengthy document
containing all information about student housing. The change in policy was not announced
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in university or external media. Informal discussion with students suggested that relatively
few were aware of the assignment policies when they started their studies and those who
were aware tended to have older siblings or friends at the university.
Third, admissions staff report that students typically live in dormitories if and only if
their family’s permanent residence is outside Cape Town. The dormitory system is somewhat
oversubscribed and so at most 4% of dormitory places are available for students from Cape
Town and its suburbs. Other local students tend to live with their families, as the university
is within one hour drive of most parts of the greater Cape Town metropolitan area. Students
from outside Cape Town could, in principle, rent private accommodation rather than live in
dormitories. However, private accommodation is typically considerably more expensive: a
single room and three meals a day in a university dormitory in 2010 cost approximately 85%
of the rent for a single room in a shared apartment equivalently close to the university.15 This
suggests that students have relatively little discretion over whether they live in a dormitory
or in private accommodation. Panel D of table 1.1 verifies this fact: the proportion of
students from schools inside Cape Town who live in the dormitory system is approximately
equal during the tracking and random assignment periods. The same condition holds for the
proportion of students from schools outside Cape Town who do not live in the dormitory
system. These equal time trends also hold for students at the top and bottom of the high
school graduation test score distribution. This again suggests that students’ decisions to
enter the dormitory system were determined by where they lived, rather than strategic
considerations.16
Fourth, there were no simultaneous policy changes at the university that are likely to
affect the composition of the student body or their academic performance. The only change
to the administration of the dormitory system was the closure of one old dormitory in 2006
and the opening of a new dormitory in 2007. My results are robust to omitting students in
those dormitories. The admissions and financial aid policies at the university stayed constant
15The apartment rental rate is the average of the first ten apartments listed on the website www.gumtree.
co.za on 30 October 2011 in the same neighborhood as the university.
16There are some students from Cape Town high schools who do live in dormitories and vice versa. This
arises because dormitory admissions decisions are based on home location and this is imperfectly proxied by
school location: some students at Cape Town schools live outside Cape Town and vice versa. Anecdotally,
these students report either commuting long distances or living in hostels or dormitories during high school.
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over this period. The tuition fee policy did change between 2005 and 2006: students were
previously charged a flat rate for enrollment and this was replaced by a fee-per-credit hour
system. I show in appendix 1.A.1 that the number of courses students took did not change
over this period so there is little evidence that this fee policy change influenced students’
behavior. This is unsurprising, as students were still required to enroll full time and the first
year curriculum at this university requires a fairly standard number of courses. Inspection
of minutes of Senate and other academic committee meetings shows no evidence of changes
in grading standards or criteria at this time.
This discussion suggests that the “equal trends” assumption required for validity of the
difference-in-differences design is plausible. In particular, the institutional setting allows
limited scope for students to select strategically whether to live in dormitories in responses
to the policy change: the change was not widely advertised and students’ home location
largely determined their admission to the dormitory system. Consistent with this claim,
the time trends in observed characteristics for dormitory and non-dormitory students are
approximately equal. Finally, there is little evidence of substantial changes in other policies
at the university over this time period. The appendices also present detailed robustness
checks that demonstrate that my results are robust to failures of the identifying assumption.
1.3 Treatment Effects of Tracking
I begin by estimating the average treatment effect of tracking on the treated students. The
direction of this effect is not a priori clear: if tracking raises strong students’ GPAs and
lowers those of weak students, the sign of the average effect is ambiguous. I show that the
data point to a large negative effect of tracking and then go on to explore how this effect
varies throughout the distribution of student performance.
Average treatment effect of tracking: Table 1.2 reports estimates of the average
treatment effect of tracking from the difference-in-differences model in equation (1.2). Col-
umn (1) reports a treatment effect of -0.13 standard deviations of GPA without conditioning
on students’ demographic characteristics or high school graduation test scores.17 The point
17I standardize GPA by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard
deviation in each year.
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estimate is significant at the 10% level, with standard errors estimated using a cluster-robust
variance matrix estimator that allows unrestricted correlation in the variances of students’
unobserved characteristics at the dormitory-year level. Adding dormitory fixed effects to re-
move any time-invariant characteristics of the dormitories that might affect students’ GPAs
(such as access to study facilities, proximity to campus, shared rooms) reduces the treatment
effect to a more precisely estimated -0.11 standard deviations. Column (3) adds a flexible set
of conditioning variables: student gender, language, nationality, race, a cubic in high school
graduation test scores and all possible two- and three-way interactions between these vari-
ables. Column (4) conditions on dormitory fixed effects and student characteristics, yielding
a precisely estimated treatment effect of -0.12 standard deviations. Taken together, these
results suggest that tracking reduced dormitory students’ GPAs by approximately 0.12 stan-
dard deviations with a 95% confidence interval from 0.06 to 0.18 standard deviations, and
that this effect is not explained by baseline characteristics of the students or dormitories.
I measure effect sizes in standard deviations of grade point average. This GPA measure
is constructed from raw scores students obtain in each class, which range from 0 to 100. I
take a credit-weighted average of each student’s class-specific scores and then standardize the
resultant student grades to have mean zero and standard deviation one in each year for the
control group of non-dormitory students.18 The pre-standardized GPA measure has mean
58.9 with percentiles 1 and 99 equal to 7 and 83.6 respectively. No student ever obtains
the maximum feasible grade of 100, so ceiling effects on this outcome measure are less of a
concern in this setting than in US universities where many students obtain the maximum
possible GPA. I use the raw numerical scores students obtain in each class, which are unlikely
to have been “curved.”
The effect size of 0.12 standard deviations is equal to approximately 150% of the male-
female GPA gap and 30% of the black-white GPA gap in this sample of university students.
Given the salience of race in the South African context, this points to a large and econom-
18Specifically, I first observe raw scores from 0 to 100 for every class that a student takes in her first year
at the university. Second, I construct credit weightings for each class. Most of these weightings are recorded
in the electronic dataset I obtained from the University of Cape Town; I construct the remaining weightings
from physical copies of course catalogues from the relevant period. Third, I construct a credit-weighted
average grade that ranges from 0 to 100 for each student in their first year at the university. Finally, I
standardize this GPA measure to have mean zero and standard deviation one in each year for the control
group of non-dormitory students.
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ically meaningful treatment effect. Benchmarking the magnitude of this effect relative to
the existing literature is complicated by the fact that there are few prior studies of different
peer group assignment rules. The two most similar studies in the existing literature yield
comparably sized treatment effects, assuming that standard deviation-based scales are com-
mensurable across such different settings. First, Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2011) find that
instructional tracking in Kenyan primary schools increases students’ test scores by 0.14 to
0.18 standard deviations relative to random assignment. Second, Carrell, Sacerdote, and
West (2012) find that their “optimal” rules for assigning students to noninstructional peer
groups at the US Air Force Academy reduce students’ GPAs by 0.08 to 0.1 standard devia-
tions relative to random assignment. These effects are small relative to many of the resource-
and instruction-based interventions in developing countries reviewed in Glewwe and Kremer
(2006). However, the low cost involved in redistributing students across groups may make
this type of intervention more attractive to policymakers.
How does tracking affect different subgroups? This subsection disaggregates the
negative average treatment effect of tracking using a variety of heterogeneous treatment
effect estimators. These estimates consistently show large negative treatment effects near
the bottom of the GPA distribution and approximately zero treatment effects on students
near the top of the GPA distribution.
Table 1.3 reports estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated for each quartile
of the distribution of high school graduation test scores. The effects are in fact negative in
all four quartiles but are considerably larger below the median (-0.22 to -0.26 standard
deviations) than in the top quartile (0.09 standard deviations). These results clearly point
to negative effects on weaker students but suggest that even those students with high baseline
performance might have lower GPAs under tracking.
It is, however, possible that quartiles are too coarse a division and that there are some
subgroups of students in the top quartile who do benefit from tracking. I explore this pos-
sibility by estimating a local linear regression of GPA on high school graduation test scores,
separately for dormitory students in the tracking period, dormitory students in the random
assignment period, non-dormitory students in the tracking period, and non-dormitory stu-
dents in the random assignment period. I then use the local linear estimates ˆGPADT (HS)
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for group D in period T to compute the local difference-in-differences estimator
∆̂ATT (HS) = ˆGPA11(HS)− ˆGPA10(HS)− ˆGPA01(HS) + ˆGPA00(HS)
at each percentile of high school graduation test scores (HS). This provides a flexible test
of whether tracking has a positive effect for any subset of students. Panel A of figure 1.4
plots ∆̂ATT (HS) and shows that the point estimates are negative for approximately 80%
of the distribution of high school graduation test scores.19 The treatment effect is equal to
approximately one quarter of a standard deviation in much of the bottom quartile, while the
positive effect in the left tail never exceeds one tenth of a standard deviation. The bootstrap
confidence intervals are relatively wide but the estimates are negative and significant from
approximately the 15th to the 65th percentiles.20 This nonparametric regression does not
control for student or dormitory characteristics but results are robust to splitting the sample
and estimating τ̂ATT (HS) separately by octile with the same conditioning variables used in
the previous section.21
Table 1.4 reports average treatment effects on the treated for several demographic sub-
groups. The treatment effects on male and female students are equal, but black students
experience a substantially larger negative effect than white students (-0.23 standard devia-
tions compared to -0.14 standard deviations). This difference is not significant but it suggests
that black students, who on average have lower high school graduation test scores and lower
socio-economic status, are disproportionately affected by the tracking policy. There is a
positive but entirely insignificant treatment effect on students of other race groups; the rea-
19I use an Epanechnikov kernel and a plug-in bandwidth chosen separately for each of the four nonpara-
metric regressions (Fan and Gijbels, 1996). The results are qualitatively robust to substantial changes in the
bandwidth parameter.
20This bootstrap algorithm resamples dormitory-year clusters, computes the local linear estimate for the
resampled data, orders the resultant point estimates from 1000 replications, and computes the confidence
intervals as the difference between the 25th and 975th estimates. The ordering is implemented separately for
each percentile of the distribution of high school graduation test scores so the confidence intervals should be
interpreted as providing only pointwise coverage. These confidence intervals depend on non-pivotal statistics
and so do not offer asymptotic refinement but do avoid the need to rely on critical values from the standard
normal distribution that may be a poor approximation to the finite sample distribution of the test statistic
(Horowitz, 2001).
21Including controls in the local linear model is in principle possible. However, existing estimators for
this “partially linear” model either assume that the distribution of high school points is strictly continuous
(Yatchew, 1997) or require the choice of multiple bandwidth parameters and are highly sensitive to these
choices (Robinson, 1988).
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son for this effect is unclear. Given that black students have on average lower high school
graduation test scores than white students, these results are consistent with the idea that
lower-scoring students are affected more by tracking than higher-scoring students.
Quantile treatment effects of tracking: The nonlinear difference-in-differences model
proposed by Athey and Imbens (2006) provides an alternative way to explore heterogeneous
treatment effects, which I discuss in detail in appendix 1.B. In brief, the model constructs
the full counterfactual distribution (CDF) of GPAs for dormitory students under tracking
if tracking had not been implemented, whereas the standard linear difference-in-differences
model constructs only the counterfactual mean of this distribution. The observed and coun-
terfactual distributions of graduation test scores are shown in figure 1.5. The horizontal
difference between these two distributions at each quantile is defined as the quantile treat-
ment effect on the treated and these are plotted for each quantile in the first panel of figure
1.6. These are large and negative in the lower tail of the distribution, with effects of more
than -0.6 standard deviations at the 5th percentile and more than -0.3 standard deviations at
the 10th. The effects are smaller at higher percentiles but remain negative for approximately
90% of the distribution. The estimates are relatively imprecisely estimated and statistically
differ from zero only in the lowest quartile of the distribution22 but the results clearly reaf-
firm that tracking has a substantial negative effect on the lower tail of the distribution and
little or no effect on the upper tail.23
The additional flexibility of the nonlinear difference-in-differences model comes at the
cost of a stronger identifying assumption: that the distribution of baseline characteristics is
constant through time for each group (dormitory and non-dormitory students). I show in
appendix 1.B that this restriction can be relaxed to allow for changes in observed student
characteristics through time. This relaxation operates by reweighting students to equalize
22I again construct the confidence intervals using the percentile cluster bootstrap algorithm discussed in
footnote 20. The validity of the bootstrap for the nonlinear difference-in-differences estimator has not been
formally established. However, Athey and Imbens (2006) present simulation results showing that tests based
on bootstrap confidence intervals have coverage probabilities closer to their nominal levels than confidence
intervals based on the analytical variance estimator that they derive.
23Note that these are treatment effects on quantiles of the outcome distribution, not treatment effects on
individual students. The two concepts are equivalent only if tracking is a rank-preserving treatment, so that
the students in the bottom of the observed distribution would also be at the bottom of the counterfactual
distribution (Heckman, Smith, and Clements, 1997).
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the distribution of observed baseline characteristics through time, following DiNardo, Fortin,
and Lemiuex (1996) and Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003). The second panel of figure 1.6
shows the quantile treatment effects estimated by this reweighted nonlinear difference-in-
differences estimator. The results are very similar to those from the unadjusted estimator,
reinforcing the ongoing theme that the effects of tracking are not confounded by differences
in students’ observed characteristics between the tracking and random assignment periods.
Figures 1.4 and 1.6 convey complementary but subtly different information about the
nature of the treatment effects. The former figure presents treatment effects for students
at different points in the distribution of high school graduation test scores. This shows that
students with low high school graduation test scores were significantly harmed by the policy
and that students with high graduation test scores may have been helped slightly. The
latter figure presents treatment effects at different points in the distribution of university
GPA. This shows that the lower tail of the GPA distribution dropped by a very large margin
under tracking and the upper tail was unaffected. These latter statements are about the
distribution of outcomes and make no claim about which students are at which point of this
distribution. The former statements apply to specific subgroups of students defined by their
high school graduation test scores. The two analyses present a consistent picture – tracking
hurts weaker students and does little to help strong students – but do so using different
methods.
Having constructed the full counterfactual distribution of GPAs, I can also compare a
range of summary statistics for the observed and counterfactual distributions. In particular,
the first row of table 1.5 shows that the average treatment effect on the treated from the
nonlinear model is -0.13 standard deviations, or -0.1 standard deviations after conditioning on
student characteristics and dormitory fixed effects. This is very similar to the treatment effect
estimated by the linear difference-in-differences model, which provides some reassurance that
my results are not driven by differences in the two models’ assumptions.
Inequality treatment effects of tracking: The next four rows of table 1.5 show that
standard measures of inequality in academic performance are sharply higher for the distri-
bution of tracked outcomes than the counterfactual distribution. The interdecile range rose
by approximately 15%, the interquartile range by approximately 10%, the Gini coefficient
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by approximately 20% and the coefficient of variation by a considerably smaller margin.24
These differences are all significant and suggest that any social welfare function that values
both average GPA and equality of GPA would find tracking a particularly unattractive pol-
icy in this setting.25 This finding is also relevant for the academic tracking literature more
broadly. This literature strongly emphasizes inequality considerations (see Betts, 2011) but
few papers quantify the effect of tracking on standard inequality measures. I provide a simple
method of quantifying this effect, which improves on the existing approaches of estimating
average subgroup treatment effects and then informally discussing whether these suggest
increases in inequality.
Mobility treatment effects of tracking: The previous subsections have established
that tracking has a large negative effect on low-scoring students and at most a small positive
effect on high-scoring students. This raises the concern that tracking might also entrench
the baseline ranking of academic performance, by impairing the potential for students who
begin university near the bottom of the distribution of academic performance to catch up to
or overtake their peers. This would concern any policymaker or social planner who values
academic mobility and the capacity of university-level policy to reduce or reinforce differences
in academic performance relative to high school. Given that the South African education
system is characterized by high levels of socio-economic inequality (as are many others in
developed and developing countries), this concern is highly salient.
This subsection therefore examines the relative effects of tracking and random assignment
to dormitories on changes in students’ rank mobility between high school and university.
Specifically, I test whether the two policies have different effects on the probability that
students will change their rank in the distribution of academic performance from high school
24The Gini coefficient is only defined for random variables with strictly positive support. I therefore add
4 to the standardized GPA measure to ensure that all values are positive. The treatment effect on the Gini
coefficient, expressed in percentage terms, is robust to alternative location shifts provided these ensure a
strictly positive support. This also ensures that the mean is non-zero, which is necessary for estimating the
coefficient of variation.
25Note that I construct the counterfactual distributions quantile-by-quantile so the interdecile and in-
terquartile ranges are direct by-products of this process but the mean, Gini coefficient, and coefficient of
variation require linear approximation between the quantiles. This linear approximation introduces non-
classical measurement error into the estimation so the estimates should be interpreted with a degree of
caution. I attempt to minimize the extent of the error by estimating the counterfactual distribution at 199
quantiles.
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to university. This complements the analyses in the previous section, which showed that
tracking had a significant negative effect on GPAs in the lower tail of the distribution. This
level effect demonstrates that random assignment helps low-achieving students to “catch
up” to their peers. The rank analysis I present in this section demonstrates that random
assignment is not sufficient to facilitate “overtaking” or rank changes between high school
and university.
I begin by constructing transition matrices for the tracking and random assignment pe-
riods. Each pij element of these four-by-four matrices indicates the probability that an
individual in quartile i of the distribution of high school graduation test scores will move
to quartile j of the distribution of university GPA. A diagonal matrix corresponds to zero
mobility (every student remains in the same quartile), while pij = 0.25 ∀i, j corresponds to
complete mobility (students’ final quartiles are independent of their initial quartile). I pool
dormitory and non-dormitory students’ graduation test scores and GPAs to compute the
quartile boundaries but present the transition probabilities for only dormitory students.
The two transition matrices are reported in table 1.6. The first row of panel A shows
that dormitory students in the tracking period who are in the bottom quartile of the high
school graduation test score distribution remain in the bottom quartile in university with
probability 0.37 and move to the top quartile with probability 0.28. A visual inspection of
panel A (tracking) and panel B (random assignment) suggests that the policy change had
little effect on the transition probabilities.
Table 1.7 presents several summary measures of mobility in each period. I define a
mobility treatment effect as the change in a summary mobility measure from the random
assignment to the tracking period. The first row shows that the average probability that
a student will move from one quartile to another is slightly higher than 0.8 in each period
(Bartholomew, 1982). The average number of quartile changes is approximately 0.9 in each
period (Bartholomew, 1982) and the correlation between initial and final quartiles (measured
by the second largest eigenvalue of each transition matrix) is approximately 0.55 (Sommers
and Conlisk, 1979). None of the mobility treatment effects are significant and the magnitudes
are very small, suggesting that the policy change raised the level of low-achieving students’
GPAs but had little effect on their probability of overtaking students with higher graduation
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test scores in high school.
1.4 What Can Be Learned from Cross-Dormitory Variation?
The preceding section presents indirect evidence of the importance of peer effects in de-
termining students’ GPAs. My argument can be characterized as follows: students’ GPAs
changed sharply when the residential tracking policy was introduced, this change cannot be
explained by differences in student or dormitory characteristics, no substantial simultaneous
policy changes occurred, so the change must be due to the different peer groups created by
the tracking policy. This section complements the argument by presenting a direct test for
peer effects using cross-dormitory variation in peer characteristics and then exploring the
structure of the education production function.
Begin by considering a simple model of students’ GPA production adapted from Manski
(1993) and Sacerdote (2001):
GPAig = α0 + α1HSig + α2HSg + α3GPAg + εig, (1.4)
where GPAig and HSig are the university GPA and high school graduation test score re-
spectively of student i in dormitory g. Define GPAg and HSg as the average GPA and
high school graduation test score of all students in dormitory g. In the language of Manski
(1993), α2 is an “exogeneous peer effect,” in which students’ GPAs are influenced by the
baseline characteristics of their peers and α3 is an “endogenous peer effect,” representing a
feedback loop between each students’ GPA and that of her peers. It is clearly impossible
to estimate equation (1.4) consistently, as the same variable appears on both sides of the
























≡ π0 + π1HSig + π2HSg + ηig.
(1.5)
If students are randomly assigned to groups, HSg is uncorrelated with ηi, which is a student-
specific deviation from the average dormitory unobserved characteristics. Then this model
can be consistently estimated and π2 6= 0 if and only if some peer effect exists: α2 6= 0 or
α3 6= 0.26 Sacerdote (2001) therefore proposes H0 : π̂2 = 0 as a reduced-form test for the
existence of either peer effect.
Table 1.8 reports the results of this test for the sample of all dormitory students who
are randomly assigned to dormitories. The value of π̂2 ≈ 0.24 implies that a one standard
deviation increase in peers’ high school graduation test scores is associated with a one quarter
standard deviation increase in each student’s GPA in their first year of university. This result
is robust to conditioning on students’ demographic characteristics (column 2), to including
dormitory fixed effects (column 3), and to excluding the one outlying dormitory discussed
in section 1.2 (columns 4–6).27
While it is impossible to recover the values of the structural parameters α2 and α3 from
the reduced form coefficients π1 and π2, it is worth noting that if α3 = 0, then α̂2 = π̂2 ≈ 0.24
(standard error 0.09) and if α2 = 0, then α̂3 =
π̂2
π̂1+π̂2
≈ 0.4 (standard error 0.06). The latter
estimate of the endogeneous peer effect or social multiplier implies that approximately two
fifths of the gain from a dormitory-level increase in GPA spills over onto each student.
These effect sizes are comparable to the larger results from previous studies of residential
peer effects in higher education. This may reflect the fact that my measure of peer academic
proficiency, standardized scores on content-based high school graduation tests, differs from
the scholastic aptitude test (SAT) scores used in most prior studies. The latter measure
assigns a relatively higher weight to peers’ academic ability and less to their study behavior
and content knowledge. Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006) present evidence suggesting
26Unless one peer effect is negative, a possibility seldom considered in the literature.
27I also estimate equation (1.5) using dormitory-by-year medians instead of means. The point estimates
are very similar though slightly less precisely estimated.
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peer effects are larger when using measures of peer characteristics that attach more weight
to study behavior and knowledge.
Note that the variation in HSg used to estimate π̂2 arises because randomization balances
dormitory means only in expectation, not in any particular finite sample. This means that
the regressor of interest takes on only 30 values, which are relatively close together. This
narrow support of the regressor and the cluster-robust variance estimator I use yield relatively
large standard errors. The point estimate suggests that a one standard deviation increase
in peers’ mean graduation test scores in high school increase own GPA by one quarter of a
standard deviation. However, the range of HSg is only 0.85 (after excluding the outlying
dormitory), so moving from the “worst” to the “best” observed peer group would raise GPA
by one fifth of a standard deviation.
The linear-in-means model is a standard point of departure in the empirical peer effects
literature but it embodies a number of important limitations. In particular, the model
requires that own and mean peer group high school graduation test scores are additively
separable in the production function. Moving a high-scoring student from one dormitory
to another will increase average student performance in the second group by exactly the
same amount that it decreases average student performance in the first group. Hence, any
reallocation of students between peer groups will leave the average GPA unchanged. This
implies a zero average treatment effect of tracking, as well as any other reallocation policy.
Combining this observation with the empirical results in section 1.3 suggests that the linear-
in-means model is seriously misspecified.





+XigΓ + ηig (1.6)
where f (·, ·) is a polynomial function and Xig is a vector of student characteristics and
dormitory fixed effects. I estimate f using a series estimator with the order of the polynomial
chosen by cross-validation.28 A polynomial order of 2 minimizes of the mean squared error
28I use a leave-out-one-cluster cross validation scheme that allows for possible dependence of the error
structures within dormitory-year clusters. This follows the spirit of the literature on cross-validation for
dependent data in a time series context (Burman, Chow, and Nolan, 1994). The quadratic model is also the
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of the regression, so I estimate the model
GPAig = β0 + β1HSig + β11HS
2
ig + β2HSg + β22HS
2
g + β12HSigHSg +XigΓ + ηig (1.7)
with and without the vector of student demographic characteristics Xig.
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Table 1.9 reports estimates of the parameters of the augmented model (1.7). The key
results are that β̂12 is consistently negative across all specifications, while the sign and
magnitude of β̂22 are somewhat sensitive to specification of the control vector. A likelihood
ratio test strongly rejects the linear model relative to the quadratic model. The negative
value of β̂12 indicates that students with low high school graduation test scores benefit more
from an increase in mean peer high school graduation test scores than do students with
higher graduation test scores. This implies that tracking, by blocking interaction between
low and high scoring students, will hurt the former group more than it helps the latter
and so reduce average GPA. The negative average treatment effect of tracking estimated
in section 1.3 is entirely consistent with this result. Both the theoretical and empirical
literature on peer effects (and neighorhood segregation) have emphasized the importance of
this complementarity parameter and my results are consistent with the claim that when own
and peer characteristics are partially substitutable, tracking reduces mean outcomes.
The inconclusive sign of β̂22 is also of interest. If this parameter is negative, then GPA is
a concave function of peers’ high school graduation test scores. Average output will therefore
be lower with one high and low scoring peer group than with two groups with equal mean high
school scores.30 Unlike β̂12, this parameter does not provide any information about which
students benefit most from strong peers. However, it does provide important information
about whether mixed or tracked peer groups maximize average output. The role of convexity
or concavity in peer effects models has received relatively little attention in the empirical
literature but is emphasized in theoretical and methodological work by Benabou (1996) and
Graham, Imbens, and Ridder (2011). If both β̂12 and β̂22 were negative, the negative average
specification that minimizes the Bayesian Information Criterion for this model. Note that this estimation
strategy departs from a fully nonparametric approach by assuming that Xig is linear and separable from f .
29I also estimate this model using dormitory-by-year medians instead of means. The point estimates are
very similar though slightly less precisely estimated.









effect of tracking would have been predictable using cross-dormitory variation. Given the
ambiguous sign of β̂22, out-of-sample prediction might lead to incorrect conclusions.
Even if estimates of the two key parameters were consistently negative, predicting the
negative effect of tracking would require an ambitious out-of-sample extrapolation. Figure
1.7 panel A shows the density of dormitory-level mean high school graduation test scores un-
der tracking and random assignment. Tracking generates a much more dispersed distribution
of means ranging from -0.8 to 1.2 standard deviations, while those under random assignment
range from -0.2 to 0.6. A similar problem applies to other dormitory-level statistics such as
the variance and proportion of students at different percentiles of the high school graduation
test score distribution, shown in panels B – D. This figure highlights the limitation of existing
methods for predicting the effect of changes in group assignment policies or inferring optimal
assignment policies (Bhattacharya, 2009; Graham, Imbens, and Ridder, 2011). These meth-
ods cannot predict out of sample without strong assumptions and so cannot speak to the
effect of changing the policies that create peer groups that are not observed under the status
quo assignment policy. This may account for the puzzling result in Carrell, Sacerdote, and
West (2012), where a change in group assignment policy reduced average outcomes instead
of raising them, as estimates based on randomly assigned groups suggested. The “optimal”
groups created by the new policy were not observed under the old assignment policy and
so their estimated optimality relied on out-of-sample projection. A similar argument can be
applied to aspects of the results in Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2011). They estimate variants
of the linear-in-means model in equation (1.5) using students who are randomly assigned to
first grade classrooms in Kenyan schools. They interpret this result as evidence that tracking
students into classrooms should hurt low-scoring students and help high-scoring students,
unless instructors adapt their behavior to respond to the changed classroom composition.
However, it is also possible that their estimates should not be extrapolated out-of-sample to
tracked classrooms.
1.5 Mechanisms
Having established the effects of tracking in section 1.3 and the effect of marginal changes in
peer group composition in section 1.4, I now consider the mechanisms that might be driving
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these results. In particular, I suggest that residential peer effects may operate through two
conceptually distinct channels: a direct channel, in which peers exert influence through spa-
tial proximity,31 and an indirect channel, in which spatial proximity influences the formation
of social and/or academic networks, which in turn influence student outcomes. The models
discussed in section 1.4 estimated a reduced form combination of these effects. If indirect
effects are important, then changes in dormitory assignment policies might change the re-
lationship between spatial proximity and social networks. Estimates that combine direct
and indirect effects would then be sensitive to assignment policies and so could not reliably
predict the effect of changes in these policies. For example, if students prefer to interact with
peers of similar academic proficiency, then intra-dormitory social networks will be stronger
under tracking than random assignment. The size of the indirect effects will therefore be
magnified under tracking and peer effects estimated under random assignment will be un-
derstated. This further emphasizes the importance of explicit cross-policy comparisons, even
if the out-of-sample extrapolation and model specification problems were not present.
I present evidence in this section that direct effects alone cannot explain the estimated
peer effects. Specifically, I estimate an augmented version of the reduced-form linear-in-
means model that allows peer effects to differ within and across race groups:
GPAi,g,r = ψ0 + ψ1HSi,g,r + ψ2HSg,r + ψ3HSg,−r + νi,g,r. (1.8)
where HSg,r is the average high school graduation test score for students in dormitory g
of the same race as student i and HSg,−r is the average for students of other races. Table
1.10 reports that for randomly assigned dormitory students, ψ̂2 ≈ 0.16 (standard error 0.09)
and ψ̂3 ≈ −0.05 (standard error 0.07). These results suggest that peer effects occur almost
entirely within race groups. Given the salience of race in contemporary South Africa, social
and study networks may be strongly correlated with race groups. If this is true, the near-zero
cross-race peer effects are evidence that spatial proximity (measured by assignment to the
same dormitory) alone does not predict academic outcomes. Instead, the strong within-race
peer effects suggest that spatial proximity matters by influencing students’ networks, and
31For example, noisy neighbors in the dormitory might impair students’ ability to study, even if no direct
interaction occurs between the students.
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hence their academic outcomes.
I estimate a similar variant of the linear-in-means model that allows the effect of change in
peers’ mean high school graduation test scores to differ for students in the same and different
colleges/faculties/schools, such as engineering, science, and social science. Table 1.11 shows
that peer effects are not stronger within than across faculties. The point estimates for within-
faculty effects are in fact consistently smaller than those for cross-faculty effects, though I
cannot reject equality of the coefficients in any specification.32 This suggests that peer effects
do not primarily operate through direct academic collaboration (study groups, cooperation
on essays, copying problem sets, etc.). Peer effects may instead be operating through time
allocation toward studying and leisure activities, a result consistent with Stinebrickner and
Stinebrickner (2008). However, without detailed time use data I cannot explicitly test this
hypothesis.
An unusual feature of the assessment system at the University of Cape Town provides
additional insight into the time at which peer effects matter. In particular, I show that
the treatment effect operates early on in the semester, rather than being concentrated on
students’ performance in final examinations. Course-level assessment at many South African
universities takes place in two stages. In the first stage, students are graded on their perfor-
mance in tests, problem sets and class discussion, and sometimes their attendance record.
Students who perform particularly poorly in this assessment stage may be refused permission
to proceed to the second stage of assessment, typically a final examination. I refer to these
as “excluded courses” and the transcript data that I use simply shows an exclusion symbol
for these courses, rather than a numerical grade.
The results in section 1.3 assigned zero grades to excluded courses. I can instead drop
these courses from the sample, calculate students’ GPAs using only the non-excluded courses
and estimate the treatment effects on this alternative outcome measure.33 The third and
32I obtain similar results when I estimate the effect on students’ results in a particular class, such as
Economics 1. There is no evidence that the characteristics of peers taking Economics 1 matter more than
the characteristics of peers not taking the course. The same result holds for most large introductory classes.
33Note that this is not a standard censored data problem. If a student is academically excluded from a
course I still observe them in the data and they still obtain grades for all their other courses. Less than
0.05% of the sample are academically excluded from all the courses that they take in first year. This group
of students enter the main results as having a zero GPA (before standardization) and are omitted from the
regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) of table 1.12.
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fourth columns of table 1.12 show that this reduces the average treatment effects on the
treated to -0.07 standard deviations (standard error 0.03). This is approximately half as
large as the treatment effect on the original GPA measure but is still significant. The fifth
and sixth columns estimate the treatment effect on the proportion of courses for which
students are excluded. This rises from 5 percentage points in the absence of tracking to 8
percentage points under tracking. A large part of the average treatment effect is therefore
operating at the extensive margin, through the mechanism of course exclusions.
These additional outcome measures provide some important evidence about the mech-
anisms through which tracking is lowering GPA. The fact that course exclusions are based
on performance early in the semester suggests that tracking is reducing students’ academic
aptitude or application from an early stage in the courses, with a particularly deleterious
effect on the bottom tail of the distribution. This is more consistent with a model in which
peer effects operate from early in the semester than a model in which peers only effect time
allocation during intensive study periods just before final examinations.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper describes in detail the difference in student GPAs between a period in which
students were tracked into dormitories and a period in which they were randomly assigned
to dormitories at the University of Cape Town in South Africa. I show that under tracking
the mean GPA was lower and the level of GPA inequality higher. This result arises because
low-scoring students experience a large drop in academic performance when living with
only low-scoring peers, while high-scoring students experience no effect on their academic
performance when living with only high-scoring peers. These substantial peer effects occur
largely from interaction with spatially proximate own-race peers and the relevant form of
interaction does not appear to be direct academic collaboration. I present an extensive
argument supporting a causal interpretation for these results.
These results demonstrate that different policies for assigning students to peer groups
can have large effects on their academic performance. In particular, academic tracking may
generate a substantially worse distribution of academic performance than random assign-
ment. However, caution should be exercised in using my results to judge holistically the
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relative merits of the two policies. Different assignment policies may entail transfers from
some groups of students to others and, as academic outputs are typically non-tradeable, it
may not be possible to Pareto rank different policies. Many non-measured student outcomes
may also be affected by different group assignment policies, including time use (Stinebrickner
and Stinebrickner, 2008) and attitudes toward diversity (Boisjoly, Duncan, Kremer, Levy,
and Eccles, 2006). For example, high-scoring students’ performance may be unaffected by
tracking because the rise in their peers’ academic proficiency induces them to substitute time
away from studying toward leisure. In future work I plan to study the long-term effects of
tracking versus random assignment on graduation rates, time-to-degree, and labor market
outcomes. These results will permit a more comprehensive evaluation of the relative merits
of the two group assignment policies.
Despite these concerns, my findings provide important evidence regarding the importance
of peer group assignment policies. I provide what appears to be the first clean evidence on
the effects of noninstructional tracking. This complements the small literature that cleanly
identifies the effect of instructional tracking. For example, Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2011)
find that although the total effect of instructional tracking is positive, there is suggestive
evidence that this combines a negative direct peer effect of tracking with a positive effect
due to changes in instructor behavior. My findings also suggest that policymakers can
change the distribution of students’ academic performance by rearranging the groups in
which these students interact while leaving the marginal distribution of inputs into the
education production function unchanged. This is attractive in any setting but particularly
in resource-constrained developing countries. While the external validity of any result is
always debatable, my findings may be particularly relevant to universities serving a diverse
student body that includes both high performing and academically underprepared students.
This is particularly relevant to selective universities with active affirmative action programs,
such as those studied in Bertrand, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2010).
The examination of peer effects under random assignment in sections 1.4 and 1.5 also
points to fruitful avenues for future research. These results show that peer effects estimated
under random assignment had limited ability to predict the effects of a change in assignment
policy and that peer effects do not operate only directly through spatial proximity but
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instead appear to be mediated by changes in students’ social networks. This highlights the
risk of relying too heavily on reduced form estimates that do not explicitly acknowledge
the behavioral content of peer effects. Research that combines peer effects estimated under
different peer group assignment policies with detailed data on social interactions and explicit
models of network formation may provide additional insights.
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Table 1.1: Baseline demographics and high school graduation test scores for dormitory and
non-dormitory students in the tracking and random assignment periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dormitory students Other students Second
Tracked Randomized Tracked Randomized difference
Panel A: High school graduation test scores
Mean score (standardized) .17 .20 .00 .00 -.03
(.04)
% “A” students .20 .21 .15 .18 .02
(.01)
% “D” students .10 .10 .12 .13 .01
(.01)
Panel B: Demographic characteristics
% female .50 .52 .52 .51 -.03
(.02)
% black .50 .52 .12 .12 -.02
(.01)
% white .35 .33 .52 .49 0
(.02)
% other races .13 .13 .34 .37 .03?
(.01)
% English-speaking .59 .56 .85 .86 .05???
(.01)
% international .23 .18 .11 .06 0
(.01)
Panel C: Year of high school graduation
% who graduated in an early enough .027 .033 .006
year to be eligible to enroll under tracking (.004)
% “A” students eligible for tracking .001 .003 .002
(.003)
% “D” students eligible for tracking .055 .048 -.007
(.016)
Panel D: Geographic location of high school
In Cape Town .116 .106 .770 .749 -.012
(.013)
% “A” students in Cape Town .112 .078 .811 .785 .008
(.028)
% “D” students in Cape Town .246 .228 .775 .762 .004
(.049)
Notes: This table shows that the change in students’ baseline characteristics between the random
assignment and tracking periods is approximately equal for for dormitory and non-dormitory stu-
dents. This is evidence that students are not strategically choosing whether to live in dormitories
and provides support for the assumptions of the research design. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses are estimated using White’s heteroscedasticity-robust covariance matrix. ???, ?? and ? denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 1.2: Estimates of the average treatment effect of tracking using a linear difference-in-
differences regression model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Full sample Restricted sample
Dependent variable GPA
Average treatment effect of -.129? -.107? -.111??? -.123???
tracking on the treated (.073) (.061) (.034) (.031)
Dormitory fixed effects × ×
Individual controls × ×
# dorm-year clusters 60 60 60 60
# dormitory students 7480 7480 6600 6600
# other students 7188 7188 6685 6685
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using a cluster-robust variance estimator
that allows unrestricted error correlation at the dormitory-year level, with non-dormitory students
treated as singleton clusters. ???, ?? and ? denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Restricted sample in columns (3) and (4) excludes observations with missing individual controls.
Columns (3) and (4) control for student gender, race, language, nationality, a cubic in high school
graduation test scores and all possible three-way interactions.
Table 1.3: Estimates of the average treatment effect of tracking for students in each quartile
of the high school graduation test score distribution using a linear difference-in-differences
regression model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample All students
Quartiles of high school graduation test scores
Fourth Third Second First
Dependent variable GPA
Average treatment effect of -.123??? -.224??? -.261??? -.157??? -.091?
tracking on the treated (.031) (.075) (.058) (.048) (.05)
Dormitory fixed effects × × × × ×
Individual controls × × × × ×
# dorm-year clusters 60 59 59 58 57
# dormitory students 6600 1298 1301 1475 1811
# other students 6685 1715 1663 1663 1460
F-test for equality of quartile effects
without controls 3.706??
with controls and fixed effects 1.85
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using a cluster-robust variance estimator
that allows unrestricted error correlation at the dormitory-year level, with non-dormitory students
treated as singleton clusters. ???, ?? and ? denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Observations with missing individual controls are excluded from the sample. All columns control
for student gender, race, language, nationality, a cubic in high school graduation test scores and
all possible three-way interactions.
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Table 1.4: Estimates of the average treatment effect of tracking for race and gender subgroups
using a linear difference-in-differences regression model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All students Female Male Black White Other races
Dependent variable GPA
All students Female Male Black White Other races
Average treatment effect of -.123??? -.116??? -.122?? -.232??? -.138??? .141??
tracking on the treated (.031) (.039) (.05) (.086) (.043) (.069)
Dormitory fixed effects × × × × × ×
Year fixed effects × × × × × ×
Individual controls × × × × × ×
# dorm-year clusters 60 36 42 60 58 59
# dormitory students 6600 3368 3232 3234 2428 845
# other students 6685 3459 3226 689 3484 2376
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using a cluster-robust variance estimator
that allows unrestricted error correlation at the dormitory-year level, with non-dormitory students
treated as singleton clusters. ???, ?? and ? denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Observations with missing individual controls are excluded from the sample. All columns control
for student gender, race, language, nationality, a cubic in high school graduation test scores and
all possible three-way interactions.
Table 1.5: Estimates of the average and inequality treatment effects of tracking using a non-
linear difference-in-differences model with and without reweighting to adjust for differences
in baseline student characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All students Restricted sample
Treated Counterfactual Difference Treated Counterfactual Difference
Mean .052 .182 -.131? .084 .178 -.095?
(.072) (.056)
Interdecile range 2.238 1.877 .361??? 2.185 1.910 .275???
(.106) (.102)
Interquartile range 1.023 .911 .112?? 1.016 .916 .100?
(.056) (.056)
Gini coefficient .097 .079 .018??? .094 .080 .014???
(.004) (.004)
Coefficient of variation 1.016 1.010 .006??? 1.015 1.010 .005???
(.001) (.001)
Individual controls × × ×
Dormitory fixed effects × × ×
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are estimated from 1000 bootstrap replications, stratifying
by tracking/random assignment period and by dormitory/ non-dormitory status, clustering at the
dormitory-year level, and treating non-dormitory students as singleton clusters. ???, ?? and ?
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Observations with missing individual
controls are excluded from the restricted sample. Columns (4), (5), and (6) use propensity score
reweighting to control for dormitory fixed effects and student gender, race, language, nationality,
a cubic in high school graduation test scores and all possible three-way interactions.
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Table 1.6: Transition probabilities for students from their rank in the distribution of high
school graduation test scores to their rank in the distribution of university GPA
Panel A: Tracking Panel B: Randomization
Quartiles of university GPA Quartiles of university GPA
4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1
Quartiles of 4 .37 .22 .13 .28 .39 .25 .15 .21
high school 3 .29 .25 .19 .27 .28 .23 .23 .26
graduation 2 .13 .18 .28 .41 .16 .19 .27 .39
test scores 1 .05 .04 .23 .68 .06 .08 .22 .63
Notes: Quartiles are defined on the full sample of all dormitory and non-dormitory students in
each period but transition probabilities are reported for dormitory students only.
Table 1.7: Treatment effects of tracking on students’ academic mobility, measured by the
probability of changing their rank in the distribution of high school graduation test scores
to their rank in the distribution of university GPA
Tracking Randomization Difference
Average probability of changing quartile .813 .830 -.017
(.021)
Average number of quartiles changed .921 .912 .009
(.038)
“Correlation” between high school and college quartile .547 .566 -.019
(.035)
Notes: Quartiles are defined on the full sample of all dormitory and non-dormitory students in
each period but transition probabilities are reported for dormitory students only. Standard errors
in parentheses are estimated from 1000 bootstrap replications, stratifying by tracking/random
assignment period and by dormitory/ non-dormitory status, clustering at the dormitory-year level,
and treating non-dormitory students as singleton clusters. ???, ?? and ? denote significance at 1%,
5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 1.8: Estimates of the effect of peers’ high school graduation test scores on students’
university GPAs using a linear-in-means model for peer effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Randomly assigned dormitory students
Dependent variable GPA
Own high school graduation .362??? .332??? .331??? .363??? .333??? .332???
test score (.017) (.016) (.016) (.017) (.016) (.016)
Mean dorm high school .241?? .222?? .22?? .35??? .336??? .216??
graduation test score (.089) (.092) (.098) (.075) (.067) (.099)
Demographic controls × × × ×
Dormitory fixed effects × ×
Excluding outlying low-SES dormitory × × ×
Adjusted R2 .213 .236 .248 .215 .239 .248
# observations 3068 3068 3068 3048 3048 3048
# clusters 30 30 30 28 28 28
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using a cluster-robust variance estimator
that allows unrestricted error correlation at the dormitory-year level, with non-dormitory students
treated as singleton clusters. ???, ?? and ? denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respec-
tively. Observations with missing high school graduation test scores are excluded from the sample.
Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) control for students’ gender language, nationality, and race.
Table 1.9: Estimates of the effect of peers’ high school graduation test scores on students’
university GPAs using a quadratic-in-means model for peer effects
Own high school graduation test score .4??? .374??? .373???
(.023) (.022) (.022)
Own high school graduation test score squared .137??? .143??? .142???
(.017) (.018) (.018)
Mean dorm high school graduation test score .221??? .174?? .316???
(.058) (.08) (.145)
Mean dorm high school graduation test score squared .306??? .273??? -.159
(.089) (.096) (.178)
Own × mean dorm high school graduation test score -.129?? -.132?? -.132??
(.063) (.06) (.06)
p-value of test against linear-in-means model 0 0 0
Demographic controls × ×
Dormitory controls ×
Dormitory fixed effects ×
Adjusted R2 .244 .272 .278
# observations 3068 3068 3068
# clusters 30 30 30
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using a cluster-robust variance estimator
that allows unrestricted error correlation at the dormitory-year level, with non-dormitory students
treated as singleton clusters. ???, ?? and ? denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respec-
tively. Observations with missing high school graduation test scores are excluded from the sample.
Columns (2) and (3) control for students’ gender language, nationality, and race. Column (2)
controls for dormitories’ time-invariant physical characteristics: proximity to the university’s main
academic campus, number of students, and whether students have single or shared rooms.
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Table 1.10: Estimates of the effect of peers’ high school graduation test scores on students’
university GPAs, separately for peers in the students’ own and different race groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Randomly assigned dorm students
Dependent variable GPA
Own high school (HS) graduation test score .362??? .331??? .327??? .327???
(.017) (.016) (.017) (.017)
Mean dorm HS graduation test score .241?? .22??
(.089) (.098)
Mean dorm HS graduation test score for own race group .204??? .159?
(.058) (.09)
Mean dorm HS graduation test score for other race groups -.003 -.051
(.054) (.066)
p-value for test of equal effects within and across races 0 .04
Demographic controls × ×
Dormitory fixed effects × ×
Adjusted R2 .213 .248 .22 .248
# observations 3068 3068 3068 3068
# clusters 30 30 30 30
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using a cluster-robust variance estimator
that allows unrestricted error correlation at the dormitory-year level, with non-dormitory students
treated as singleton clusters. ???, ?? and ? denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respec-
tively. Observations with missing high school graduation test scores are excluded from the sample.
Columns (2) and (4) control for students’ gender, language, nationality, and race.
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Table 1.11: Estimates of the effect of peers’ high school graduation test scores on stu-
dents’ university GPAs, separately for peers in the students’ own and different col-
lege/faculty/school (e.g. commerce, engineering, social science)
(1) (2) (3)
Sample Randomly assigned dorm students
Dependent variable GPA
Own high school graduation test score .345??? .298??? .307???
(.019) (.017) (.016)
Mean dorm high school graduation test score for own faculty .049 .105?? .066
(.047) (.044) (.062)
Mean dorm high school graduation test score for other faculties .152? .171?? .151
(.072) (.062) (.073)
p-value for test of equal effects within and across faculties .171 .342 .409
Demographic controls × ×
Dormitory fixed effects × ×
Faculty fixed effects ×
Adjusted R2 .202 .239 .251
# observations 3068 3068 3068
# clusters 30 30 30
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using a cluster-robust variance estimator
that allows unrestricted error correlation at the dormitory-year level, with non-dormitory students
treated as singleton clusters. ???, ?? and ? denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respec-
tively. Observations with missing high school graduation test scores are excluded from the sample.
Columns (2) and (3) control for students’ gender, language, nationality, and race.
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Table 1.12: Average treatment effects of tracking on different measures of university academic
performance estimated using a linear difference-in-differences regression model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All Restricted All Restricted All Restricted
Dependent variable
Mean GPA from courses Prop. of courses
GPA where students are not where students are
academically excluded academically excluded
Average treatment effect of -.129? -.123??? -.076 -.068?? .028??? .027???
tracking on the treated (.073) (.031) (.089) (.033) (.006) (.005)
Dep var mean .05 .049
Dormitory fixed effects × × ×
Year fixed effects × × ×
Individual controls × × ×
# dorm-year clusters 60 60 60 60 60 60
# dormitory students 7480 6600 7449 6576 7480 6600
# other students 7188 6685 7043 6559 7188 6685
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using a cluster-robust variance estimator
that allows unrestricted error correlation at the dormitory-year level, with non-dormitory students
treated as singleton clusters. ???, ?? and ? denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Observations with missing individual controls are excluded from the sample. Columns (2), (4), and
(6) control for student gender, race, language, nationality, a cubic in high school graduation test
scores and all possible three-way interactions. Columns (1) and (2) calculate students’ GPA using
all courses for which they register and assigning zero grades if they are academically excluded from
the course. Columns (3) and (4) calculate students’ GPA using only courses from which they are
not excluded. Columns (5) and (6) measure the percentage of courses from which students were
excluded.
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Figure 1.1: Difference between tracking and randomization periods in the mean high school
graduation test scores of students’ dormitory peer groups for students at each percentile of
the high school graduation test score distribution.
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Notes: This figure quantifies the change in students’ mean peer group academic proficiency, mea-
sured by their high school graduation test scores. It shows that low-scoring students have sig-
nificantly lower-scoring dormitory peers in the tracking period (≈ 0.5 standard deviations in the
lowest decile) and high-scoring students have significantly higher-scoring dormitory peers (≈ 0.4
standard deviations in the top decile). The figure is constructed in four steps. First, I calculate
the mean high school graduation test score in each dormitory and assign this to each student as
a measure of their peers’ academic proficiency. Second, I estimate a nonparametric regression of
this peer group measure against students’ own high school graduation test scores, separately for
the tracking and random assignment periods. I use a local linear regression with an Epanechnikov
kernel and a plug-in bandwidth following Fan and Gijbels (1996). I allow the bandwidth to differ
for the tracking and random assignment periods. Third, I calculate the difference between the two
fitted curves at each percentile of the distribution of high school graduation test scores. Finally, I
construct a 95% confidence interval from the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of a nonparametric bootstrap,
stratifying by tracking/random assignment period.
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of dormitory-by-year means and standard deviations of
high school graduation test scores. The tracking policy increases the observed range of mean dor-
mitory test scores to (-0.2,0.6) from (-0.8,1.2) under the random assignment policy. This provides
a measure of the redistribution of peer groups induced by the policy change. The four outliers in
the left tail are the four annual observations of a single dormitory with a different assignment rule
that typically houses only students from low-income families. It accounts for ≈ 1.4% of the sample
and all results are robust to its exclusion.
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Figure 1.3: Cumulative distribution function of high school graduation test scores for dor-
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Dorm students, tracking Non−dorm students, tracking
Dorm students, randomization Non−dorm students, randomization
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of standardized high school graduation test scores. The
long left tail increases the within-dormitory variation of this measure in low-track dormitories.
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Figure 1.4: Average treatment effects of tracking for students at each percentile of the
distribution of high school graduation test scores

















Average treatment effect of tracking
Notes: Point estimates are obtained by estimating a local linear regression of GPA on high school
graduation test scores, separately for dormitory students in the tracking period, dormitory stu-
dents in the random assignment period, non-dormitory students in the tracking period, and non-
dormitory students in the random assignment period; I then take the second difference between
these estimates to obtain local difference-in-differences estimates. The local linear regressions use
Epanechnikov kernels and plug-in bandwidths chosen separately for each of the four nonparamet-
ric regressions following Fan and Gijbels (1996). The results are qualitatively robust to substan-
tial changes in the bandwidth parameter. Confidence intervals are estimated using a percentile
bootstrap with 1000 replications replications, stratifying by tracking/random assignment period
and by dormitory/non-dormitory status, clustering at the dormitory-year level, and treating non-
dormitory students as singleton clusters. Observations with missing high school graduation test
scores are excluded from the sample.
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Figure 1.5: Nonlinear difference-in-differences analysis, comparing the observed distribution
of GPA for tracked dormitory students to the counterfactual distribution that the same
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GPA
Treated: tracked dormitory students
Counterfactual: trend−corrected randomized dormitory students
Notes: The counterfactual cumulative distribution function is estimated using the nonlinear
difference-in-differences model discussed in appendix 1.B, without adjusting for differences in the
distribution of baseline covariates between the tracking and randomization periods.
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Figure 1.6: Nonlinear difference-in-differences analysis, which uses the observed and counter-
factual distributions of GPA for tracked dormitory students to estimate quantile treatment
effects of tracking
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Notes: The counterfactual distribution of GPAs is estimated using the nonlinear difference-in-
differences model discussed in appendix 1.B. Panel B adjusts for differences in the distribution of
observed student characteristics between the tracking and randomization periods using reweighting.
The reweighting model includes gender, language, nationality, race, a cubic in high school gradu-
ation test scores, all possible three-way interactions, and dormitory fixed effects. The confidence
intervals are estimated from 1000 replications of a percentile bootstrap, clustering at the dormitory-
year level and stratifying by tracking/randomization period and dormitory/non-dormitory group.
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Figure 1.7: Density of selected summary statistics for high school graduation test scores
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Notes: These comparative densities show that there are values of the dormitory-level summary
statistics that are observed under tracking but not under random assignment, such as mean high
school graduation test scores below -0.2 and above 0.6. This emphasizes the extent to which using
peer effects estimated under random assignment to predict the effects of tracking requires out-of-
sample extrapolation. The density plots are deliberately oversmoothed (i.e. artificially high values
of the bandwidth are used) to focus attention on the range.
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1.A Robustness Checks
1.A.1 Changes in course taking behavior
The body of the paper treated GPAs during the tracking and random assignment periods as
comparable measures, an assumption that may be problematic if the mix of courses taken is
different during the two periods and grading standards vary across courses. I perform three
robustness checks to show that the average treatment effects discussed in section 1.3 are
not driven by changes in the mix of courses. In all of these checks, I continue to condition
on observed student characteristics and dormitory fixed effects as in the body of the paper.
First, column 2 of table 1.13 shows that the estimated treatment effect is largely unaffected
by the inclusion of college/faculty/school fixed effects. Second, columns 3 to 8 report treat-
ment effects estimated separately for each of the university’s six colleges/faculties/schools:
commerce, engineering, law, medicine, science, and social science and humanities. The point
estimates are all negative, four of the six are significantly different to zero, and only one is
significantly different to the overall treatment effect. The one exception is the law faculty,
which is sufficiently small that the extremely large and imprecisely estimated negative point
estimate should be treated with caution. Third, table 1.14 estimates treatment effects within
the six largest introductory courses at the university: economics, information systems, man-
agement, physics for engineers, sociology, and statistics. All treatment effects are negative,
four of the six are significantly different to zero, and none of the six are significantly different
to the overall treatment effect. These results show that the treatment effect is not driven by
changes in course selections but instead occurs within individual courses.
1.A.2 Instrumental variables estimates based on admission rules
The identification strategy in the bulk of the paper can be characterized as a selection
on observed variables strategy. I claim that after conditioning on students’ demographic
characteristics and high school graduation test scores, the change in GPAs between the
tracking and random assignment periods would be identical for dormitory and non-dormitory
students if tracking were not in place. If students choose whether to live in dormitories or
in private accommodation or if students choose whether to attend the university during
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the tracking or random assignment period in order to maximize their expected GPA, this
assumption may be violated.
I argue in section 1.2 that such selection on unobserved characteristics is implausible,
given the limited information available to prospective students about the dormitory allo-
cation policies and the rules that determine which students are admitted to the dormitory
system. In this appendix, I explicitly use these admission rules to construct instrumen-
tal variables that exogenously affect the probability that students will be in each of the
four groups in my analysis (dormitory and non-dormitory students, during the tracking and
random assignment periods).
Specifically, I use the year of high school graduation as an instrument for the period that
students enter the university: the instrument takes the value one for students who graduated
in 2004 or earlier and the tracking indicator equals one for students who enrolled in the uni-
versity in 2005 or earlier.34 I use the location of each student’s high school as an instrument
for whether the student enters the dormitory system: the instrument takes the value one
for students who attended a high school outside Cape Town and the dormitory indicator
equals one for students living in a dormitory. I use the interaction of these instruments as an
instrument for the treatment indicator, which equals the interaction of dormitory and the
tracking indicators.
The instruments are strongly correlated with the group indicators: the first stage coeffi-
cients for the tracking instrument, dormitory instrument, and interaction are 0.927 (standard
error 0.006), 0.647 (0.014), and 0.706 (0.031) respectively. The exclusion restriction for the
instrumental variables difference-in-differences model is that any direct effect of the year of
high school graduation on GPA (i.e. any effect not operating through the dormitory assign-
ment policy) is identical for dormitory and non-dormitory students and that any direct effect
of whether the student attended a high school inside or outside Cape Town does not change
from the tracking to the mixing period. This restriction does not rule out time trends in stu-
dent characteristics or differences in school quality but requires that these are, respectively,
equal for high schools inside and outside Cape Town and unchanging through time.
34South Africa uses a January to December school year, so this means that students who graduate in
December 2004 or earlier are defined as eligible for the tracking period, which included the academic year
starting in January 2005.
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Table 1.15 shows that the instrumented treatment effects are similar to those estimated
without the instrumental variables correction. They are, however, relatively imprecisely
estimated. This may in part reflect a limitation in the “high school in or outside Cape
Town” instrument. Students are admitted to the dormitory system based on their home
address and the address of the high school that they attend is an imperfect proxy, as some
students attend schools far from their home and live in school hostels or dormitories.35 This
means that the instrument suffers from non-classical measurement error. Simulation results
suggest that measurement error-induced bias increases the absolute value of the estimated
local average treatment effect.
Given this concern, caution should be exercised in interpreting the instrumental variables
estimates. They provide reassuring evidence that the treatment effects reported in the body
of the paper are not driven by selection on unobserved variables but should not be viewed
as a definitive refutation of this possibility. Appendix 1.A.4 therefore develops a further
sensitivity analysis that demonstrates the robustness of the least squares treatment estimates
to at least some forms of selection on unobserved variables.
1.A.3 Time trends in student characteristics
The identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences model will be violated if the trends
in dormitory and non-dormitory students’ outcomes differed for reasons unrelated to the
policy change. I use a simple placebo test to explore this possibility. Specifically, I compare
the change in dormitory students’ mean GPA from 2001–2002 to 2004–2005 to the change
in non-dormitory students’ GPA over the same time period.36 The tracking policy was in
place during this entire period, so under the identifying assumption this estimate should
be approximately zero. The first column of table 1.16 shows that the difference in these
pre-treatment trends was -0.04 standard deviations of GPA (standard error 0.04). This
estimate is insignificant and considerably smaller than the treatment effect using the actual
experiment. This supports the plausibility of the identifying assumption. The second column
35I do not observe the home address for the majority of students and so cannot use this information
directly.
36I omit 2003 from the analysis because a database problem at the University of Cape Town resulted in
over half the observations in 2003 being assigned non-unique identifiers.
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performs the same test for students’ mean high school graduation test scores. This point
estimate is also small and insignificant (-0.02, standard error 0.04), suggesting that the pre-
treatment trends in the characteristics of students entering the university were also equal
and again supporting the plausibility of the identifying assumption.37
1.A.4 Sensitivity analysis for potential violations of the identifying assumptions
The difference-in-differences model used in the bulk of the paper yields consistent estimators
of the average treatment effects of tracking on the treated under specific assumptions. In par-
ticular, the linear model assumes that the mean change in dormitory students’ unobserved
characteristics between the two periods was equal to the mean change in non-dormitory
students’ unobserved characteristics. This assumption is fundamentally untestable but the
discussion and data presented in section 1.2 suggest that it is reasonable in this context.
Furthermore, the fact that the estimated treatment effects are highly robust to controls for
observed student characteristics suggest that there are no substantial differences in unob-
served characteristics that are correlated with the observed characteristics.
However, there may still be concerns that there exist some unobserved characteristics
that satisfy three conditions: they are correlated with GPA, their distribution violates the
“equal trends” assumption above, and they are weakly correlated or uncorrelated with the
observed characteristics. Here I propose a simple model of this form of selection and show
what it implies for the estimated value of the treatment effect. Consider the possibility that
GPAs are generated by the model
GPA = δ11DT + δ10D(1− T ) + δ01(1−D)T + δ00(1−D)(1− T ) + Zγ + ε
≡ δG+ Zγ + ε
(1.9)
where GPAn×1 is a vector of outcomes, Gn×4 is a matrix indicating group membership
(dormitory in tracking period, dormitory in random assignment period, non-dormitory in
37I do not have access to dormitory assignment records for 2001 and 2002. The placebo test results are
therefore intention-to-treat estimates using high school location in the regression instead of dormitory/non-
dormitory status. This also means that I cannot define the dormitory-by-year clusters I would normally use
in the variance estimation. I therefore report heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in column (1), which
produce an artifically tight confidence interval. As I find an insignificant and imprecisely estimated effect,
this should not be a source of concern.
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tracking period, non-dormitory in random assignment period), Z is an unobserved student
characteristic, and εn×1 is a mean-zero error term uncorrelated with GPA, G, and Z. To
reduce the dimension of the problem, I assume that Z ∈ {−1, 1} with E[Z] = 0, E[Z|D =
0, T = 1] = E[Z|D = 0, T = 0] = 0,38 and E[Z|D = 1, T = 1] = ρ = −E[Z|D = 1, T = 0].
Substantively, I interpret Z as “academic orientation,” and consider two possible forms of
selection:
• Students with high academic orientation (Z = 1) prefer to live in dormitories under
tracking than under random assignment because this exposes them to similar peers
who are also focused on academic performance, so ρ > 0.
• Students with low academic orientation (Z = −1) prefer to live in dormitories under
tracking than under random assignment because this exposes them to similar peers
who are also more interested in social and leisure activities, so ρ < 0.
This might arise because the set of students who apply to the university differs in their
values of Z between the two periods, not necessarily because the same students are being
redistributed between the two periods.
















where µdt and σ
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dt are the mean and variance respectively of the indicator variable 1{D =
d, T = t}. The difference-in-differences test statistic is therefore









38The assumption that the distribution of Z is identical for non-dormitory students across the two periods
simplifies the resultant algebra but can be relaxed without altering the conclusions.
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The test statistic is upward biased when academically orientated students are more common
in the tracking period (ρ > 0) and downward biased when they are less common (ρ < 0).
Furthermore, the means and variances can be replaced by sample analogues and a “bias-
corrected” estimator39









can be constructed for any hypothesized values of ρ and γ.
I use the observed covariates to calibrate plausible values for these parameters. In par-
ticular, I note that if the observed binary characteristics in table 1.1 are transformed so
that X ∈ {−1, 1}, the largest value of |ρ| is 0.095 (for language). Similarly, the value of γ
can be chosen to match the strength of the association between GPA and selected student
demographic characteristics. For example, the value of γ implied by the difference between
black and white GPAs is 0.23.
Figure 1.8 plots the value of the bias-corrected treatment effect for selected values of
γ and for all −0.2 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.2. The top panel shows that if the unobserved characteristic
differs between the tracking and random assignment periods as much as the “most different”
observed characteristic (language) and is “as important” a determinant of GPA as race,
the bias-corrected treatment effect is approximately -0.07 standard deviations (if academi-
cally orientated students select out of tracking) or -0.17 standard deviations (if academically
orientated students select into tracking).40
The second panel repeats the same analysis under the assumption that the true GPA
model is GPA = δG + Xβ + Zγ + ε, the misspecified model is GPA = δG + Xβ + ε, and
E[Z|X] = 0. The last assumption is not necessary but it again simplifies the algebra and
corresponds to the “worst-case” selection problem, as the bias arising from an unobserved
Z that is correlated with X will be reduced by controlling for X. I include in X students’
gender, language, nationality, and race, a cubic in high school graduation test scores, all
possible threeway interactions and dormitory fixed effects.41 Conditioning on X marginally
39This estimator is actually still biased for τ because µ̂dt/σ̂
2
dt is a consistent but biased estimator of
µdt/σ
2
dt. The bias arising from the nonlinearity of the statistic can be reduced using a higher order Taylor
series approximation. This correction makes no difference to my results so I omit it for expositional clarity.
40Inference on these point estimates should be performed with a degree of caution, as the omission of Z
from the GPA model will also inflate the estimated standard errors of the coefficients.
41The previous bias calculation can be readily extended to control for X using standard partitioned
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attenuates the bias–corrected treatment effects but the difference is negligible, which is
consistent with the limited impact on the treatment effect of controling for individual and
dormitory characteristics throughout the paper.
This analysis suggests that an implausibly large degree of selection on unobserved char-
acteristics is necessary to explain the estimated treatment effect. This, combined with the
results of the previous appendix, strongly suggests that the treatment effect is not driven by
violations of the identifying assumptions laid out in section 1.2.
1.A.5 Bootstrap-based test procedures
My data is characterized by a natural group structure, as is almost inevitable in any study
of peer effects. Dormitory students live together and there may be concerns that the er-
ror terms are correlated within these buildings. The main body of the paper addresses
this problem using a “cluster-robust variance estimator” that generalizes the Eicker-White
heteroscedaticity-robust variance estimator. This estimator has the desirable feature of im-
posing no structure on the nature of the error correlations within dormitory-year clusters42
but it converges with the square of the number of clusters, rather than the number of stu-
dents. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) note that this may lead to tests with sizes
far lower than their nominal rates when the number of clusters is small. Cameron, Miller,
and Gelbach (2008) discuss several remedies for this problem and particularly recommend
tests based on either cluster or wild cluster bootstraps applied to pivotal statistics.43
Table 1.17 repeats the analyses in table 1.2, but implements the test that each treatment
effect equals zero using four different strategies: the default cluster-robust variance estima-
tor, a cluster bootstrap estimate of the treatment effect’s standard error, a cluster bootstrap
regression results. The only substantive change is that γ is now interpreted as the relationship between
GPA and Z conditional on X and τ̂ is obtained from a regression of MX(GPA) on MXG, where MX =
I −X(X ′X)−1X ′.
42In contrast, both random effects estimators and Moulton-style corrections to ordinary least squares
estimators assume that the group and individual components of the error structure are additively separable.
My inferences are robust to using both of these estimators but, as there is no theory-driven reason to assume
additive separability, I do not report these results.
43Pivotal statistics are those whose asymptotic distribution does not depend on unknown parameters.
This includes most conventional test statistics, as test statistics for single and multiple hypotheses are
asymptotically N (0, 1) and χ2(k) respectively under standard assumptions. However, this excludes most
parameter and standard error estimators, as these are centered around their true but unknown values.
59
approximation of the distribution of the test statistic, and a wild cluster bootstrap approxi-
mation of the distribution of the test statistic.44 Panel A shows that the p-values on the test
of zero treatment effect are highly robust across different testing procedures. In most cases,
the models that do not control for covariates generate estimates that are marginally signifi-
cant (0.014 ≤ p ≤ 0.187), while those that control for covariates generate highly significant
estimates (0 ≤ p ≤ 0.007). Given this robustness, the use of analytical standard errors as
a default is relatively innocuous. Furthermore, the third and fourth testing strategies apply
only to test statistics and do not yield valid standard error estimates, limiting the ability of
the reader to perform tests other than those reported by the author or to mentally construct
confidence intervals.
Panel B of table 1.17 reports the results of implenting the same procedures but allowing
for error correlation at the dormitory level, rather than dormitory-year level. Bertrand, Duflo,
and Mullainathan (2004) recommend this approach for most difference-in-differences designs
that rely on repeated cross-sections as cluster-specific shocks may persist through time. This
concern is arguably less relevant in my application because my sample consists of only first
year students, so no student appears in the sample in multiple years. This consideration is
relevant only to the extent that a shock affecting first year students in dormitory d in year t
continues to affect these students in year t+ 1 and hence affects the new cohort of first year
students in dormitory d. My inferences are again robust to this more conservative inference
procedure: the models that control for covariates still yield highly significant estimates.
1.B Reweighted Nonlinear Difference-in-differences Model
Given the limited use of the Athey-Imbens nonlinear difference-in-differences model in the
applied literature, this appendix provides an overview of the model and the reweighting
extension that I propose.
Begin by defining T as an indicator variable equal to one in the tracking period and zero
in the mixing period and D as an indicator variable equal to one for dormitory students and
44See Cameron, Miller, and Gelbach (2008) for details on the implementation of these various procedures. I
use 1000 replications of a stratified cluster bootstrap that resamples dormitory-year clusters (with probability
proportional to size) and individual non-dormitory students after stratifying by period. I implement the
bootstrap t-statistic procedures with the relevant null hypothesis imposed.
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zero for other students. Formally, the model is identified under three assumptions:
(A1) GPA in the absence of tracking is strictly continuous and generated by the model
GPA = h(U, T ), which is monotone in the unobserved scalar U . Note that the function
h need not be known and that GPA does not directly depend on D.
(A2) The distribution of the unobserved characteristic remains constant through time for
each group, in this case dormitory and non-dormitory students: U ⊥ T |D.
(A3) The support of dormitory students’ GPAs is contained in the support of non-dormitory
students’ GPAs: supp(GPA|D = 1) ⊆ supp(GPA|D = 0).
These assumptions are sufficient to identify the counterfactual distribution of dormitory
students’ GPAs in the tracking period in the absence of tracking, denoted by FCFGPA|D=1,T=1 (·).
These are the outcomes that the treatment group would have experienced in the treatment
period if treatment had not been applied. I follow Athey and Imbens in assuming that
the distribution of GPA is strictly continuous and has no mass points, so the cumulative
distribution function is invertible.45
To understand the identification proof, begin by considering the observed distribution
of dormitory students’ GPAs in the random assignment period, FGPA|D=1,T=0 (·). Under
assumption A1, GPA can be written as g = h(U, T ) and so depends only on the unobservable
U and the time period. Under assumption A2, the distribution of U does not change through
time, so the difference between FCFGPA|D=1,T=1 (·) and FGPA|D=1,T=0 (·) is due entirely to the
change from T = 0 to T = 1 in h. If h were known, it would be straightforward to evaluate
this change. However, the function is unknown and so an indirect argument must be used
to construct a mapping from g = h(u, 0) to g̃ = h(u, 1) for each possible realization u of U .
1. Let A and B denote two students in the random assignment period with GPA g and
assume that A is a dormitory student and B is a non-dormitory student. As h does not
depend directly on whether students live in a dormitory or not, A and B must have
the same value of the unobservable u. The common support assumption A3 ensures
45The GPA measure I use is approximately continuous. There are 5215 unique values of GPA, so each
value accounts for an average of 0.02% of the total mass. The most common value accounts for only 0.26%
of the total mass.
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that every dormitory student in the mixing period has an appropriate comparison
non-dormitory student with the same GPA.
2. Let q = FGPA|D=0,T=0(g) denote B’s location in the distribution of non-dormitory
students in the random assignment period and let C be a non-dormitory student in
the tracking period with the same location q in her distribution FGPA|D=0,T=1(·). As h
is monotone in u and the distribution of U does not change through time, B and C’s
equal locations imply that they have the same value of the unobservable u. Their GPAs






3. In the absence of tracking, the same analysis could have been applied to dormitory
students. Hence, a dormitory student in the tracking period with U = u would have a






. Denote this student
by D.
4. As A and D, the two dormitory students in different periods, have the same values of
the unobservable, they would have the same locations in their respective distributions,
so FCFGPA|D=1,T=1 (g̃) = FGPA|D=1,T=0 (g).
Combining the results in the third and fourth list entries yields the counterfactual distribution
of GPAs for dormitory students in the tracking period:







The quantile treatment effect on the treated at quantile q is defined as the horizontal distance
between the observed and counterfactual distributions:
∆(q) = F−1GPA|D=1,T=1 (q)− F
CF,−1
GPA|D=1,T=1 (q) (1.13)
Intuitively, the first assumption A1 imposes sufficient structure on the data generating pro-
cess to allow us to compare students’ GPAs across groups and their locations in the GPA
distribution through time. The second assumption ensures that changes through time in the
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GPA distribution are due to time changes, which are common to both groups, not changes
in the distribution of unobserved characteristics.
Note that the model imposes structure only on the data generating process for GPA
in the absence of treatment (tracking) and remains agnostic regarding the data generating
process for GPA under tracking. This identifies the counterfactual distribution of GPAs
for dormitory students under tracking if tracking had not been implemented but provides
no information about the counterfactual distribution of GPAs for non-dormitory students if
they had been exposed to tracking. The model therefore identifies the treatment effect on
the treated, in the framework of Heckman and Robb (1985).46
The original paper only briefly considers the role of observed student characteristics
and suggests two somewhat ad hoc means of controling for these characteristics. The first
suggestion is to implement the model separately for specific values of the covariates (for
example, for male and female students). However, this is clearly infeasible with many discrete
covariates or with continuous covariates. The second suggestion is to “residualize” GPA
by regressing it on the covariates and then applying the model to the residuals from this
regression. However, this residualization scheme has a number of disadvantages. It assumes
that the observed and unobserved characteristics are additively separable in the production
function (i.e. GPA = Xβ + ε), which undermines the nonparametric spirit of the entire
model. Any misspecification of the functional form of X will result in inconsistent estimates
of β and hence ε̂ may not converge in distribution to F (ε).
I instead use a reweighting scheme that avoids the assumption of additive separability
and may be more robust to specification errors. Specifically, I define the reweighted coun-
terfactual distribution as






46Athey and Imbens also consider a “quantile difference-in-differences” model that computes second differ-





F−1GPA|D=0,T=0(q). This is perhaps a more intuitive approach but it requires the stronger assumption that
the distribution of the unobservables is identical for both groups in both time periods. This stronger assump-
tion permits a direct comparison of GPAs through time and across groups, rather than using the location
comparison through time. This stronger assumption is clearly inappropriate in my application (see table
1.1) but my results are robust to using this alternative model.
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where FGPAd0ω (·) is the distribution function of GPA× Pr(T = 1|D = d,X)/Pr(T = 0|D =
d,X). Intuitively, this scheme assigns high weight to students in the random assignment
period whose observed characteristics are similar to those in the tracking period. This is
a straightforward extension of the reweighting techniques used in the wage decomposition
literature (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemiuex, 1996) and the program evaluation literature (Hi-
rano, Imbens, and Ridder, 2003). Firpo (2007) lays out the technical assumptions under
which the reweighted distribution is consistently estimated by the predicted probabilities
from a series logistic regression of T on X. Under these assumptions
τ̂QTT (q) = F̂−1GPA11(q)− F̂
−1,RW,CF
GPA11 (q) (1.15)
is a consistent estimator of the quantile treatment effect on the treated in the reweighted
nonlinear difference-in-differences model.
An important assumption invoked for consistency of this reweighted estimator is that the
propensity score Pr(T = 1|D = d,X) is consistently estimated. Firpo (2007) proposes doing
so using a semiparametric logistic model in which T is regressed on a polynomial function of
X whose order satisfies certain regularity conditions. Selecting the order of the polynomial
is a difficult process and the literature provides relatively little guidance. In practice, I use
polynomial orders from 1 to 4, and the choice of this tuning parameter makes little difference
to my results.
I implement the estimator in three steps:
1. I regress an indicator for the tracking period on a flexible logistic function of X, sep-
arately for each group, and use the predicted probabilities from that regression to
construct P̂ r(T = 1|D = d,X) for each student.
2. For each half-percentile of the distribution of GPAs (i.e. quantiles 0.5 to 99.5), I
implement equation (1.14) to construct the reweighted counterfactual distribution of
GPAs in the absence of tracking.
3. I then replicate this process 1000 times on bootstrap resamples of the data, clustering at
the dormitory-year level and stratifying by group and period, to construct percentile
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bootstrap confidence intervals for the estimated treatment effect at each of the 199
quantiles from step 2.
The Stata code for implementing this estimator is available on request. Note that I do
not attempt to estimate the counterfactual minimum and maximum, as inference on these










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.14: Estimates of the average treatment effect of tracking within the six largest
entry-level classes using a linear difference-in-differences regression model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample
Economics Information Management Physics Sociology Statistics
systems
Dependent variable GPA (with zeros for excluded credits)
ATT of tracking -.149??? -.146?? -.184??? -.263??? -.099 -.065
(.045) (.071) (.062) (.09) (.092) (.051)
Dormitory fixed effects × × × × × ×
Individual controls × × × × × ×
# dorm-year clusters 59 56 60 59 55 60
# dormitory students 2160 1174 1322 822 547 1801
# other students 2094 1228 1296 574 969 1978
Notes: These results show that the negative treatment effect of tracking on student GPAs is
present within each of the first year entry-level classes. This suggests that the treatment effect
cannot be explained by changes in course-taking behavior. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the dormitory-year level, with non-dormitory students treated as singleton clusters.
???, ?? and ? denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Observations with
missing individual controls are excluded from the sample. All columns control for student gender,
language, nationality, race, a cubic in high school graduation test scores and all possible three-way
interactions.
Table 1.15: Instrumental variables estimates of the average treatment effect of tracking using
a linear difference-in-differences model, instrumenting the year of college admission with the
year of high school graduation and dormitory/non-dormitory status with an indicator for
whether the student attended a high school in Cape Town
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All students Non-missing geocodes
Dependent variable GPA
Estimator OLS OLS ITT 2SLS
Avg treatment effect -.129 -.114 -.104? -.144?
(.073) (.074) (.059) (.077)
# dorm-year clusters 60 60 60 60
# dormitory students 7480 6187 6187 6187
# other students 7188 6110 6110 6110
Notes: These results show that the negative treatment effect of tracking on student GPAs is robust
to instrumenting for whether each student lives in a dormitory or not and the time period in which
they attend the university. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the dormitory-year
level, with non-dormitory students treated as singleton clusters. ???, ?? and ? denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Observations with missing high school geocodes are
excluded from columns (2) to (4).
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Table 1.16: Placebo difference-in-differences tests for differences in the pre-treatment trends
for dormitory and non-dormitory students
(1) (2)
Sample All students Restricted sample




Placebo average treatment effect -.041 -.023
of tracking on the treatment (.038) (.041)
# dormitory students 6677 5457
# other students 4908 4873
Notes: These results show that the time trends in student GPA and high school graduation test
scores are equal for dormitory and non-dormitory students in the pre-treatment period (2001 and
2002 vs 2004 and 2005). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the dormitory-year level,
with non-dormitory students treated as singleton clusters. ???, ?? and ? denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Observations with missing individual controls or with missing
high school geocodes are excluded from columns (2) to (4).
Table 1.17: Estimated p−values for the test that the average treatment effect of tracking is
zero using alternative test procedures in a linear difference-in-differences regression model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Full sample Restricted sample
Dependent variable GPA
ATT of tracking -.129 -.107 -.113 -.123
Dormitory fixed effects × ×
Year fixed effects × ×
Individual controls × ×
Panel A: p-values for test of zero treatment effect, dormitory-year clusters
cluster-robust variance estimator .077 .078 .001 0
cluster bootstrap variance estimator .079 .187 .001 .001
cluster bootstrap t-statistic .014 .062 0 0
wild cluster bootstrap t-statistic .143 .09 .005 .007
Panel B: p-values for test of zero treatment effect, dormitory clusters
cluster-robust variance estimator .146 .254 .001 .001
cluster bootstrap variance estimator .155 .27 .001 .001
cluster bootstrap t-statistic .098 .191 0 .001
wild cluster bootstrap t-statistic .266 .363 .014 .012
Notes: These results show that the significance of the negative average treatment effect of tracking
is robust to alternative test procedures. ???, ?? and ? denote significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels respectively. Observations with missing individual controls are excluded from columns
(3) and (4), which control for student gender, language, nationality, race, a cubic in high school
graduation test scores and all possible three-way interactions.
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Figure 1.8: “Bias-corrected” estimates of the average treatment effect of tracking from a
linear difference-in-differences regression model with different assumptions about the rela-
tionship between an unobserved scalar and GPA and the time trend in the unobserved
variable
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Notes: This figure explores how sensitive the results are to alternative assumptions about poten-
tial differences in unobserved student characteristics between the tracking and random assignment
periods. The horizontal axis ρ shows “how much” a hypothesized unobserved characteristic differs
between the two periods. The vertical lines provide a benchmark by showing the maximum differ-
ence between the two periods for any observed characteristic (which is language, as shown in table
1.1.) The γ parameter measures the strength of the relationship between GPA and the hypoth-
esized unobserved characteristic. For example, the solid line indicates the value of γ associated
with gender. The figure implies that to entirely explain the observed treatment effect, there would
need to be an unobserved student characteristic whose mean changes “as much” from the tracking




How Price Sensitive is School Enrollment? Evidence from Nation-
wide School Fee Reforms in South Africa
2.1 Introduction
Increasing participation in formal schooling is an important thrust of public policy through-
out the developing world. The United Nations’ Millenium Development Goals aim to ensure
that every child can complete primary education. A wide range of countries have eliminated
school fees1 or given cash grants to households whose school-aged children meet minimum
enrollment, attendance or performance thresholds. This policy emphasis is consistent with
economic research showing that additional years of schooling increase average individual
earnings (Card, 1999; Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, 2006). In particular, some public poli-
cies that increase or restrict access to formal schooling in middle income countries have
been shown to affect the labor market outcomes of affected individuals (Duflo, 2001; Ozier,
2011). Other studies document that more educated individuals in low income countries adopt
new agricultural and health technology faster (Besley and Case, 1993; Dupas, 2013) and have
healthier and better educated children (Behrman, Foster, Rosenzweig, and Vashishtha, 1999;
Glewwe, 1999). A complementary macroeconomic literature shows a positive association be-
tween average years of education and economic growth (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil, 1992). These associations need not all reflect causal relationships but they
provide strong suggestive evidence that increased participation in formal schooling improves
average economic outcomes.
1I use the term “school fees” to encompass all mandatory direct payments from households to schools.
These may be known as “enrollment fees” or “tuition fees” in different settings. School fees have historically
been common in developing country public schools, particularly in the Commonwealth of Nations.
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Policymakers have pursued a range of interventions in order to increase participation in
formal schooling: “demand-side” interventions include school fee elimination or reduction,
conditional cash transfers, and merit scholarships; and “supply-side” interventions include
school construction or upgrading, class size reduction, and changes in education technology.
The effects of some of these policies on school participation have been thoroughly studied.
For example, Fizbein and Schady (2009) review the evidence on conditional cash transfers.
They report generally modest effects on school participation that vary substantially with
the magnitude and design of the transfers, the characteristics of the target population, and
the characteristics of the schooling system. Other interventions have been subject to less
detailed study. In particular, very few studies have examined school fee elimination. The
effect of this intervention on school participation is a relatively open question.
More than ten African countries have eliminated school fees in all or some primary schools
during the past two decades. Several countries are actively considering extending this policy
to secondary schools. These interventions may have substantial effects on the education
outcomes of school-age youths. Some enrolled youths may be induced to continue their
formal education for longer than they otherwise would. Some unenrolled youths may start
formal education or return after a period of nonenrollment. The households of inframarginal
youths who would enroll in any case will receive an effective lump-sum transfer equal to
the school fees they no longer need to pay. Inframarginal youths may also be affected
by changes in their class sizes and peer groups induced by rising enrollment. Eliminating
school fees changes the financial resources and incentives of schools themselves. If the loss
in fee revenue is not offset by compensating transfers from government, schools may need
to lay off teachers, cut salaries, or defer investment in physical capital. Even if government
transfers make fee elimination revenue-neutral for schools, their accountability shifts in part
from students and their families to a potentially more distant layer of government. These
effects on school composition, finances, and incentives make fee elimination a potentially
very different intervention to conditional cash transfers paid directly to households.
I contribute to the sparse literature on school fees by studying the effect of a geographi-
cally targeted school fee elimination intervention in South Africa. The national government
eliminated school fees for schools located in high-poverty neighborhoods between 2006 and
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2007. Specifically, schools were ranked based on the poverty rate in the surrounding neigh-
borhood and then divided into five quintiles. Schools in the first and second quintiles were
required to eliminate fees and were given additional per-student government transfers in-
tended to offset the lost fee revenue. This generated time-series variation in school fees –
before and after the intervention – and controlled cross-sectional variation – high- versus
low-poverty quintiles. I use this variation to generate difference-in-differences and regres-
sion discontinuity estimates of the effect of school fee elimination on enrollment and other
education outcomes. This approach is similar to prior studies of fee elimination in Colom-
bia (Barrera-Osorio, Linden, and Urquiola, 2007) and South Africa (Borkum, 2011). The
estimates are less subject to concerns about confounding than those based on time-series
variation alone (Deininger, 2003) or cross-sectional and time-series variation induced by the
incidence of civil war (Fafchamps and Minten, 2007). My primary analysis uses a restricted
access school-by-grade-by-year longitudinal dataset collected by South Africa’s national De-
partment of Education.2
I show that fee elimination has a relatively small effect on enrollment. My preferred
estimates suggest that 1 to 3 additional students are induced to enroll in the average school.
This increases the baseline enrollment level by 1% or less and the baseline enrollment rate
by less than 1 percentage point. The data do not allow me to identify the price elasticity
with respect to baseline fee levels but informal calculations imply it is smaller than -0.01
(in absolute value). The effects are robust to accounting for pre-treatment time trends and
pre-treatment differences between high- and low-poverty schools’ characteristics. They are
not driven by net transfers of students between treated schools and those that continued to
charge school fees, even though South Africa allows substantial school choice. The increased
enrollment occurs entirely in secondary grades, partly due to the very high baseline enroll-
ment rate for primary school-aged youth. The zero effects on primary grades suggest that
schools are not systematically overreporting enrollment in order to obtain more per-student
government tranfers.
These results imply that demand for schooling is relatively price insensitive in the neigh-
2The dataset includes all schools in the country but key variables are missing for schools in four of the
nine provinces. My analysis is therefore restricted to the Eastern Cape, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, Northern
Cape and Western Cape provinces.
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borhoods treated by the fee elimination intervention. I explore several possible explanations
for this pattern. The enrollment response remains small in populations with low baseline
enrollment, ruling out ceiling effects on enrollment as a primary explanation. Schools do not
appear to face binding capacity constraints on enrollment. Enrollment effects are larger in
populations less likely to face credit constraints, so pecuniary costs other than school fees may
still inhibit enrollment. However, post-treatment enrollment rates in populations less likely
to be credit constrained remain well below one. These results suggest that price insensitive
demand in part reflects low valuation of additional years of enrollment amongst unenrolled
youths and their parents. Low valuation may reflect high opportunity costs or low returns
to education. Labor market opportunity costs are likely to be lower in South Africa than
in other developing countries: youth employment is exceptionally high (Banerjee, Galiani,
Levinsohn, McLaren, and Woolard, 2008) and the smallholder agriculture sector is unusually
small (Terreblanche, 2002). This leaves non-pecuniary opportunity costs or low returns to
education as explanations. Education “quality,” measured by standardized test scores, grade
progression rates, and high school graduation is low for already-enrolled students at schools
located in high poverty neigborhoods (Lam, Ardington, and Leibbrandt, 2010; van den Berg
and Louw, 2007). Unenrolled youths may perceive that enrollment will not lead to grade
progression or learning, which would explain the small enrollment effects of fee elimination.
Eliminating school fees may also affect school finances and resources, which may affect
enrollment behavior by forward-looking youths. I show that some simple measures of school
resources and performance – class size, grade progression and dropout rates, and the socio-
economic status of the student body – are largely unaffected by fee elimination. Students
may have been deterred from enrolling by concerns about falling school resources, but such
beliefs would not be consistent with the outcomes of the intervention.
In sum, these results suggest that nationwide geographically targeted school fee elimina-
tion had small effects on student enrollment and on measured school characteristics. The
intervention’s largest effect may have been on households containing inframarginal students,
who no longer needed to pay fees. The net welfare effect of the program depends on the
weight assigned to these generally low-income households relative to the taxpayers who
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funded the intervention.3 The net welfare effect is more likely to be positive if some stu-
dents with a high valuation enrollment were previously deterred from enrollment by credit
constraints. Edmonds (2006) supports this consideration by showing that some rural house-
holds in South Africa were credit constrained with respect to school enrollment. Finally, the
absence of substantial student transfers from fee-charging into fee-eliminating schools shows
that geographic targeting of pro-poor subsidies can be accurate under certain circumstances.
This may be a cost effective alternative to income-dependent pricing of public services when
verifying individual income is difficult. However, this result may not generalize to situations
where demand for public services is more price sensitive.
Organization of the paper: I develop a simple conceptual framework in section 2.2
that motivates the empirical analysis. Section 2.3 provides an overview of the South African
education system and fee elimination intervention. I then explain how the design of the
intervention motivates the identification strategies. Section 2.4 reports the treatment effects
of school fee elimination on school-level enrollment. I then discuss the magnitude of these
effects and a number of robustness checks. I explore a number of explanations for these
price-insensitive demand estimates in section 2.5. Section 2.6 reports treatment effects on
measures of school composition, performance and resources. I also consider how these results
relate to the enrollment effects. Section 2.7 concludes.
Related literature: This paper directly advances a growing literature that studies the
effect of school fee eliminations on student enrollment in primary and secondary schools.
Studies in Madagascar (Fafchamps and Minten, 2007), Malawi (Al-Samarrai and Zaman,
2000), Kenya (Lucas and Mbiti, 2009), and Uganda (Deininger, 2003) have found large
increases in enrollment of up to 100% off relatively low bases. These results are typically
an order of magnitude larger than those I find, which may reflect more elastic education
demand in lower income countries or limitations of these research designs. Most studies
rely on simple comparisons of enrollment before and after a nationwide fee elimination. The
implementation of other simultaneous policy changes may also have affected enrollment and
resulted in upward biased estimates of the effect of fee elimination.
3The intervention was funded by the national Department of Education out of the general fiscus. The
incidence of the cost of the intervention cannot be directly determined. Most national government revenue
in South Africa is raised through a progressive personal income tax and flat rate corporate income tax.
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Barrera-Osorio, Linden, and Urquiola (2007) and Borkum (2011) provide perhaps the
most credible evidence to date on this question. The former paper examines a natural ex-
periment in Bogota, Colombia, where the local government reduced school fees for households
whose socio-economic status fell below a threshold level. The authors find that enrollment
increased by 0-5 percentage points in households just below the threshold, relative to house-
holds just above the threshold who did not qualify for fee reductions. The latter paper also
studies the South African fee reform in a single province using more limited data and finds
a rise in enrollment of 0-2%.
The contrast between these two strands of the literature may reflect a number of dif-
ferences. First, the interrupted time series and panel data used in the former literature
may be subject to substantial upward biases due to correlated policy changes. Second, the
regression discontinuity designs used in the latter literature and in my own work estimate
valid treatment effects only in the neighborhood of the cutoff. If poorer households are more
responsive to fee eliminations, treatment effects may be considerably larger well below the
cutoff. I find some evidence in my data that increases in enrollment after school fee elimina-
tion are negatively correlated with neighborhood poverty rates. Third, countries studied by
the latter literature typically have much higher baseline enrollment rates so the treatment
effects may be restricted by ceiling effects.
This paper is also related to a substantial literature on the enrollment effects of condi-
tional cash transfers. These transfers have typically been offered in countries without school
fees and are designed to offset the lost contributions to home production and labor market
earnings from enrolled children. These programs typically raise enrollment by less than 10%,
though there is some heterogeneity across studies (Angelucci and di Giorgi, 2009; Glewwe
and Kassouf, 2011; Schultz, 2004; Todd and Wolpin, 2006). This heterogeneity has been as-
cribed to differences in baseline enrollment rates across different countries and to differences
in the extent to which conditions bind. For example, some cash transfers are only conditional
on school enrollment, while others also impose conditions on attendance or grades. All else
equal, the latter tend to have smaller effects, perhaps because the stricter conditions render
more potential students inframarginal with respect to the intervention (Filmer and Schady,
2008; Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton, 2009). The effect sizes that I find from eliminating
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school fees are roughly comparable to those associated with conditional cash transfers in
Brazil and Mexico, suggesting that the two policies may have relatively similar effects when
applied in countries with comparable levels of baseline enrollment.
A small number of studies have considered the effect on school participation of reducing
other pecuniary costs of education. Evans, Kremer, and Ngatia (2009) show that distributing
free school uniforms increased attendance amongst already-enrolled youths. In contrast,
Hidalgo, Onofa, Oosterbeek, and Ponce (2013) find negative effects of free school uniforms
on attendance, though this may have been driven by very low treatment compliance.
There is also a small literature that studies the enrollment effects of changes in the cost
of education in the developed world. See Dynarski (2003), Dynarski, Gruber, and Li (2009),
Kane (1994), and Seftor and Turner (2002) for examples and Neal (2002) for a discussion
of the challenges faced by this research agenda. However, these research designs typically
focus on margins different to those in the development literature: the choice between private
and (free) public primary or secondary education and the choice between different types of
postsecondary institutions with different costs. These are very different to the choice between
fee-charging public and no primary or secondary education, which is the more relevant margin
in much of the developing world. While these studies provide useful insights into the nature
of education investment decisions, they do not reduce the need for better evidence on the
relationship between school fees and enrollment.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
Consider a simple reduced form model of the enrollment decision. Assume that each youth
i decides whether to enroll in the local school s at time t. Panel A of figure 2.1 depicts
this decision in a simple demand and supply framework. The vertical axis V shows the
value and cost of enrolling for an additional year of schooling in money metric terms. The
horizontal axis shows the proportion P ∈ [0, 1] of youth in this school’s neighborhood who
are enrolled. The downward-sloping demand curve D captures the idea that the value of
enrollment is heterogeneous across individuals within a school.4 This heterogeneity may arise
4Throughout this section I assume that the demand curve has no discontinuities in the interior. This
follows from the assumption that the density of individual valuations of enrollment within a school is strictly
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from different levels of academic ability, different outside options, and the fact that students
have reached different grade levels at time t. Assume for now that the cost of enrollment is
identical for all agents, so that the cost curve C is horizontal. This assumption is relaxed
below. Equilibrium enrollment occurs at p1. Note that v1 is the net value of enrollment for
the marginal student (gross value less cost), not a market-clearing price.
Eliminating school fees shifts the cost curve downward from C1 to C2. The new equilib-
rium enrollment rate is p2 ≥ p1. Students can be divided into three categories with respect
to the fee elimination intervention. p1 of the students are inframarginal and enroll whether
fees are charged or not; 1 − p2 of the students are inframarginal and do not enroll even if
fees are not charged; p2 − p1 of the students are marginal and enroll if and only if fees are
eliminated. This yields two general implications of the framework:
I1 Eliminating school fees increases total enrollment and the enrollment rate. Larger
baseline school fees will lead to a larger effect on enrollment. If the baseline enrollment
rate is at or near one, eliminating fees will have a smaller effect on enrollment.
I2 The change in the enrollment rate equals the proportion of students whose gross value
of enrollment is smaller than the cost of enrollment including fees C1 but larger than
the cost of enrollment excluding fees C2.
This simple framework treats enrollment as a static decision, rather than adopting a dynamic
discrete choice framework. The framework also abstracts away from uncertainty. In practice,
grade progression is far from universal in South Africa and the potentially stochastic rela-
tionship between enrollment and grade progression may vary across schools and individuals
within a school (Lam, Ardington, and Leibbrandt, 2010). The value of enrollment V can be
interpreted as the expected present value of the discounted stream of future benefits from
enrollment, which implicitly includes the option value of enrolling in higher grades in future
years. Explicitly accounting for dynamics and uncertainty does not appear to generate any
empirical predictions that can be implemented with my data.
Panel B of figure 2.1 considers two potential valuation curves: DX is relatively elastic
in the neighborhood of the equilibrium and inelastic DY is relatively inelastic. Eliminating
continuous.
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change is clearly larger, generating another implication of the framework:
I3 The effect of fee elimination on enrollment is increasing in the local elasticity of the
valuation curve D.
Panel C of figure 2.1 considers three potential demand curves: convex DX , linear DY ,
and concave DZ . The change in enrollment rates induced by eliminating fees is largest for
DY and smallest for DZ . The mean valuation amongst the “always-enrollers” is largest for
DZ and smallest for DX . This generates another implication of the framework:
I4 There is not a monotonic relationship between the mean valuation amongst students
enrolled when school fees are charged and the increase in enrollment rate induced by
eliminating fees.
I4 is particularly empirically important. It implies that school-level treatment effects of
school fee elimination will not necessarily be correlated with proxies for the valuation of
enrollment prior to elimination. Hence, enrollment may rise by a smaller or larger margin in
“good” than “bad” schools. In this depiction, the proportion of always-enrollers and their
mean valuation of enrollment are positively correlated. However, this does not hold more
generally.
The framework can be extended to allow for a number of more realistic elements. In
particular:
I5 If baseline costs of enrollment are heterogeneous, the cost curve will be upward-sloping
and the effect of fee elimination on enrollment will be attenuated relative to the
constant-cost case.
I6 If schools face binding capacity constraints, the equilibrium enrollment rate will be
constrained to be below 1 and the effect of fee elimination on enrollment may be
attenuated.
I7 If fee elimination reduces the valuation of enrollment, perhaps due to resource con-
straints or negative peer effects, the demand curve will shift downward and attenuate
or potentially reverse the effect of fee elimination on enrollment.
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This framework generates several guidelines for the empirical analysis. First, eliminating
fees should increase the enrollment rate (I1). Second, if the enrollment rate falls, this must
be due to negative effects of fee elimination on the perceived valuation of enrollment (I7).
Third, if the change in the enrollment rate is small, this may reflect near universal baseline
enrollment (I1), a low initial value of fees (I1), inelastic demand (I2/3), heterogeneous costs
(I5), binding capacity constraints (I6), and/or negative effects on the valuation of enrollment
(I7). Fourth, the magnitude of the treatment effects need not be explained by the mean
valuation of enrollment amongst students enrolled at baseline (I4).
The framework as written assumes that credit constraints never bind on the enrollment
decision. The presence of credit constraints will have an ambiguous impact on the relation-
ship between fee elimination and enrollment. In terms of figure 2.1 panel A, eliminating fees
will induce some credit-constrained students with valuations above v1 to enroll, However,
credit-constrained students with valuations between v2 and v1 will not be able to enroll. If the
former group is larger than the latter, the treatment effect of fee elimination on enrollment
will be increased relative to a world with no credit constraints.
2.3 Background Information and Identification Strategy
2.3.1 Background on South African Education
South Africa is a middle income country with a history of sharp economic, political, and
social inequality. The public education system was racially segregated until the early 1990s,
and per capita government expenditure on white schools was orders of magnitude larger than
on black schools. Both enrollment and high school graduation rates differed sharply by race
and there is some evidence of large differences by household socio-economic status (Fedderke,
Luiz, and de Kadt, 2000; Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). A small number of black students
from low income households enrolled in private schools, mostly church-run. Despite recent
growth in the number of small, for-profit private schools in low income communities, the best
available data suggest that the private sector remains negligible relative to the public sector
and considerably smaller than in South Asian countries (Centre for Development Enterprise,
2010).
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State expenditure on black education rose substantially in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s and
this was associated with rapidly rising enrollment rates. However, substantial evidence sug-
gests that the quality of education remained very low in historically black schools. Curricula
at these schools had deliberately focused on non-academic subjects until the 1990s, reflecting
the apartheid government’s insistence on preparing black students for manual employment
only. Few students completed secondary schooling, pass rates on high school graduation ex-
aminations were low, and even fewer students took mathematics or physical science as high
school subjects (Fedderke, Luiz, and de Kadt, 2000). The education system was officially
desegregated in the early 1990s but the majority of black students continue to attend histor-
ically black schools. Sharp racial differences are visible in which schools students attend and
whether they attend school at all, with black enrollment up to 10 percentage points lower
than white enrollment.
There are two approaches to estimating baseline enrollment rates and they produce
slightly different results. The first approach divides the total number of students that schools
report enrolling by the population projected from census data. This method yields national
enrollment rates of 85% and 78% for for 7-13 and 14-18 year-old youths respectively. The
second approach uses nationally representative household survey data and yields enrollment
rates of 96% and 85% in these age brackets.5 Both approaches suggest that enrollment is
high at younger ages and tapers into adolescence. These are net enrollment rates, which
measure the proportion of the age-eligible population enrolled. This may overstate the en-
rollment rate in a country with substantial rates of late school entry, grade repetition, and
temporary dropout (Department of Education, 2009).
These baseline enrollment rates show that there was substantial room for fee elimina-
tion to increase enrollment. I am not aware of any nationally representative dataset that
would allow calculation of the baseline enrollment rate in neighborhoods where fees were
eliminated. There is a strong negative correlation between youth enrollment and house-
hold socio-economic status, suggesting that baseline enrollment was substantially lower in
5These data are reported in Department of Education (2009) and Department of Education (2011).
The survey data are drawn from the General Household Survey, a nationally representative annual project
conducted by Statistics South Africa. The survey is relatively comparable to its namesake in the United
Kingdom.
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treated than in untreated neighborhoods. The difference between enrollment behavior in
low- and high-income households led some policymakers to advocate interventions to reduce
the pecuniary cost of schooling (Pampallis, 2008). Such policies aligned closely with the
post-apartheid government’s long-standing stated commitment to free education. They may
also have been motivated by widespread primary school fee eliminations in other African
countries during the 1990s and 2000s. Edmonds (2006) shows that rural households that re-
ceived a fully anticipated income increase (a state old age pension) were more likely to enroll
their children than those that did not. This is consistent with credit constrained enrollment
decisions.
Low income and credit constraints are not the only reasons offered for low enrollment
rates in some neighborhoods. Dropout in secondary school has also been ascribed to the
low quality of schools in low income neighborhoods and may be a rational response to low
returns to education in these schools. There are no direct measures of returns to education
at different types of schools, so these arguments typically infer low returns to education from
evidence of low school quality. While measuring “school quality” is a difficult process, it
is true that South African students attending schools in low-income neighborhoods perform
considerably worse on international literacy and numeracy assessments than poorer students
from other African countries (van den Berg and Louw, 2007). South Africa has a system
of nominal school choice, under which individuals from low income neighborhoods can in
principle enroll in schools in high income neighborhoods. The limited data available on
this phenomenon suggests that it is uncommon. This may reflect a combination of high
commuting costs in cities that are still highly segregated by income and race, and social
and cultural barriers that limit low income students’ ability to integrate into schools in high
income neighborhoods.
Two interventions were introduced in order to reduce the pecuniary cost of education and
promote higher enrollment: means-tested individual-level school fee waivers and school-level
school fee eliminations. The former intervention was introduced in 1996 and required that
schools grant partial fee waivers to any household that either earned less than 10 times the
per-student school fee or was eligible to receive a means-tested government child grant. The
latter requirement meant that a large proportion of the country’s students were eligible for the
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waiver. However, household survey data from 2005 show that approximately 2% of students
benefitted from fee waivers and some media reports suggest that parents were discouraged
by schools from requesting waivers (Borkum, 2011; Hanes, 2006). This intervention reduced
the actual price of education below its nominal level and so risks attenuating any effect of
the second intervention on enrollment behavior. I argue below that any bias is likely to
be small, due to the rarity of fee waivers and the discontinuous implementation of the fee
elimination intervention.
2.3.2 School Fee Elimination
The school fee elimination intervention was announced in 2006 and implemented in 2007.6
Schools treated by this intervention were required to eliminate all tuition and enrollment
fees, though the status of additional fees for extra-curricular activities was not regulated.
These “no fee” schools were chosen by a complex three-stage interaction between provincial
and national governments, laid out in guidelines published by the national Department of
Education.
In the first stage, provincial governments assigned each school in their province a “poverty
score” based on characteristics of the electoral ward in which it was located.7 These scores
ranked all schools within the province from least to most poor, with ties permitted. The
national Department of Education provided each province with ward-level data on income,
employment, education, health, and “living environment” from the 2001 census as a start-
ing point for the assignment of poverty scores. Provinces were permitted choose their own
weighting of these five data series and to make ad hoc adjustments to the resultant score
based on within-ward heterogeneity. They were not permitted to use any data collected
directly from schools, such as administrative data on school’s physical facilities or student-
teacher ratios. Wildeman (2008) conducted anonymous interviews with provincial officials
responsible for creating the poverty scores and reported that most of the ad hoc adjust-
ments were made for schools near the boundaries of electoral wards, as the socio-economic
characteristics of their students may have differed from those of the electoral ward. Wilde-
6South Africa’s academic year runs from January to December.
7The electoral ward is not an administrative unit in South Africa. Assignment took place at this level
because it is the smallest geographic unit at which census data is available.
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man’s interviewees reported no incidents of schools lobbying provincial officials to change
their scores, although lobbying may have occurred in the third stage described below. The
formulae used to determine the poverty scores were left to the discretion of the provinces
and no province has made its formula publicly available.8
In the second stage, the national government divided all schools in the country into five
“quintiles” based on these poverty scores. Each quintile was intended to contain approxi-
mately 20% of the students in the country (based on 2006 enrollment data) and each quintile
would contain approximately “equally poor” school neighborhoods in each province. So in
the relatively poor Eastern Cape province, 35% and 6% of all schools were assigned to the
first and fifth quintiles respectively; in the relatively low poverty Western Cape province, 7%
and 23% of all schools were assigned to the first and fifth quintiles respectively. The choice
of how many schools were to be treated in each province was based on province-level data
from the 2001 census but the exact algorithm used for this decision is unclear. All schools
in quintiles 1 and 2 were intended to be no fee schools. By determining the number of
schools to be treated in each province, the national government implicitly specified a cutoff
value of the poverty score above which all schools were the “intention to treat” and below
which all schools were the “intention to control” group. National government officials report
that the number of schools to be treated was chosen after the poverty scores had already
been assigned, so it was not possible for poverty scores to be precisely manipulated in the
neighborhood of the cutoff.
In the third and final stage, provincial governments decided which schools were to abol-
ish fees, which created an “actual treatment” group of schools. The actual treatment as-
signments followed the intended treatment assignments relatively closely: 98% of quintile
1/2 schools above the cutoff eliminate fees while only 6% of quintile 3/4/5 schools below
the cutoff do so. The discrepancies may reflect lobbying by schools above the cutoffs who
wished to continue charging fees or by schools below the cutoff who wished to eliminate
them. The frequency of these discrepancies varies across provinces: 30% of schools have
8Each province used a different scale for the poverty scores. I standardize these by recentering them at
the cutoff between quintiles 2 and 3 and rescaling them to have standard deviation one within each province.
The results are reasonably robust to alternative standardizations: rescaling the range to one within each
province or rescaling the variance to minimize the sum of the differences between the quintile 1/2 cutoff and
the quintile 3/4 cutoff.
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different intended and actual treatment statuses in the least compliant province (Northern
Cape), while intended and actual treatment statuses are identical for all schools in one other
province (Gauteng).
2.3.3 Identification Strategy
The design of the fee elimination intervention makes it a natural candidate for analysis using
both difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity methods. I compare schools below
the cutoffs, the intended control group, with schools above the cutoffs, the intended treatment
group. If the poverty scores are “as good as randomly assigned” (Lee and Lemieux, 2010)
in the neighbourhood of the cutoffs, these two groups differ only in their treatment status
and so any differences in enrollment between the two groups may be interpreted as a causal
effect of the fee elimination intervention.
Baseline difference-in-differences specification: My primary estimation sample
consists of schools in quintiles 2 and 3. I use quintile 2 schools as the “intention to treat”
group and quintile 3 schools as the control group. By eliminating quintile 1, 4, and 5 schools,
I restrict the sample to schools with relatively similar baseline characteristics in line with
the spirit of the regression discontinuity design. I begin by estimating
Fee eliminationi = α0 + α1High poverty scorei + εi (2.1)
by ordinary least squares. The coefficient α1 captures the difference in the probability of fee
elimination between schools with high poverty scores (i.e. in quintile 2) and schools with
low poverty scores (i.e. in quintile 3). This tests whether assignment to treatment is broadly
consistent with the process described in the previous subsection. I use the cross-section of
schools in 2007 to estimate this model.
I then estimate
Enrollmentit =β0 + β1High poverty scoreit + β21{Year ≥ 2007}
+ β3High poverty scoreit × 1{Year ≥ 2007}+ νit
(2.2)
The coefficient β3 captures the difference in the change in enrollment from pre-2007 to post-
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2007 between schools with high poverty scores (i.e. in quintile 2) and schools with low
poverty scores (i.e. in quintile 3). This tests whether schools in the intention to treat group
experience a larger increase in enrollment from 2005/6 to 2007/8 than other schools. I use
a panel of school-level enrollment between 2005 and 2008 to estimate this model and I use
a cluster-robust variance estimator that allows unrestricted intertemporal correlation in νit
for each school i.9
I finally estimate
Enrollmentit =γ0 + γ1Fee eliminationit + γ21{Year ≥ 2007}
+ γ3Fee eliminationit × 1{Year ≥ 2007}+ ηit
(2.3)
using instrumental variables, with the indicator for fee elimination instrumented by high
poverty score indicator and the interaction term treated analogously. The coefficient γ3
captures the difference in the change in enrollment from pre-2007 to post-2007 between
no fee schools and fee charging schools who comply with their intended school fee policy.
This captures the effect of fee elimination on enrollment for schools that comply with their
intended treatment status. I again use a panel of school-level enrollment between 2005
and 2008, with a cluster-robust variance estimator. The results in section 2.4 verify that the
instruments used in estimating equation (2.3) easily pass the appropriate tests for instrument
strength.
Identification of (α1, β3, γ3) relies on the assumption that the counterfactual trend in
enrollment for quintile 2 and quintile 3 schools from 2005/6 and 2007/8 would have been
identical if fees had not been eliminated. This assumption may be problematic if the two
groups of schools differ on observed or unobserved characteristics that are associated with
enrollment trends. If such “confounding” occurs, the identification assumption will fail. I
use two strategies to address this potential concern.
Reweighted difference-in-differences specification: I first consider the possibility
that quintile 2 (intention to treat) and quintile 3 (control) schools may differ on observed
9I pool 2005 and 2006 together and 2007 and 2008 together to smooth out potential measurement error
in the reported enrollment data. Formal tests do not reject equality of enrollment in 2005 and 2006 and in
2007 and 2008.
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characteristics. The panel structure of the difference-in-differences design is equivalent to in-
cluding school-level fixed effects in equations (2.1) – (2.3). This accounts for any differences
in the level of enrollment between intention to treat and control schools. However, it does
not account for the possibility that enrollment trends may be systematically correlated with
baseline observed characteristics that differ systematically between intention to treat and
control schools. I observe data on a vector of baseline characteristics from 2005 and 2006:
enrollment, number of grades offered, phase (primary, intermediate, or secondary), location
(urban or rural), historical racial classification (Asian, black, white, mixed race, or founded
after desegregation), designation as a mathematics and science specialization school, partial
self-governance status, class size, student-teacher ratio, proportions of part-time and tem-
porary teachers, dropout rate, grade promotion rate, proportion of orphans in the school,
and proportion of students in the school whose families receive government social grants.
The means of almost all of these characteristics differ significantly between quintile 2 and 3
schools and the χ2 test statistic for equality of all characteristics is 2323. I therefore construct
a sample of control schools weighted to have the same distribution of observed characteristics
as the intention to treat schools. I follow Abadie (2005) and DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemiuex
(1996) in using the reweighting function
ω(Xit) =
Pr(High poverty scorei = 1|Xit)
1− Pr(High poverty scorei = 1|Xit)
(2.4)
for all schools in the control group. This term assigns high weight to control schools whose
observed characteristics Xit in the baseline period (2005 and 2006) “look like” those of the
intention to treat schools.10 I estimate the predicted probability using a logistic regression
of an indicator for high poverty scores (i.e. quintile 2 schools) on the full vector of observed
characteristics and quadratic terms in the continuous variables.11 I then estimate equations
10I include missing data indicators where values of any of the observed characteristics are not reported in
the dataset.
11Although the two groups differ on average characteristics, there is reasonable overlap in the pre-
dicted probabilities P̂ r(High poverty scorei = 1|High poverty scorei = 1, Xit) and P̂ r(High poverty scorei =
1|High poverty scorei = 0, Xit). The maximum predicted probabilities in the two samples are almost iden-
tical and less than 1% of the control observations have predicted probabilities below the minimum in the
intention to treat group.
86
(2.1) – (2.3) using weighted least squares.12
After constructing the weights, I test whether the means of the observed characteristics
differ between the intention to treat and the reweighted control group. I fail to reject the
null hypothesis of equal means for any of the individual observed characteristics and fail to
reject the null of joint equality (χ2 test statistic of 28.3 with p-value 0.45) from a weighted
seemingly unrelated (SUR) regression. This confirms that the reweighted sample of control
schools are statistically indistinguishable from the intention to treat schools on observed
baseline characteristics. Hence, the weighted least squares estimates from equations (2.1) –
(2.3) will be purged of any confounding due to differences in enrollment trends correlated
with observed school-level characteristics.
Regression discontinuity differences specification: The strategy above will account
for any confounding due to differences in observed baseline characteristics between intention
to treat and control schools. However, it will not account for confounding due to differences
in unobserved characteristics that are correlated with enrollment trends between the two
groups. It will also be problematic if enrollment trends are correlated with socio-economic
status as measured by poverty scores. These determine schools’ status in the intervention
and so are disjoint between intention to treat and control schools and cannot be used in the
reweighting algorithm. I address this concern by taking advantage of the process used to
assign schools to treatment status. Specifically, I estimate
No fee schooli =1{Poverty score ≥ 0} × f+ (Poverty scorei)
− 1{Poverty score < 0} × f− (Poverty scorei) + εi
(2.5)
and
∆Enrollmenti =1{Poverty score ≥ 0} × f+ (Poverty scorei)
− 1{Poverty score < 0} × f− (Poverty scorei) + εi
(2.6)
where f+, f−, g+, and g− are polynomial or local linear functions of poverty scores. The idea
12I approximate the standard errors of the resultant estimators using 100 replications of a boostrap al-
gorithm that iterates over both stages of the estimation: construction of the weights and estimation of the
linear difference-in-differences models. The bootstrap algorithm resamples school clusters with replacement.
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behind these models is to specify flexibly the relationship between the outcome of interest




f̂+ (Poverty scorei)− lim
Poverty score↑0
f̂− (Poverty scorei)
to estimate the magnitude of the change in the outcome of interest that occurs in the
neighborhood of the cutoff poverty score that separates intention to treat and control schools.
Provided schools are not able to manipulate precisely the poverty score they are assigned
by province, untreated schools on one side of the cutoff should be a valid counterfactual for
treated schools on the other side of the cutoff. Note that I use a time-differenced outcome
variable in equation (2.6) so the specification already removes any time-invariant observed or
unobserved characteristics. This identification strategy may be considered “doubly robust”
relative to standard regression discontinuity designs that use only cross-section data.
This identification strategy generates two testable predictions. First, I verify that none of
the observed characteristics listed above have statistically significant or economically mean-
ingful “jumps” at the cutoff. Second, I verify that there is no evidence that the density of
the poverty score variable jumps at the cutoff (see figure 2.2). McCrary (2008) notes that
such a jump would be consistent with manipulation of the poverty scores in order to control
treatment assignment.
2.4 Effect of fee elimination on enrollment
Figure 2.3 shows the time trend in enrollment rates calculated from the General Household
Survey. Comparing 2006 and earlier years to 2007 and subsequent years suggests that enroll-
ment amongst primary school-aged youths was largely unaffected by the intervention, while
enrollment amongst secondary school-aged youths rose very slightly. Table 2.1 presents the
more formal difference-in-differences analysis comparing quintile 2 (intention to treat schools)
to quintile 3 (control schools). Column 1 shows that quintile 2 schools are 94 percentage
points more likely to eliminate school fees than quintile 3 schools. This high rate of com-
pliance with the intervention means that poverty score is a strong instrument (first stage
F -statistic over 50000) for fee elimination. Column 2 shows that enrollment in schools that
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eliminated fees rose from 2005/6 to 2007/8 by 3.6 students more on average than in other
schools. The 95% confidence interval for this intention to treat estimate is 0 to 7.1 students
and the point estimate is marginally significantly different to zero. The corresponding in-
strumental variables estimate in column 3 is 3.8 students per school (95% confidence interval
0 to 7.5).
This effect size can be expressed in several different metrics. First, it directly measures the
number of additional students induced to enroll by the intervention in each school. Second,
the intention to treat and instrumental variables estimates respectively imply 0.9% and 1%
increases in total baseline enrollment (confidence intervals respectively 0 to 1.8% and 0 to
1.9%). Third, the effect can be converted into a change in the enrollment rate under some
additional assumptions. The baseline enrollment rate for youth aged 7-18 in 2005/6 in the
General Household Survey was 92%. If this enrollment rate applied to the neighborhoods
around fee-eliminating schools, the intervention would increase the enrollment rate by 0.83
(ITT) to 0.91 (IV) percentage points.13 The actual enrollment rate is strongly negatively
correlated with household socio-economic status and is likely to be considerably lower near
treated schools. Hence, the change in the enrollment rate for any given change in the level
of enrollment will be smaller. The upper bound of the 95% confidence intervals allow me to
rule out effect sizes larger than 1.7 percentage points for the intention to treat estimate or
1.8 percentage points for the instrumental variables estimates. This implies that a minimum
of 6% of youths remained unenrolled despite the elimination of fees, with the rate in affected
neighborhoods probably substantially higher.
Converting this effect size into an elasticity is complicated by the lack of available data on
baseline school fees. The South African Department of Education has collected these data
for all schools around the country but I have not yet been able to obtain access to them.
Without these data, it is not possible to assign a monetary value to the eliminated fees or
to calculate how this compares to other pecuniary costs of enrollment (transport, uniforms,
books, etc.). I use two sources of survey data to obtain a rough value of the elasticity. First,
the proportion of youths aged 7-18 in the General Household Survey who were enrolled and
13This follows from multiplying the baseline enrollment rate by the percentage increase in the baseline
enrollment level.
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paying school fees fell from 98% in 2005/6 to 73% in 2007/8. Although these respondents
cannot be matched to schools and hence to treatment status, I assume that the proportion
of students in each quintile is equal and that all students not paying fees at baseline were in
the treated quintiles 1 and 2. This implies a baseline fee payment rate of 95%. If all students
who paid fees after the intervention were in the control quintiles 3 - 5, then the fee payment
rate in treated schools fell to 32%.14 This implies that the arc price elasticity of enrollment








× 0.6× 0.95 + 0.4× 0.32
0.92
= −0.010
for the intention to treat estimate and -0.011 for the instrumental variables estimate. Even
using the upper bound of the 95% confidence intervals for the change in the enrollment rate
yields elasticities of -0.019 and -0.020.
The second approach to calculating an elasticity uses calculations by Branson, Lam, and
Zuze (2012) based on data from the National Income Dynamics Survey.15 They report that
the average school fees paid by enrolled youths of any age in 2007 were 64 rands16 in quintile
1/2 schools and R301 rands in quintile 3/4 schools. Under the extreme assumption that
these values were identical prior to the fee elimination, the intervention reduced fees by 79%
of their baseline value. If fees were the only pecuniary cost of education, this implies that
14This calculation abstracts away from the fact that the number of enrolled students is changed by the
intervention. The small magnitude of this change means that the results are robust to taking this into
account.
15The National Income Dynamics Survey is a nationally representative panel dataset that began in 2008.
The baseline questionnaire included some questions on retrospective schooling history. Branson, Lam, and
Zuze (2012) are able to match approximately 90% of enrolled youths to schools in the Department of
Education’s public database.
16One South African rand was equal to approximately $0.145 in 2007 without adjusting for purchasing
power parity.
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× 0.6× 301 + 0.4× 64
0.92
= −0.008
for the intention to treat estimate and - 0.009 for the instrumental variables estimate. The
price elasticity of enrollment with respect to the total pecuniary cost of enrollment ε̃2 will
be weakly larger. If, for example, fees are only half of the total cost of enrollment, then ε̃2 =
-0.023 (ITT) or -0.026 (IV).17
The discussion above implies that fee elimination induced less than four additional stu-
dents per school to enroll, increasing the baseline enrollment level by 1% and the baseline
enrollment rate by less than one percentage point. Informal calculations suggest elasticities
with respect to any fee or to the value of the fee no larger than -0.01. By any measure,
this implies that demand for enrollment in the treated schools was highly price insensitive.
Demand for broader measures of school participation that also take into account attendance
by marginal students may be even lower. The remainder of this section shows that the re-
sult is robust to a variety of alternative estimation strategies. Section 2.5 explores potential
explanations for this result.
Robustness checks: The results reported above are valid estimates of the causal ef-
fect of the fee elimination intervention on enrollment only if fee-charging and fee-eliminating
schools would have experienced the same change in enrollment from 2005/6 to 2007/8 in
the absence of the intervention. This assumption may fail if the two groups of schools
have different observed or unobserved characteristics. To address this possibility, I estimate
equations (2.1) – (2.3) using the weights in equation (2.4) to equalize the distribution of
observed baseline school characteristics. Column 7 of table 2.1 shows that the difference
in fee elimination rates between high and low poverty schools is unaffected by reweighting.
However, the enrollment effect is halved from 3.6 students per school to 1.7 students per
17To derive this result, define E, F , and O as respectively the enrollment rate, the cost of fees and the
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school (95% confidence interval -1.5 to 4.9). This implies even more price insensitive de-
mand than in the unweighted results. I also transform equations (2.3) – (2.3) from level
to first difference specifications and include the vector of baseline school characteristics in
the regression. The results, shown in columns 4 – 6 of table 2.1, are essentially identical
to those from the unweighted regression. The “doubly-robust” analysis that uses regression
and reweighting generates results very similar to those using just reweighting. All of these
results suggest a very high rate of compliance with the intervention by schools and small
effects on enrollment.18
An alternative approach to robustness is to estimate treatment effects for schools in the
neighborhood of the poverty score cutoff between intention to treat and control schools.
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show estimates of the regression discontinuity models in equations (2.5)
and (2.6) respectively. The estimates are obtain using local linear regression with bandwidth
chosen to minimize the mean squared error of the treatment effect, following Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2009). The first figure shows that the probabilty of fee elimination rises
from approximately 8% for schools just less poor than the cutoff to approximately 86% for
schools just more poor than the cutoff. The difference of 76 percentage points is smaller than
the difference between all intention to treat and control schools but is still substantial. The
second figure shows that enrollment increases from 2005/6 to 2007/8 by 2.8 students more in
intention to treat than control schools (confidence interval -0.7 to 6.3). This is slightly smaller
than the difference for all schools, though the estimates are not statistically distinguishable
at conventional significance levels. I also implement the regression discontinuity using global
linear, quadratic and cubic models, and comparing means in the 50%, 25%, and 10% of the
sample closest to the cutoff. The point estimates for the change in enrollment are somewhat
sensitive to specification but are all between 0.8 and 4 students. This reinforces the earlier
result that fee elimination had a relatively small effect on student enrollment.
As a final robustness check, I consider a longer time series of enrollment that includes four
years of pre-treatment data. Figure 2.6 shows the raw enrollment data for intention to treat
18The difference between the weighted and unweighted results reflects heterogeneous enrollment trends over
some observed characteristics, discussed in section 2.5 below. The unweighted estimators, with or without
regression adjustment, are not consistent estimators of the relevant treatment effect in the presence of this
form of heterogeneity. The identifying assumptions upon which the unadjusted and regression-adjusted
models are based are subtly different, as discusssed in Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).
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and control schools. The two groups have very different pre-treatment levels of enrollment
but there is little evidence of differential trends. The enrollment time series for the reweighted
control schools looks almost identical to the treated schools. The graph supports the iden-
tifying assumption of parallel pre-treatment trends. I use a more formal test of this idea
from Heckman and Hotz (1989) by constructing a “difference-in-second-differences” estima-
tor. This equals the conventional difference-in-differences estimator (2007/8 versus 2005/6
enrollment in intention to treat and control schools) minus the pre-treatment difference-
in-differences estimator (2005/6 versus 2003/4 enrollment in intention to treat and control
schools). This is a consistent estimator of the treatment effect of interest under the weaker
assumption that the two groups have linear but potentially non-parallel trends and are sub-
ject to common shocks. The estimated values of this parameter with and without reweighting
are respectively 5.9 and 3.1 students (standard errors 4.7 and 4.2), compared to the standard
estimate of 3.6 and 1.7 students (s.e. 1.8 and 1.6). This implies that pre-treatment enroll-
ment in intention to treat schools was declining slightly relative to control schools. However,
it still implies a small overall effect on enrollment.
2.5 Explaining the price-insensitive demand
This section builds off the conceptual framework developed in section 2.2 to explore possible
reasons for the small enrollment effects that I find. The framework suggests that this may
be due to (1) high baseline enrollment or “ceiling effects,” (2) low baseline fees, (3) inelastic
demand, (4) binding capacity constraints, (5) credit constraints, or (6) negative effects on
the valuation of enrollment. I do not directly observe baseline fees and so cannot test the
second explanation. I explore the first, fourth and fifth explanations in this section and find
that they cannot fully account for the small effects. The sixth explanation is left to the next
section. The analysis as a whole suggests an important role for the residual explanation,
inelastic demand.
Treatment effects by poverty level: The analysis to date has concentrated on quintile
2 schools and omitted the quintile 1 schools in poorer neighborhoods that also eliminated fees.
Given the positive correlation between household income and enrollment found in survey
data, baseline enrollment rates are likely to be lower in quintile 1 than quintile 2 schools.
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There is thus less scope for ceiling effects on enrollment. I estimate quintile-specific versions of
the difference-in-differences model in equations (2.1) – (2.3), with and without reweighting.19
Table 2.2 column 1 reports that the treatment compliance rates are very high: 99 and 95%
for quintile 1 and 2 schools respectively. These are unaffected by reweighting. Enrollment
increased from 2005/6 to 2007/8 in quintile 1 schools by 7.7 students (95% confidence interval
4.3 to 11 students), which represents a 2% increase in baseline enrollment. The equivalent
change in quintile 2 schools is 3.4 students (confidence interval -0.1 to 7 students) or 0.9%
of baseline enrollment. Combining these estimates using instrumental variables shows that
fee elimination increased enrollment by an average of 6.1 students across all fee eliminating
schools. As in the previous section, reweighting substantially reduces the magnitude of the
treatment effects.
The significantly larger change in enrollment in quintile 1 schools may be due to ceiling
effects on enrollment in quintile 2 schools. It may also reflect more elastic demand in quintile
1 schools.20 This result is unlikely to be generated by differences in baseline school fees. Fees
were higher in quintile 2 than quintile 1 schools (Borkum, 2011), implying larger treatment
effects in the former unless students are credit constrained. I discuss the possibility of credit
constraints in more detail below.
Grade-specific treatment effects: Baseline enrollment rates calculated from the Gen-
eral Household Survey are substantially higher for primary school-aged youths (96%) than
secondary school-aged youths (85%). Even if these overstate the relevant enrollment rates
due to grade repetition, they suggest that ceiling effects on enrollment are substantially more
likely in primary than secondary school. I therefore estimate treatment effects on enrollment
in each grade from 0 to 12 using basic and reweighted difference-in-differences models. The
results are shown in figure 2.7. Panels A and C show that there are near-zero enrollment
19Reweighting quintile 3 schools to “look like” quintile 2 schools was successful in the sense that the mean
values of the treatment and reweighted control schools’ baseline characteristics are neither substantively nor
significantly different. Applying the same procedure to compare quintile 1 and 3 schools was less successful.
The χ2 test statistic for the null hypothesis that the means of all 28 baseline characteristics are equal across
quintile 1 and reweighted quintile 3 schools is 54.3 (p-value 0.002). It is only possible to reduce this difference
by using substantially higher order polynomial expressions in the reweighting functions in equation (2.4).
The estimated treatment effects in quintile 1 should therefore be interpreted with a degree of caution.
20These explanations are not entirely independent. A highly concave demand curve will result in near
universal baseline enrollment and will be inelastic in the range affected by fee elimination.
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changes in quintile 1 and quintile 2 primary schools respectively. The treatment effects are
largest in the early grades of secondary school (8-10) and largely die out by grades 11 and
12. The reweighted estimates in panels B and D have a similar pattern though the point
estimates are considerably smaller.
What do these effect sizes imply for enrollment rates? Averaging across quintile 1 and 2
schools, enrollment increases by 8.9 students in each of grades 8 and 9 and by 0.4 students
in each grades 10, 11 and 12. These imply respective increases of 14.8% and 0.4% of the
baseline enrollment level.21 The 2005 and 2006 General Household Surveys report enrollment
rates of 87% for ages 14-15 and 83% for ages 16-18. Matching these age and grade brackets
implies that eliminating fees increased age 14-15 enrollment from 87% to almost 100% and
left age 16-18 enrollment almost unchanged at 83%.22
Capacity constraints: Some schools may have a binding upper limit on the number of
students they can accommodate, due to limited personnel, classroom space or other physical
facilities. This would lead them to deny enrollment to students who would otherwise be
induced to enroll by the policy change. The legal status of such denials is subject to an
ongoing court challenge but anecdotal reports suggest that it is uncommon. I formally
test for the existence of capacity constraints in two steps. I first calculate the maximum
enrollment in each school between 2003 and 2006. This is one measure of each school’s
maximum capacity. I then compare the frequency with which 2007 or 2008 enrollment
exceeds the previous maximum by quintile. This occurs in 26% of quintile 3 (control), 26%
of quintile 2 schools, and 33% of quintile 1 schools. A substantial fraction of schools are thus
able to accommodate additional students and this proportion is higher in fee-eliminating
than fee-charging schools. Furthermore, the change in enrollment from 2006 to 2007 is
smaller than at least one previous annual change in enrollment (2003 to 2004, 2004 to 2005
or 2005 to 2006) in over half of the sample. Hence, many schools are able to accommodate
larger increases in enrollment than they experience when fees are eliminated. The results
21The difference between the level and percentage measures arise because the average school contains 53
students in each of grades 8 and 9, compared to 112 students in each of grades 10, 11 and 12.
22Matching age and grade brackets assumes that no youths start school after the mandatory age, repeat
grades or temporarily drop out of schooling. This assumption is clearly incorrect but unavoidable. In
practice, many of the youths aged 16-18 will be enrolled in grades 8 and 9. This will bias the estimated
treatment effect on the enrollment rate. The direction of the bias depends on the relative frequency of
overage students in the inframarginal and marginal populations.
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do not conclusively rule out capacity constraints but they do not appear to be of central
importance.
Credit constraints: How important might credit constraints be in explaining the pat-
tern of results discussed above? Section 2.2 noted that credit constraints might attenuate
or augment the treatment effects of fee elimination. Edmonds (2006) reports some evidence
of credit constraints to school enrollment in rural but not urban areas. Lam, Ardington,
Branson, Goostrey, and Leibbrandt (2010) study a largely urban population and find little
evidence of credit constraints to enrollment in tertiary education, which is typically much
more expensive than primary or secondary enrollment. These results motivate estimating
treatment effects separately for urban and rural schools.23 Table 2.3 reports the results of
this exercise. The compliance rates are equally high in both groups of schools. The enroll-
ment effects are substantially larger in urban than rural areas, although the urban sample is
smaller and the estimates less precise.24
If credit constraints are indeed present in rural but not urban areas, these results suggest
that there are a substantial number of rural students who would be induced to enroll by fee
elimination if not for credit constraints. This is consistent with Edmonds’ results, as the
income shock he uses to test for credit constraints is substantially larger than the value of
school fees. However, the results could also be due to larger baseline fees in urban areas or
more elastic demand in urban areas. Even the larger effects in urban areas imply increases
of less than 2% of baseline enrollment in quintile 1 and quintile 2 schools. Eliminating fees
therefore leaves a large fraction of the population unenrolled in both rural and urban areas.
Taken together, these results demonstrate that the small enrollment effects are not ex-
plained by ceiling effects, capacity constraints or credit constraints. The next section explores
whether they may be explained by a declining valuation of enrollment.
23This includes all non-rural schools, urban and suburban.
24The substantial difference between urban and rural schools’ enrollment results explains the discrepancy
between the reweighted and regression-adjusted results in table 2.1. The regression-adjusted estimates fail
to take this heterogeneity into account.
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2.6 Effects of fee elimination on school composition and outcomes
Fee elimination may change the resources available to schools and the composition of their
student body. Compensating government transfers may be larger or smaller than the foregone
fee revenue. Even if per-student revenues are unaffected, education inputs such as classrooms
and teachers may adjust to changes in student numbers with a lag. Student expectations
about changes in education resources may in turn affect their enrollment decisions and so
attenuate or augment the enrollment response to fee elimination.
This section explores the equilibrium effects of fee elimination on education outcomes
(measured by dropout rates, grade repetition rates, and class sizes) and the socio-economic
profile of the enrolled students (measured by the proportion of students eligible for means-
tested government social grants and the proportion who have had at least one parent die).
These effects are equilibrium in that they are conditional on student enrollment decisions.
They provide no direct information about the function mapping enrollment to education
outcomes or vice versa. The section also explores the enrollment trends in control schools
close to and far from treatment schools in order to address the possibility of spillovers.
Education outcomes: Table 2.4 column 2 shows fee elimination causes the dropout
rate in fee-eliminating schools to fall from 2.8% to 2.1%. The rate of grade repetition also
falls from 9.6% to 9.2% (column 4), though this effect is quite imprecisely estimated. Average
class size increases from 39.3 to 39.8 students (column 6). In sum, fee elimination appears
to have marginally increased enrollment and decreased per student education resources but
reduced grade repetition and substantially reduced dropout. The dropout effect is most
striking relative to its baseline level. This pattern would arise if marginal students are
substantially less likely to drop out than their inframarginal peers or if fee elimination reduces
credit constraint-induced dropout by inframarginal students. None of the other effects are
large enough to suggest that education outcomes in schools are substantially affected by fee
elimination. Future research will also examine whether high school completion, measured
by passing a national graduation examination, is affected by fee elimination.
Socio-economic profile: The effect of fee elimination on the socio-economic profile of
the enrolled student population is shown in columns 8 and 10 of table 2.4. The proportion
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of students who have lost at least one parent to death falls from 20.7% to 19.5%25 while the
proportion of students eligible for means-tested government social grants stays constant. The
socio-economic profile of the fee-eliminating schools appears relatively stable, suggesting that
the marginal students are not substantially different on these dimensions to the inframarginal
students. However, these data are collected as teachers’ reports of students’ self-reports and
so are likely to be measured with substantial error. The effects should therefore be interpreted
with caution.
Transfers between fee-eliminating and fee-charging schools: My estimation strat-
egy assumes that the school fee elimination policy has no effect on enrollment levels at the
control schools that continue to charge fees. This assumption may be violated if students
who attended control schools before the policy change transfered to treatment schools after
the policy change to take advantage of their lower cost. Such behavior would result in an
upward bias in the estimated treatment effect of the fee elimination intervention.
I do not observe student-level data on transfers that would permit a direct test of this
hypothesis. I therefore implement an indirect test that examines whether control schools
that are geographically closer to treatment schools experience falls in enrollment from 2006
to 2007 relative to farther away control schools and relative to their own enrollment change
in previous years. Figure 2.8 shows a local linear regression of the change in grade-level
enrollment from 2006 to 2007 at control schools against the distance from the nearest treat-
ment school offering the same grade.26 Control schools nearer to treatment schools actually
experience small gains in enrollment relative to control schools farther away. I cannot reject
that this pattern of changes is identical to that observed between 2005 and 2006, before the
fee elimination policy was implemented. The result is robust to restricting the sample to
control schools within one half standard deviation of the cutoff. I interpret this as strong
evidence against the spillover hypothesis.
I also estimate a linear regression of change in enrollment by grade at fee-charging schools
from 2006 to 2007 on the same measure at the nearest fee-eliminating school. If the treatment
effect is driven entirely by transfers, the slope coefficient should be approximately equal to
25The effect on the proportion of students who have lost both parents to death falls by 0.2 percentage
points from a baseline of 3.8%. The patterns for both definition of orphan are therefore consistent.
26I construct this distance measure using GIS codes for every school in the sample.
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-1. Instead, it equals 0.045 (standard error 0.016). This is not significantly different to the
coefficient in the equivalent regression using changes from 2005 to 2006 (0.037, with standard
error 0.08). This result is robust to weighting the regression by the inverse distance between
treatment and control schools, to restricting the sample to control schools within one half
standard deviation of the cutoff, and to excluding control schools that are more than 10 miles
from the nearest treatment school. These results strongly suggest that the treatment effects
are not driven by transfers between schools. However, I observe only net transfers and not
gross inflow and outflow of students into each school. I cannot rule out the possibility that
approximately equal numbers of students transfer in each direction between fee-charging and
fee-eliminating schools.
One interpretation of these results is that geographically targeted variation in the prices
of public services may be an effective alternative to individual-level means testing. The
absence of spillovers in this context suggests that setting lower prices for public services in
poor neighborhoods does not induce people from wealthier neighborhoods to adjust their
behavior to take advantage of the lower cost services. Geographic targeting may be a desir-
able alternative to individual means-testing when the latter is expensive. However, caution
should be exercised in generalizing this result to settings where use of public services is more
price-sensitive or transport costs are lower.
2.7 Conclusion
Increasing participation in formal schooling is an important thrust of public policy through-
out the developing world. A wide range of countries have employed a wide range of demand-
and supply-side interventions to increase student enrollment and attendance. Empirical work
in microeconomics has found evidence of positive relationships between formal schooling and
individual earnings, health and future children’s human capital accumulation, at least some
of which seem to capture causal effects of education. The macroeconomic literature points
to a potential role of formal schooling in explaining cross-country differences in per capita
income and growth.
This paper contributes to this literature and policy by studying the effect of geographi-
cally targeted school fee eliminations on primary and secondary school enrollment in South
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Africa. Fee-reducing and -eliminating interventions have become popular in developing coun-
tries over the past two decades. There is, however, relatively little empirical evidence on their
effects. I find that eliminating fees to enroll in South African schools in high-poverty neigh-
borhoods increased enrollment by a relatively small margin. My preferred estimates suggest
that 1 to 3 additional students were induced to enroll in the average school. This increased
the baseline enrollment level by 1% or less and the baseline enrollment rate by less than 1
percentage point. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest a price elasticity of enrollment
in the neighborhood of -0.01. School-level composition, education outcomes and resources
are also largely unaffected by fee elimination.
I explore a variety of explanations for this pattern. The results are not explained by
pre-treatment time trends, pre-treatment differences between high- and low-poverty schools’
characteristics, overstated enrollment levels, or transfers between fee-eliminating schools and
fee charging schools. They are not fully explained by ceiling effects on enrollment, capacity
constraints in schools or credit constraints in households.
I therefore conclude that demand for schooling is relatively price insensitive in the neigh-
borhoods treated by the fee elimination intervention. This is more likely due to low returns to
education for marginal students in these schools than to high labor market opportunity costs.
A substantial body of prior research has documented low “quality” of education in high-
poverty South African schools, measured by enrolled students’ test scores and graduation
rates. Particularly low returns to enrollment for marginal students would be unsurprising.
My results imply that reducing enrollment costs may have limited impact on school
participation levels in settings where enrollment does not translate into substantial learning
or grade progression. This emphasizes a potential complementarity between cost-reduction







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2: Treatment effects of fee elimination on enrollment in high- and very-high poverty
schools (quintiles 2 and 1)







Estimator OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
High poverty 0.949??? 0.945???
(0.004) (0.004)
Very high poverty 0.995??? 0.995???
(0.001) (0.002)
High poverty × 3.41? 0.67
post-treatment (1.81) (1.74)
Very high poverty × 7.65??? 4.91???
post-treatment (1.73) (1.66)
Eliminated fees × 6.13??? 3.26??
post-treatment (1.66) (1.58)
Reweighting × × ×
Adjusted R2 0.930 0.059 0.058 0.957 0.001 0.001
# clusters 10235 10235 10235 10235 10235 10235
# observations 20470 40940 40940 20470 40940 40940
Notes: Columns 1 and 4 show the rates of fee elimination in high- and very high-poverty
schools (quintiles 2 and 1) relative to low-poverty schools (quintile 3). Columns 2 and
5 show the change in enrollment from 2005/6 to 2007/8 in high- and very high-poverty
schools relative to low-poverty schools. Columns 3 and 6 show the change in enrollment
from 2005/6 to 2007/8 in fee-eliminating schools relative to fee-charging schools with fee
status instrumented by indicators for high- and very high-poverty schools. Columns 4, 5,
and 6 are estimated using weighted least squares with weights assigned to low poverty schools
to equate their distribution of baseline characteristics with those of the high- and very high-
poverty schools. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. In columns 1, 2 and 3 these are
estimated using a cluster-robust variance estimator allowing unrestricted error correlation
within each school unit. In columns 4, 5 and 6 these are constructed from 100 replications
of a bootstrap algorithm that resamples school units and is stratifed by treatment group. ?,
??, and ???denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 2.3: Treatment effects of fee elimination on enrollment in rural and urban schools







Estimator OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Sample Urban schools Rural schools
High poverty 0.979??? 0.944???
(0.006) (0.005)
Very high poverty 1.000??? 0.997???
(0.000) (0.001)
High poverty × 9.18?? -0.04
post-treatment (3.93) (1.93)
Very high poverty × 7.50?? 4.75??
post-treatment (3.83) (1.86)
Eliminated fees × 8.40??? 3.12?
post-treatment (3.27) (1.79)
Reweighting × × ×
Adjusted R2 0.982 0.050 0.049 0.902 0.016 0.017
# clusters 2791 2791 2791 7293 7293 7293
# observations 5582 11164 11164 20470 40940 40940
Notes: Columns 1 and 4 show the rates of fee elimination in high- and very high-poverty
schools (quintiles 2 and 1) relative to low-poverty schools (quintile 3). Columns 2 and
5 show the change in enrollment from 2005/6 to 2007/8 in high- and very high-poverty
schools relative to low-poverty schools. Columns 3 and 6 show the change in enrollment
from 2005/6 to 2007/8 in fee-eliminating schools relative to fee-charging schools with fee
status instrumented instrumented by indicators for high- and very high-poverty schools.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using a cluster-robust variance
estimator allowing unrestricted error correlation within each school unit. ?, ??, and ???denote




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework showing the effect of fee elimination C1 → C2 on the
proportion of students enrolled P























































Notes: This figure illustrates the conceptual framework used in the paper. The proportion
of students enrolled P is increased by eliminating school fees (panel A), the magnitude of
the effect is larger when demand is more elastic (panel B), and the magnitude of the effect
need not be correlated with mean baseline valuation (panel C).
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Standardized poverty score
Fitted density 95% confidence interval
Raw density
Notes: This figure estimates the density of poverty scores for schools in low- and high-poverty
neighborhoods (left- and right-hand sections of the figure respectively). The difference be-
tween the densities evaluated at the cutoff between low- and high-poverty schools is -0.002
and is not statistically significant. This provides reassuring evidence that there was not
systematic manipulation of poverty scores in order to control schools’ assignment to (in-
tended) treatment status. The densities are estimated separately on either side of the cutoff
using local linear regression with a plug-in bandwidth selection. The results are robust to
alternative bandwidth choices.
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Figure 2.3: Time trend in net enrollment rate


















Age 7 - 15
Age 16-18
Notes: This figure shows the time series of the net enrollment rate. Data are calculated
from the General Household Survey using appropriate sampling weights.
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Notes: This figure shows the fitted probability that schools eliminate fees by their assigned
poverty score. The fitted curves and 95% confidence intervals are from local linear regressions
estimated separately on either side of the cutoff, with bandwidth choices following Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2009). The estimated difference between the curves at the threshold
value is 76 percentage points with a standard error of 1 percentage point.
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Notes: This figure shows the fitted change in school enrollment from 2005/6 to 2007/8 by
schools’ assigned poverty scores. The fitted curves and 95% confidence intervals are from
local linear regressions estimated separately on either side of the cutoff, with bandwidth
choices following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009). The estimated difference between the
curves at the threshold value is 2.8 students with a standard error of 1.8 students.
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Figure 2.6: Level of enrollment from 2003 to 2008 for intention to treat schools, control
schools, and reweighted control schools















Intention to control schools
Reweighted control schools
Intention to treat schools
Notes: This figure shows the level of enrollment for different groups of schools in each year
from 2003 to 2008. The solid blue line shows intention to treat (quintile 2) schools, the
dashed red line shows intention to control (quintile 3) schools, and the dotted red line shows
the latter group of schools after reweighting them to have the same distribution of baseline
observed characteristics as the intention to treat schools.
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Figure 2.7: Treatment effects of fee elimination on enrollment by grade
Panel A: Very high poverty schools Panel B: Very high poverty schools, reweighted










































Panel C: High poverty schools Panel D: High poverty schools, reweighted








































Notes: This figure shows grade-specific treatment effects of fee elimination on enrollment.
Panels A and B show results for schools in very high poverty neighborhoods (quintile 1)
while panels C and D show results for schools in less high poverty neighborhoods (quintile
2). Panels B and D show results after reweighting the control schools (quintile 3) to have
the same distribution of baseline observed characteristics. These are intention-to-treat ef-
fects. The compliance rate does not vary substantially by grade so the overall pattern of
instrumental variables effects is similar. The 95% confidence intervals in panels A and C
are obtained from a school-level cluster robust variance estimator. The intervals in panels B
and D are obtained from 100 replications of a bootstrap that resamples schools and stratifies
by quintile.
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Figure 2.8: Changes in enrollment from 2005 to 2006 and 2006 to 2007 for fee-charging
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2007 change 95% CI
2006 change
Notes: This figure uses local linear regression to estimate the relationship between the change
in enrollment from 2006 to 2007 and proximity to a fee-eliminating school (solid line) for
the sample of fee-charging schools. It estimates the same relationship for the change from
2005 to 2006 (dashed line). A strong negative slope for the former relationship relative to
the latter relationship would suggest that fee-charging schools near fee-eliminating schools
are losing students to those treated schools. The results strongly reject this hypothesis and
are robust to alternative bandwidth choices.
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Chapter 3
Mobility Treatment Effects: Identification, Estimation, and Appli-
cation
3.1 Introduction
The measurement and analysis of intertemporal economic mobility is an important subject
in both academic research and policy analysis. Intergenerational economic mobility has
featured prominently in the practice and study of politics. Economists and other social
scientists have studied how educational attainment, income, and occupation changes through
time and between generations. Developing satisfactory measures of economic mobility has
been a central theme of this research agenda.
In this paper I demonstrate how to interpret intertemporal economic mobility measures in
a treatment effects or decomposition framework. I consider the problem of comparing levels
of economic mobility across two groups. I develop a set of sufficient conditions under which
this difference can be causally attributed to group membership. Equivalently, I develop a
set of sufficient conditions for identification of mobility treatment effects. My framework also
demonstrates how mobility differences across groups can be decomposed into components
explained and not explained by differences in observed characteristics. This decomposition
exercise is identified under the same set of conditions required for causal analysis, though
the economic interpretation of the conditions may be different.
Consider a simple example to illustrate this paper’s contribution. Assume that income
Y is observed for two groups D ∈ {0, 1} in two periods T ∈ {0, 1}. In period 0, half the
members of each group have income below a time-invariant poverty line Y . The income
113















for groups D = 0 and D = 1 respectively. The first matrix indicates that of individuals
below the poverty line in period 0, two thirds remain below the line in period 1 (cell m011)
and one third move above the poverty line (cell m012). Of individuals above the poverty line
in period 0, one third move below the poverty line in period 1 (cell m021) and two thirds
remain above the poverty line (cell m022). In contrast, the second matrix indicates that two
thirds of individuals below the poverty line in period 0 move above it in period 1 (cell m112)
and vice versa for individuals above the poverty line in period 0 (cell m121).
The simplest way to summarize the information in these matrices is to note that the
probability that an individual will cross the poverty line is 1/3 in group 0 and 2/3 in group
1. Group 1 therefore has a higher level of intertemporal economic mobility by this metric.
My contribution is to specify sufficient conditions for this difference in mobility to be assigned
a causal interpretation as a mobility treatment effect. This contribution also clarifies under
which assumptions the difference in mobility can be attributed to cross-group differences in
education, demographic factors, etc.
Why is the difference in economic mobility of interest to economists or to policymakers?
Note that the difference between the groups would not be captured by static comparisons in
each period. The poverty rate is 50% in each group in each period. The mobility measure
therefore conveys new information that may be of substantive importance for several reasons.
First, welfare depends on individuals’ stream of intertemporal consumption in many models
of habit formation and lifecycle consumption (Atkinson, 1983). Second, mobility measures
are well suited to analyzing how individuals’ ranks in a distribution change through time
or how individuals’ ranks depend on those of their parents. These ranks, and their changes
through time, play a central role in the political economy literature (Galor and Tsiddon,
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1997) and in models where welfare depends on the formation of reference points (Becker
and Murphy, 2000). Third, the incidence of some public policies depends on intertemporal
economic mobility. Some means-tested social programs have maximum lifetime eligibility
conditions, which bind for individuals in long-term poverty but not individuals in transient
poverty. Relatedly, the incidence of some public policies such as access to capacity con-
strained education institutions may depend on individual ranks with respect an economic
outcome (Cullen, Long, and Reback, 2013; Ozier, 2011). Understanding the intertemporal
path of individual ranks becomes important in such settings.
The framework I develop in this paper will be useful in three settings. First, mobil-
ity measures provide a useful complement to existing treatment effects estimands, whether
used in program evaluation or in more general economic analysis. Mobility measures pro-
vide information that is not captured by standard estimands such as average and quantile
treatment effects. This information may allow more comprehensive evaluation of the wel-
fare effects of treatments or facilitate differentiation between different theoretical models.
Second, economic mobility is often compared across substantially different groups (Solon,
2002). My framework clarifies under what conditions these mobility differences can be in-
terpreted causally and/or be decomposed into the relative contributions of different group
characteristics.
Third, mobility measures may also be useful in the analysis of non-cardinal data. Stan-
dardized test scores, for example, are often normed with reference to the test-taking popu-
lation and are not strictly cardinal. This makes comparison across settings difficult, such as
interpreting level differences in normed test scores between groups arising from an experi-
mental intervention. Normed data can, however, be used to explore how certain measures
of intertemporal mobility differ across arms of the intervention. For example, the number
of individuals scoring below the median in period 0 who move above the median in period
1 can be analyzed independent of the outcome scaling. This is necessarily a zero-sum mea-
sure (the same number of individuals must move in the other direction) but it still provides
information about whether different arms of the intervention increase or reduce mobility.
Organization of the paper: Section 3.2 develops the key results in the paper for iden-
tification of mobility treatment effects. The key conditions are that group assignment is
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uncorrelated with unobserved individual characteristics, conditional on baseline outcomes,
and that the baseline outcomes between the two groups have common support. I show that
these conditions are satisfied by randomized group assignment, and by some other research
designs. The conditions are similar to but weaker than the “selection on observed variables”
assumption commonly employed in applied research. I also note that with more than two
time periods, the key identification assumption is testable. Section 3.3 discusses estimation
and inference for mobility treatment effects. The key results are already established in the
econometrics literature so I merely note how they apply in this context. I discuss an applica-
tion of the ideas in this paper in section 3.4. I estimate MTEs for an education experiment
in Kenya that studied the effects of classroom tracking relative to random assignment on
test scores. I find that tracking marginally increased the level of mobility and show that this
provides additional support for the authors’ interpretation of the experiment. Section 3.5
concludes.
Related literature: This paper builds off three literatures. The first concerns the
definition and measurement of mobility. Early mobility measurement started with transition
matrices like those in equation (3.1). Mobility measures were defined as scalar summary
statistics over transition matrices (Prais, 1955; Shorrocks, 1978b; Sommers and Conlisk,
1979). Subsequent work focused on deriving mobility criteria from dynamic social welfare
functions, based on changes in individual ranks or levels through time (Atkinson, 1983; Fields
and Ok, 1996; Shorrocks, 1978a). Many of these mobility measures are based on stochastic
dominance criteria over distributions. These are less susceptible to counter-intuitive rankings
of special cases than the transition matrix summary statistics but do not necessarily yield
complete orderings over all distributions (Bartholomew, 1982).
The second literature concentrates on estimating mobility measures and performing in-
ference on these estimates. The estimation problem is typically straightforward: almost all
mobility measures are continuous functions of moments and order statistics and so can be
consistently estimated by sample analogues. Inference has proved slightly more problematic.
Several papers establish analytical variance estimators for a wide range of mobility measures
(Schluter, 1998; Formby, Smith, and Zheng, 2004) but these assume independently and iden-
tically distributed data and so are not appropriate for clustered or weighted data. Biewen
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(2002) establishes the validity of the bootstrap for most mobility measures but Davidson
and Flachaire (2007) argue that the bootstrap-based tests may be very sensitive to the dis-
tribution of the upper tail of the data and this leads to confidence intervals with incorrect
empirical coverage. This criticism does not apply to rank-based mobility measures, which
monotonically transform data into a uniform scale.
The third literature consists of empirical applications of mobility measurement. Most
studies focus on intergenerational earnings, education, or occupation mobility across gener-
ations, or intertemporal income mobility for individuals. See Solon (1999) for a review of
this empirical literature in economics.
3.2 Identification
This section of the paper lays out sufficient conditions for causal analysis of mobility mea-
sures. I use a potential outcomes framework throughout, with D = 1 and D = 0 denoting the
treatment and control groups. Let Y T denote pre- and post-treatment outcomes for T = 0
and T = 1 respectively, and let Ỹ denote outcomes under treatment. Mobility measures are
functions1 of the joint distribution of pre- and post-treatment outcomes in either group
µ
(
FY 1,Y 0|D (·, ·)
)
. (3.2)
I define a mobility treatment effect (MTE) as the difference between the observed mobility
in the treatment group and the counterfactual level of mobility that this group would have
experienced in the absence of treatment2
∆MTE = µ
(










1Measures may be scalars or vectors. In the motivating example, the transition matrices M0 and M1
are vector-valued mobility measures while the proportion of individuals crossing the poverty line is a scalar
mobility measure. The identification results also apply to functional mobility measures, which I do not
discuss here.
2I limit this discussion to identification of mobility treatment effects on the treated. The identification
conditions for mobility treatment effects on the untreated are analogous. Combining the two identification
conditions yields the set of mobility treatment effects. See Heckman and Robb (1985) for a discussion of this
distinction in the context of average treatment effects and Athey and Imbens (2006) for a similar argument
regarding combining treatment effects on the treated and untreated.
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The key contribution of the paper is develop a set of sufficient identifying assumptions
under which the unobserved counterfactual level of mobility in the treatment group can
be replaced by some transformation of the observed level of mobility in the control group
µ
(




A1 Y 1 ⊥ D|Y 0 and
A2 support(Y 0|D = 1) ⊆ support(Y 0|D = 0)
then the unobserved joint distribution of pre- and post-treatment outcomes in the treatment
group FCFY 1,Y 0|D=1 (·, ·) equals the rescaled observed joint distribution of pre- and post-treatment



































Y 1 ≤ y1|Y 0 ≤ y0, D = 0
)
.





















Y 0 ≤ y0|D = 0
)
× Pr (Y
0 ≤ y0|D = 1)
Pr (Y 0 ≤ y0|D = 0)
= Pr
(
Y 1 ≤ y1, Y 0 ≤ y0|D = 0
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× Pr (Y
0 ≤ y0|D = 1)
Pr (Y 0 ≤ y0|D = 0)







FY 0|D=0 (y0) .
Assumption A2 ensures that there are no values of y0 for which the denominator in the final
line is zero and the numerator is positive. Hence, FCFY 1,Y 0|D=1 (y
1, y0) is a well defined joint
probability distribution.
The counterfactual joint distribution for the treatment group is constructed by rescaling
the observed joint distribution in the control group. The scaling factor accounts for dif-
ferences in the baseline distribution of outcomes between the two groups. If, for example,
the treatment group includes more individuals with high Y 0, the scaling factor assigns more
weight to control individuals with high Y 0 than to those with low Y 0.
Note that this result identifies the counterfactual joint distribution for a discrete or
continuous outcome. Some mobility measures are only defined with additional assumptions
on the outcome distribution. For example, transition matrices that report the probability
pij that an individual in quintile i of pre-treatment income moves to quintile j of post-
treatment income are only defined for strictly continuous outcomes. Identifying MTEs for
certain mobility measures may therefore require additional assumptions. Theorem 1 therefore
identifies MTEs on any mobility measure that is itself well-defined for a given type of data.
What are the substantive restrictions imposed by the identifying assumptions? Assump-
tion A1 is a special case of the unconfoundedness or selection on observed variables assump-
tion. It is consistent with selection into groups based on levels of pre-treatment outcomes
Y 0 or gains from treatment Ỹ 1 − Y 1 but is violated by selection into groups based on time
trends in outcomes Y 1−Y 0. Consider the common treatment effects example of a job train-
119
ing program. MTEs can be identified if trainees have higher or lower average income than
the control group or the effect of training is much smaller or larger than on the control
group. Economic shocks between the pre- and post-treatment periods that affect trainees
and the control group equally are not a problem. MTEs cannot be identified if the trainees’
outcomes in the absence of training would have a different time trend to the control group.
In particular, trainees opting into training due a transitory drop in their income would be a
problem for identification (Ashenfelter, 1978).
Assumption A2 is a common support condition. It ensures that for every possible pre-
treatment outcome in the treatment group, there is a positive probability of observing the
same outcome in the control group. If there is some value y0 that may be observed in the
treatment group but cannot be observed in the control group, then there is no counterfactual
intertemporal transition that can be assigned to treated individuals with baseline outcome
y0. This is a population assumption and so is not formally testable in any sample. However,
it is possible to informally assess its plausibility by examining the marginal distributions
of pre-treatment outcomes in the treatment and control groups. If the assumption fails, it
is still possible to identify FCFY 1,Y 0|D=1 (y
1, y0) for those values of Y 0 observed in the control
group.
3.2.1 A Toy Example
Applying the identification result to mobility measures based on transition matrices is
straightforward. The transition matrix is a discretization of the conditional distribution
of post-treatment outcomes given pre-treatment outcomes: FY 1|Y 0,D(·). So M0 in equation
(3.1) represents the conditional distribution
Pr
(




Y 1 ≤ Ȳ |Y 0 > Ȳ ,D = 0
)
= 2/3
and M1 represents the conditional distribution
Pr
(








Under assumptions A1 and A2, M0 is equal to the conditional distribution of post-treatment
outcomes that the treatment group would have obtained if treatment were not applied.
The transition matrix by itself is sufficient to construct some mobility measures. For


















This calculation was possible only because the transition matrices are symmetric. Consider






Here the probability of crossing the poverty line is π × 2
3
+ (1 − π) × 1
3
, where π is the
proportion of individuals below the poverty line in the pre-treatment period. This illustrates
the general point that the transition matrix or conditional distribution of Y 1 given Y 0 is
not sufficient for constructing many mobility measures. In general, the marginal distribution
of Y 0 is also necessary. This marginal distribution also features in the rescaling factor in
equation (3.4). In this case the rescaling factor would simply be π1
π0
, the relative proportion
of individuals below the poverty line in each group.
The discussion up to this point has treated Ȳ as a fixed parameter, such as the poverty
line. However, many applications define transition matrices with respect to percentiles of
the outcome distributions. Thus, 
p11 p12 p13 p14
p21 p22 p23 p24
p31 p32 p33 p34
p41 p42 p43 p44

might represent the set of conditional probabilities that an individual in quartile i of baseline
income moves to quartile of j of subsequent income. The identification conditions above are
unaffected by whether the cell boundaries are fixed or relative values. However, it is not
a priori clear whether cell boundaries for the treatment group should be defined using the
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treatment or control group outcomes. The former approach captures only within-group
mobility, or the tendency of treatment to change the relative ranks of individuals in the
treatment group. The latter approach captures both within-group rerankings and any level
effects of the treatment. The cell boundaries could also be defined with respect to some
broader population in a census or unrelated survey.
To concretize this issue, consider a treatment that raises the outcomes of all treated
individuals by ∆. This will have zero mobility effect when cell boundaries are based on
percentiles of the treatment group’s outcomes but will have a positive mobility effect when
cell boundaries are based on percentiles of the control group’s outcomes. The former is
arguably most appropriate if the researcher is interested in the effect of the treatment if it
were applied to both treatment and control groups, whereas the latter is most appropriate
if the treatment is only intended to be applied to part of the relevant population.
3.2.2 Covariates and Conditional Identification
A conditional analogue of theorem 1 applies when appropriate covariates X are available.
Note that the identification result is entirely nonparametric and makes no assumptions about
the functional form of the relationship between the covariates and the outcomes.
Theorem 2. If
B1 Y 1 ⊥ D|Y 0, X and
B2 support(Y 0|D = 1, X) ⊆ support(Y 0|D = 0, X)
then the unobserved joint distribution of pre- and post-treatment outcomes in the treat-
ment group FY 1,Y 0|D=1,X (·, ·) equals the rescaled observed joint distribution of pre- and post-





× Pr (D = 1|Y
0 ≤ y0, X)
1− Pr (D = 1|Y 0 ≤ y0, X)
(3.5)
The rescaling factor now depends on differences between the treatment and control groups
in the distribution of pre-treatment outcomes Y 0 and covariates X. This is the same function
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employed in standard matching and reweighting methods for cross-sectional or longitudinal
data. The conditional selection assumption B1 requires that any differential time trend
between the treatment and control groups’ untreated outcomes be fully explained by differ-
ences in their covariates. I illustrate this point by returning to the job training example.
Assume that 60% of the trainees are women and 40% are men, that the proportions are
reversed in the control group and that men and women have would have different trends
in their outcomes in the absence of treatment. This would violate assumption A1 but not
assumption B1. Equation (3.5) shows that this pattern can be accounted for by estimat-
ing mobility treatment effects separately for men and women, and then taking a weighted
average of these effects with weights 0.6 and 0.4 on the female and male effects respectively.
The conditional contained support assumption B2 is stronger than its unconditional
analogue, as it holds within each cell of the covariate grid, rather than across the full sample.
Using the job training example, B2 requires that there is containined support for the pre-
treatment outcomes of each gender. If there exists a value y0 that is found for men in the
treatment group and women in both the treatment and control groups, B2 will fail but A2
will still hold.
As in any other method of program evaluation, only covariates that are not themselves
determined by the treatment should be included in the reweighting exercise. This excludes
many covariates that are measured after the treatment is implemented but may also exclude
covariates that are measured between the treatment’s announcement and implementation
and are contaminated by anticipation effects.
3.2.3 Which research designs satisfy the identification conditions?
Here I consider how the identification assumptions A1 and B1 relate to common research
designs used in applied microeconomic research.
Controlled randomization: The identifying assumptions A1 and B1 are satisfied if
individuals are placed in the treatment or control group by random assignment or random
assignment conditional on pre-treatment outcomes.
Difference-in-differences: These assumptions are strictly stronger than the “equal
mean trends” identification condition in the linear difference-in-differences panel model de-
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sign. These conditions are very similar to the identifying assumptions for the nonlinear
difference-in-differences panel model proposed by Athey and Imbens (2006). Note that mo-
bility treatment effects cannot be implemented using repeated cross-sections.
Regression discontinuity: The validity of the identifying assumptions depends on
whether Y 0 is the running variable that determines assignment to treatment. If pre-treatment
outcomes are used to determine assignment to treatment, then assumptions A2 and B2
will fail as the support of Y 0 will be entirely disjoint between the treatment and control
groups. As an example, Matsudaira (2008) studies the effect on test scores of a remedial
education program where entry into the program was determined by baseline test scores. If
Y 0 is not the running variable and is not too strongly correlated with the running variable,
assumptions A2 and B2 will not automatically fail. They should then hold locally under
the same assumptions used to estimate average treatment effects in regression discontinuity
designs (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
Selection on observed variables: Assumption A1 is satisfied whenever group as-
signment is uncorrelated with post-treatment outcomes conditional on pre-treatment out-
comes Y 1 ⊥ D|Y 0. This is a special case of the selection on observed variables assumption
Y 1 ⊥ D|X where the only conditioning variable is Y 0.
3.2.4 Decomposition methods
There may be interest in comparing mobility measures across two groups even when assump-
tion B1 fails and this comparison cannot be assigned a causal interpretation. In such cases,
it is possible to decompose the difference into a “composition effect,” capturing differences
in covariates and a “structure effect” capturing differences in the relationship between these
covariates and mobility. In order to distinguish this from the program evaluation application
discussed elsewhere in the paper, I denote the two groups in this application by D ∈ {A,B}.
Here I treat group A as the reference group and apply equation (3.5) to calculate the coun-
terfactural level of mobility in group B if it had the same distribution of baseline outcomes
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Composition effect on mobility
Note that FCFY 1,Y 0|D=B(·) is only a well-defined distribution if assumption B2 continues to
hold, so this decomposition exercise should only be performed when there is at least some
common support between the two groups. See Fortin, Lemiuex, and Firpo (2011) for more
discussion on this proviso and on interpretating the output of decomposition exercises.
3.2.5 More than two time periods
Multiple pre-treatment time periods can be used to test the identifying assumptions A1 and
B1. Specifically, these assumptions imply that in a stationary economic environment, the
level of mobility between the two pre-treatment time periods, T = −1 and T = 0, should be








FY 0,Y −1|D=0 (·, ·)
)
= 0
establishes whether the identifying assumption holds in the pre-treatment periods. This test
of the identifying assumption may yield erroneous conclusions if the economic environment
is rapidly changing between periods -1 and 0 in ways that affect the two groups differently
but is relatively stable between periods 0 and 1. With multiple time periods it may also
be possible to select a pre-treatment time period T = t such that a lagged identifying
assumption Y 1 ⊥ D|Y t is more plausible than Y 1 ⊥ D|Y 0. Bell, Blundell, and van Reenen
(1999) make a similar argument in the context of a difference-in-differences model.
3.2.6 More than two groups
Multiple treatment groups can each be analyzed relative to a single control group using
equation (3.4) or (3.5). Each comparison yields a mobility treatment effect for the rele-
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vant treatment group. If the different treatment groups received different treatments, the
effects can be compared. If the different groups received different treatments, equality of
the effects should be tested. Rejection of equality of the effects of the same treatment on
different populations imply that the populations must differ on some observed or unobserved
characteristic.
3.3 Estimation
Sufficient conditions for estimation of and inference on mobility measures have been estab-
lished by prior authors, so I provide only a brief review of these techniques in this section.
Estimation of mobility treatment effects is a relatively straightforward exercise. All of
the scalar summary measures of transition matrices that have been proposed as mobility
measures can be written in the form µ (pij, πi|i, j = 0, . . . , n) for some continuous function
µ(·). The pij and πi terms are conditional and marginal probabilities that can be consistently
estimated by sample analogues p̂ij and π̂i under weak regularity conditions. The continuous
mapping theorem then yields µ̂→p µ.
Estimating dominance criteria that directly compare the joint distributions FỸ 1,Y 0|D=1(·)
and FCFY 1,Y 0|D=1(·) is slightly more complex. However, techniques for estimating distribution
functions are now well established and, unlike most nonparametric estimators, they converge
at parametric rates (Pagan and Ullah, 1999). For example, the counterfactual distribution in


















i=1 1 {Y 0 ≤ y0}
where N1 and N0 are the sample sizes in the treatment and control groups respectively and
1{Z} is an indicator function equal to one when condition Z is satisfied. In practice, most
of the empirical literature appears to sidestep this challenge by using only scalar summary
measures of mobility or evaluating the distribution functions at a finite and relatively small
number of points.
The counterfactual distribution in equation (3.5) can be estimated in an analogous fash-
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Y 1 ≤ y1, Y 0 ≤ y0
}
× P̂ r (D = 1|Y
0 ≤ y0, X)
1− P̂ r (D = 1|Y 0 ≤ y0, X)
The first term is simply an empirical distribution functions. The predicted probabilities
P̂ r (D = 1|Y 0 ≤ y0, X) can be estimated by semiparametric logistic model.
A number of papers have established analytical variance formulae for mobility measures
(Formby, Smith, and Zheng, 2004; Schluter, 1998). These can be applied directly to mobility
treatment effects, although most of these approaches assume strictly continuous, indepen-
dently distributed data. Biewen (2002) establishes the validity of the bootstrap for a number
of scalar mobility measures under weak regularity conditions: a finite second moment of the
outcomes and smoothness of the mobility measures with respect to the first moment of the
outcomes. His approach allows for dependencies in the data and cluster-level resampling
may be used to account for such dependence. Davidson and Flachaire (2007) argue that
bootstrap-based tests may be very sensitive to outliers, in the sense that the bootstrap
distribution of the test statistic depends heavily on the proportion of resamples in which
these outliers are included. To illustrate why this may be a problem, note that estimates of
equation (3.4) may be poorly behaved when 1
N0
∑N0
i=1 1 {Y 0 ≤ y0} ≈ 0.
3.4 Application
I conclude by presenting a brief application of mobility treatment effects to the evaluation
of an education intervention in western Kenya. Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2011) study a
group of 121 primary schools with two grade one classes. Schools are randomly assigned to
either divide students into high- and low-track classes using their scores on a pre-treatment
standardized test or randomly divide students between two classes. The original paper shows
that after one year of treatment, students in tracking schools scored on average 0.14 standard
deviations higher on standardized tests than students in random assignment schools. The
paper also reports positive treatment effects for students in each quartile of baseline test
scores, though the effects are larger for students in higher quartiles. The authors argue that
this provides evidence that tracking benefits both low- and high-achieving students, with the
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former group benefiting from more effective instruction in more homogeneous classrooms.
I argue that mobility treatment effects provide a useful complement to the evaluation
strategies employed in this paper and permit a more nuanced evaluation of the experiment.
The direction of the mobility treatment effects are not a priori clear in this setting. If peer
effects are an important determinant of test scores, below-median students who are assigned
to “low track” classrooms and hence to weaker peers may have a lower probability of catching
up to “high track” students above the median than in random assignment schools. However,
if instructors focus their attention on the highest scoring students in their class, then students
marginally below the median may have a higher probability of catch-up in tracking schools
than in random assignment schools.
I use a sample of 5170 students for whom both baseline and endline test scores are
available. This sample includes 60 tracking schools, which I consider to be the treatment
group, and 58 random assignment schools, which I consider to be the control group. I begin
by constructing four–by–four transition matrices that measure the probability that students
in quartile i of the baseline test score distribution reach quartile j of the endline test score
distribution. I define the quartile boundaries using test scores in the control group. This
yields the marginal distributions
π1 =
(




.25 .25 .25 .25
)′
for the treatment and control groups respectively. Note that the groups are not identically
sized in the treatment group because the reference quantiles are defined using the control
group and the distributions of baseline test scores are similar but not identical. The transition
matrices for the two groups are given by
P 1 =

.42 .31 .17 .1
.19 .29 .29 .23
.11 .25 .31 .33




.52 .25 .15 .08
.28 .33 .24 .15
.14 .23 .31 .32
.06 .17 .29 .49
 .
A visual inspection of the two matrices suggests that mobility is slightly higher in the tracking
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schools, particularly for the lower quartiles. This intuition can be formalized by computing
two summary measures: the average probability of changing quartiles, defined as M1 above,





The results of this calculation are shown below, with cluster bootstrap standard errors in
parentheses.
Treatment Control Difference
Probability of changing quartile .607 .589 .018?? (.009)
Average number of quartiles changed .831 .813 .018? (.011)
This analysis confirms that tracking causes a marginally higher level of mobility than
random assignment to classrooms. The effects are small, with the probability of changing
quartiles rising by less than 2 percentage points, but precisely estimated. These estimates
are based on quartiles of the control group’s test scores and so combine rank changes within
the treatment group and rank changes relative to the control group. I can also estimate the
treatment group’s transition matrix using quartiles of the treatment group’s own distribution
and so isolate the pure reranking effect of the treatment.
Treatment Control Difference
Probability of changing quartile .598 .589 .009 (.010)
Average number of quartiles changed .826 .813 .012 (.011)
The pure reranking effect within the treatment group accounts for approximately half
of the total mobility treatment effect. The remainder is driven by the level change in the
treatment group’s outcomes relative to the control group.
I also implement a more direct test of the mobility hypotheses outlined above, using
averaged within-school mobility. Specifically, I restrict the sample to students in the second
and third quartiles of baseline test scores within each school, calculate the probability that
a student below the school-specific median in the baseline will move above the median in
the follow-up and vice versa, and test whether this probability differs between tracking
and random assignment schools. This tests whether tracking increases or decreases the
probability of reranking for students in the neighborhood of the cutoff separating low and
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so the probability of switching from above to below the median or vice versa is 4 percentage
points higher in the control than the treatment group. This effect is marginally significant
and suggests that tracking increased mobility by approximately seven percent of its baseline
level amongst students in the neighborhood of the threshold separating high and low track
classrooms.3
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that teachers focus their effort on students
near the top of their classroom, which benefits students who marginally miss assignment to
high track classrooms. Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2011) find that students just below and
just above the cutoffs in tracking schools experience no difference in levels of their endline
test scores. They interpret this as evidence that the effects on low track students of tailored
instruction and weaker peers are approximately equal and offset each other. My results
suggest that the former effect is more important when reranking is the outcome of interest
and emphasize the potentially important role of mobility treatment effects as an evaluation
criterion.
3.5 Conclusion
The measurement and analysis of intertemporal economic mobility is an important subject
in both academic research and policy analysis. Intergenerational economic mobility has
featured prominently in the practice and study of politics. Economists and other social
scientists have studied how educational attainment, income, and occupation changes through
time and between generations. Developing satisfactory measures of economic mobility has
been a central theme of this research agenda.
This paper demonstrates how to interpret intertemporal economic mobility measures
in a treatment effects or decomposition framework. I derive a simple and intuitive set of
3Restricting the sample to the fifth and six deciles yields a larger treatment effect of 7 percentage points
or 14 percent of the baseline level of mobility, though this is very imprecisely estimated.
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sufficient conditions for identifying mobility treatment effects, which I define as the causal
effect of some treatment on mobility. I show how these conditions relate to common research
designs in the applied microeconomics literature. The exisiting econometrics literature has
already established sufficient conditions for estimation of mobility measures, which permits
straightforward estimation of mobility treatment effects. Appropriate bootstrap procedures
are valid for inference on most mobility treatment effects.
This framework will be useful in three settings. First, mobility measures provide a useful
complement to existing treatment effects estimands, whether used in program evaluation or
in more general economic analysis. Second, I clarify how to interpret differences in economic
mobility across substantially different groups and link this interpretation into the decompo-
sition literature. Third, mobility measures will be useful in the analysis of non-cardinal data
such as norm-referenced standardized test scores.
131
Bibliography
Abadie, A. (2005): “Semiparametric Difference-in-difference Estimators,” Review of Economic
Studies, 72, 1–19.
Al-Samarrai, S., and H. Zaman (2000): “Abolishing School Fees in Malawi: The Impact on
Education Access and Equity,” Education Economics, 15(3), 359–375.
Ammermueller, A., and J.-S. Pischke (2009): “Peer Effects in European Primary Schools:
Evidence from PIRLS,” Journal of Labor Economics, 27(3), 315–348.
Angelucci, M., and G. di Giorgi (2009): “Indirect Effects of an Aid Program: How do Cash
Injections Affect Ineligibles’ Consumption?,” American Economic Review, 99(1), 486–508.
Angrist, J., and K. Lang (2004): “Does School Integration Generate Peer Effects? Evidence
from Boston’s Metco Program,” American Economic Review, 94(5), 1613–1634.
Arnott, R. (1987): “Peer Group Effects and Educational Attainment,” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 32, 287–305.
Ashenfelter, O. (1978): “Estimating the Effect of Training Programs on Earnings,” Review of
Economics and Statistics, 60(1), 45–57.
Athey, S., and G. Imbens (2006): “Identification and Inference in Nonlinear Difference-in-
differences Models,” Econometrica, 74(2), 431–497.
Atkinson, A. (1983): “The Measurement of Economic Mobility,” in Social Justice and Public
Policy, ed. by A. Atkinson. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Banerjee, A., S. Galiani, J. Levinsohn, Z. McLaren, and I. Woolard (2008): “Why Has
Unemployment Risen in the New South Africa?,” The Economics of Transition, 16(4), 715–740.
Barrera-Osorio, F., L. Linden, and M. Urquiola (2007): “The Effects of User Fee Reduc-
tions on Enrollment: Evidence from a Quasi-experiment,” Mimeo, Columbia University.
Bartholomew, D. (1982): Stochastic Models for Social Processes. Wiley, London, 3 edn.
Becker, G., and K. Murphy (2000): Social economics: Market behavior in a social environment.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Behrman, J. R., A. D. Foster, M. R. Rosenzweig, and P. Vashishtha (1999): “Women’s
Schooling, Home Teaching, and Economic Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 107(4), 682–
715.
132
Bell, B., R. Blundell, and J. van Reenen (1999): “Getting the Unemployed Back to Work:
The Role of Targeted Wage Subsidies,” International Tax and Public Finance, 6(3), 339–360.
Benabou, R. (1996): “Equity and Efficiency in Human Capital Investment: The Local Connec-
tion,” Review of Economic Studies, 63(2), 237–264.
Bertrand, M., E. Duflo, and S. Mullainathan (2004): “How Much Should We Trust
Difference-in-differences Estimates?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 249–275.
Bertrand, M., R. Hanna, and S. Mullainathan (2010): “Affirmative Action in Education:
Evidence from Engineering College Admissions in India,” Journal of Public Economics, 94(1/2),
16–29.
Besley, T., and A. Case (1993): “Modeling Technology Adoption in Developing Countries,”
American Economic Review, 83(2), 396–402.
Betts, J. (2011): “The Economics of Tracking in Education,” in Handbook of the Economics of
Education Volume 3, ed. by E. Hanushek, S. Machin, and L. Woessmann, pp. 341–381. Elsevier.
Bhattacharya, D. (2009): “Inferring Optimal Peer Assignment from Experimental Data,” Jour-
nal of the American Statistical Association, 104(486), 486–500.
Biewen, M. (2002): “Bootstrap Inference for Inequality, Mobility and Poverty Measurement,”
Journal of Econometrics, 108, 317–342.
Blume, L., W. Brock, S. Durlauf, and Y. Ioannides (2011): “Identification of Social In-
teractions,” in Handbook of Social Economics Volume 1B, ed. by J. Benhabib, A. Bisin, and
M. Jackson, pp. 853–964. Elsevier.
Boisjoly, J., G. Duncan, M. Kremer, D. Levy, and J. Eccles (2006): “Empathy or An-
tipathy: The Impact of Diversity,” American Economic Review, 95(5), 1890–1905.
Borkum, E. (2011): “Can Eliminating School Fees in Poor Districts Boost Enrollment? Evidence
from South Africa,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Forthcoming.
Branson, N., D. Lam, and L. Zuze (2012): “Education: Analysis of the NIDS Wave 1 and 2
Datasets,” Discussion Paper 81, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit.
Brock, W., and S. Durlauf (2011): “Interactions-based Models,” in Handbook of Econometrics
Volume 5, ed. by J. Heckman, and E. Leamer, pp. 3297–3380. Elsevier.
Burman, P., E. Chow, and D. Nolan (1994): “A Cross-Validatory Method for Dependent
Data,” Biometrika, 81(2), 351–358.
Cameron, C., D. Miller, and J. Gelbach (2008): “Bootstrap-based Improvements for Infer-
ence with Clustered Errors,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(3), 414–427.
Card, D. (1999): “The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings,” in Handbook of Labor Economics
Volume 3A, ed. by D. Card, and O. Ashenfelter, pp. 1801–1863. Elsevier.
Carrell, S., R. Fullerton, and J. West (2009): “Does Your Cohort Matter? Measuring Peer
Effects in College Achievement,” Journal of Labor Economics, 27(3), 439–464.
133
Carrell, S., B. Sacerdote, and J. West (2012): “From Natural Variation to Optimal Policy?
An Unsuccessful Experiment in Using Peer Effects Estimates to Improve Student Outcomes,”
Working paper.
Centre for Development Enterprise (2010): “Hidden Assets: South Africa’s Low-Fee Private
Schools,” .
Cooley, J. (2010): “Can Achievement Peer Effect Estimates Inform Policy? A View from Inside
the Black Box,” Working paper.
Cullen, J., M. Long, and R. Reback (2013): “Jockeying for Position: Strategic High School
Choice under Texas’ Top Ten Percent Plan,” Journal of Public Economics, 97, 32–48.
Davidson, R., and E. Flachaire (2007): “Asymptotic and Bootstrap Inference for Inequality
and Poverty Measures,” Journal of Econometrics, 141(1), 141–166.
Deininger, K. (2003): “Does the Cost of Schooling Affect Enrollment by the Poor? Universal
Primary Education in Uganda,” Economics of Education Review, 22, 291–305.
Department of Education (2009): Trends in Education Macro Indicators Report. Government
Printers, Pretoria, ZA.
(2011): Trends in Education Macro Indicators Report. Government Printers, Pretoria,
ZA.
Di Giorgi, G., M. Pellizzari, and S. Redaelli (2010): “Identification of Social Interactions
through Partially Overlapping Peer Groups,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
2(2), 241–275.
DiNardo, J., N. Fortin, and T. Lemiuex (1996): “Labor Market Institutions and the Distri-
bution of Wages, 1973 - 1992: A Semiparametric Approach,” Econometrica, 64(5), 1001–1044.
Ding, W., and S. Lehrer (2007): “Do Peers Affect Student Achievement in China’s Secondary
Schools?,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(2), 300–312.
Duflo, E. (2001): “Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in In-
donesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment,” American Economic Review, 91(4),
795–813.
Duflo, E., P. Dupas, and M. Kremer (2011): “Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the
Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya,” American Economic
Review, 101(5), 1739–1774.
Dupas, P. (2013): “Short-Run Subsidies and Long-Run Adoption of New Health Products: Evi-
dence from a Field Experiment,” Mimeo.
Dynarski, S. (2003): “Does Aid Matter? Measuring the Effect of Student Aid on College Atten-
dance and Completion,” American Economic Review, 93(1), 279–288.
Dynarski, S., J. Gruber, and D. Li (2009): “Cheaper by the Dozen: Using Sibling Discounts
at Catholic Schools to Estimate the Price Elasticity of Private School Attendance,” Discussion
Paper 15461, National Bureau of Economic Research.
134
Edmonds, E. (2006): “Child Labor and Schooling Responses to Anticipated Income in South
Africa,” Journal of Development Economics, 81(2), 386–414.
Epple, D., and R. Romano (1998): “Competition Between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers
and Peer-Group Effects,” American Economic Review, 88(1), 33–62.
(2011): “Peer Effects in Education: A Survey of the Theory and Evidence,” in Handbook
of Social Economics Volume 1B, ed. by J. Benhabib, A. Bisin, and M. Jackson, pp. 1053–1163.
Elsevier.
Evans, D., M. Kremer, and M. Ngatia (2009): “The Impact of Distributing School Uniforms
on Children’s Education in Kenya,” Mimeo.
Fafchamps, M., and B. Minten (2007): “Public service provision, user fees and political tur-
moil,” 16(3), 485–518.
Fan, J., and I. Gijbels (1996): Local Polynomial Modelling and Its Applications. Chapman &
Hall.
Fedderke, J., J. Luiz, and R. de Kadt (2000): “Uneducating South Africa: The Failure to
Address the 1910–1993 Legacy,” International Review of Education, 46(3/4), 257–281.
Fields, G., and E. Ok (1996): “The Meaning and Measurement of Income Mobility,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 71, 349–377.
Filmer, D., and N. Schady (2008): “Getting Girls into School: Evidence from a Scholarship
Program in Cambodia,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 56(3), 581–617.
Firpo, S. (2007): “Efficient Semiparametric Estimation of Quantile Treatment Effects,” Econo-
metrica, 75(1), 259–276.
(2010): “Identification and Estimation of Distributional Impacts of Interventions Using
Changes in Inequality Measures,” IZA Discussion Paper 4841.
Fizbein, A., and N. Schady (2009): Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Current and Future
Poverty. World Bank.
Formby, J., J. Smith, and B. Zheng (2004): “Mobility Measurement, Transition Matrices and
Statistical Inference,” Journal of Econometrics, 120, 181–205.
Fortin, N., T. Lemiuex, and S. Firpo (2011): “Decomposition Methods in Economics,” in
Handbook of Labor Economics Volume 4A, ed. by O. Ashenfelter, and D. Card. North-Holland.
Foster, G. (2006): “It’s Not Your Peers and it’s Not Your Friends: Some Progress Toward
Understanding the Educational Peer Effect Mechanism,” Journal of Public Economics, 90, 1455–
1475.
Frisancho, V., and K. Krishna (2011): “Affirmative Action in Higher Education in India:
Targeting, Catch Up, and Mismatch,” Working paper.
Galor, O., and D. Tsiddon (1997): “Technological Progress, Mobility, and Economic Growth,”
American Economic Review, 87(3), 363–382.
135
Garlick, R. (2012): “Mobility Treatment Effects: Identification, Estimation and Application,”
Working paper.
Glewwe, P. (1999): “Why Does Mother’s Schooling Raise Child Health in Developing Countries?
Evidence from Morocco,” Journal of Human Resources, 34(1), 124–159.
Glewwe, P., and A. L. Kassouf (2011): “The Impact of the Bolsa Escola/Familia Condi-
tional Cash Transfer Program on Enrollment, Drop Out Rates and Grade Promotion in Brazil,”
University of Minnesota.
Glewwe, P., and M. Kremer (2006): “Schools, Teachers and Education Outcomes in Developing
Countries,” in Handbook of the Economics of Education, Volume 2, ed. by E. Hanushek, and
F. Welch, pp. 945–1017. North-Holland.
Graham, B. (2011): “Econometric Methods for the Analysis of Assignment Problems in the
Presence of Complementarity and Social Spillovers,” in Handbook of Social Economics Volume
1B, ed. by J. Benhabib, A. Bisin, and M. Jackson, pp. 965–1052. Elsevier.
Graham, B., G. Imbens, and G. Ridder (2011): “Measuring the Average Outcome and In-
equality Effects of Segregation in the Presence of Social Spillovers,” Mimeo.
Guryan, J., B. Jacob, E. Klopfer, and J. Groff (2008): “Using Technology to Explore Social
Networks and Mechanisms Underlying Peer Effects in Classrooms,” Developmental Psychology,
44(2), 355–364.
Hahn, J. (1998): “On the Role of Propensity Score in Effcient Semiparametric Estimation of
Average Treatment Effects,” Econometrica, 66, 315–332.
Hanes, S. (2006): “Easing the Burden of School Fees in Africa,” Christian Science Monitor.
Hanushek, E., J. Kain, J. Markman, and S. Rivkin (2008): “Does Peer Ability Affect Student
Achievement?,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 18(5), 527–544.
Hanushek, E., and D. Kimko (2000): “Schooling, Labor Force Quality, and the Growth of
Nations,” American Economic Review, 90(5), 1184–1208.
Heckman, J., and J. Hotz (1989): “Choosing Among Alternative Nonexperimental Methods
for Estimating the Impact of Social Programs: The Case of Manpower Training,” Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 84(408), 862–880.
Heckman, J., L. Lochner, and P. Todd (2006): “Earnings functions, rates of return and
treatment effects: The Mincer equation and beyond,” in Handbook of the Economics of Education
Volume 2, ed. by E. Hanushek, and F. Welch. North-Holland.
Heckman, J., and R. Robb (1985): “Alternative Methods for Estimating the Impact of Inter-
ventions,” in Longitudinal Analysis of Labor Market Data, ed. by J. Heckman, and B. Singer.
Cambridge University Press.
Heckman, J., J. Smith, and N. Clements (1997): “Making the Most out of Programme
Evaluations and Social Experiments: Accounting for Heterogeneity in Programme Impacts,”
Review of Economic Studies, 64(4), 487–535.
136
Hidalgo, D., M. Onofa, H. Oosterbeek, and J. Ponce (2013): “Can Provision of Free School
Uniforms Harm Attendance? Evidence from Ecuador,” Journal of Development Economics,
103(3), 43–51.
Hirano, K., G. Imbens, and G. Ridder (2003): “Efficient Estimation of Average Treatment
Effects Using the Propensity Score,” Econometrica, 71(4), 1161–1189.
Horowitz, J. (2001): “The Bootstrap,” in The Handbook of Econometrics Volume 5, ed. by
J. Heckman, and E. Leamer, pp. 3159–3228. Elsevier.
Hoxby, C. (2000): “Peer Effects in the Classroom: Learning from Gender and Race Variation,”
Working paper 7867, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hoxby, C., and G. Weingarth (2006): “Taking Race out of the Equation: School Reassignment
and the Structure of Peer Effects,” Working paper.
Hsieh, C.-T., and M. Urquiola (2006): “The Effects of Generalized School Choice on Achieve-
ment and Stratification: Evidence from Chile’s Voucher Program,” Journal of Public Economics,
90(8-9), 1477–1503.
Imbens, G., and K. Kalyanaraman (2009): “Optimal Bandwidth Choice for the Regression
Discontinuity Estimator,” Discussion Paper 14726, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Imbens, G., and J. Wooldridge (2009): “Recent Developments in the Econometrics of Program
Evaluation,” Journal of Economic Literature, 47(1), 5–86.
Imberman, S., A. Kugler, and B. Sacerdote (2012): “Katrina’s Children: Evidence on
the Structure of Peer Effects from Hurricane Evacuees,” American Economic Review, 102(5),
2048–2082.
Kane, T. (1994): “College Entry by Blacks since 1970: The Role of College Costs, Family Back-
ground, and the Returns to Education,” Journal of Political Economy, 102(5), 878–911.
Kang, C. (2007): “Classroom Peer Effects and Academic Achievement: Quasi-Experimental Evi-
dence from South Korea,” Journal of Urban Economics, 61, 458–495.
Kling, J., D. Liebman, and L. Katz (2007): “Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects,”
Econometrica, 75(1), 83–119.
Kremer, M., E. Miguel, and R. Thornton (2009): “Incentives to Learn,” Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 91(3), 437–456.
Lam, D., C. Ardington, N. Branson, K. Goostrey, and M. Leibbrandt (2010): “Credit
Constraints and the Racial Gap in Post-secondary Education in South Africa,” University of
Michigan.
Lam, D., C. Ardington, and M. Leibbrandt (2010): “Schooling as a Lottery: Racial Dif-
ferences in School Advancement in Urban South Africa,” Journal of Development Economics,
95(2), 121–136.
Lavy, V., and A. Schlosser (2011): “Mechanisms and Impacts of Gender Peer Effects at
School,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(2), 1–33.
137
Lee, D., and T. Lemieux (2010): “Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics,” Journal of
Economic Literature, 48(2), 281–355.
Lucas, A., and I. Mbiti (2009): “The Effect of Free Primary Education on Student Participation,
Stratification and Achievement: Evidence from Kenya,” Mimeo, Wellesley University.
Mankiw, G., D. Romer, and D. Weil (1992): “A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic
Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 407–437.
Manski, C. (1993): “Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem,” Review
of Economics and Statistics, 60(3), 531–542.
Marmaros, D., and B. Sacerdote (2002): “Peer and Social Networks in Job Search,” European
Economic Review, 46(4-5), 870–879.
(2006): “How do Friendships Form?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121, 79–119.
Matsudaira, J. (2008): “Mandatory Summer School and Student Achievement,” Journal of
Econometrics, 142(2), 829–850.
McCrary, J. (2008): “Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity
Design: A Density Test,” Journal of Econometrics, 142(2), 698–714.
Neal, D. (2002): “How Vouchers Could Change the Market for Education,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 16(4), 25–44.
Ozier, O. (2011): “The Impact of Secondary Schooling in Kenya: A Regression Discontinuity
Analysis,” Mimeo.
Pagan, A., and A. Ullah (1999): Nonparametric Econometrics. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK.
Pampallis, J. (2008): School Fees. Centre for Education Policy Development, Johannesburg, ZA.
Pop-Eleches, C., and M. Urquiola (2012): “Going to a Better School: Effects and Behavioral
Responses,” American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Prais, S. (1955): “Measuring Social Mobility,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A,
118, 56–66.
Robins, J., and A. Rotnitzky (1995): “Semiparametric Efficiency in Multivariate Regression
Models with Missing Data,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 90(429), 122–129.
Robinson, P. (1988): “Root-n Consistent Semiparametric Regression,” Econometrica, 56(4), 931–
954.
Sacerdote, B. (2001): “Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Room-
mates,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2), 681–704.
(2011): “Peer Effects in Education: How Might They Work, How Big Are They and How
Much Do We Know Thus Far?,” in Handbook of the Economics of Education Volume 3, ed. by
E. Hanushek, S. Machin, and L. Woessmann, pp. 249–277. Elsevier.
138
Schluter, C. (1998): “Statistical Inference with Mobility Indices,” Economics Letters, 59, 157–
162.
Schultz, P. (2004): “School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican PROGRESA Poverty
Program,” 74(1), 199–250.
Seekings, J., and N. Nattrass (2005): Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa. Yale Uni-
versity Press, New Haven, CT.
Seftor, N., and S. Turner (2002): “Back to School: Federal Student Aid Policy and Adult
College Enrollment,” Journal of Human Resources, 37(2), 336–352.
Shorrocks, A. (1978a): “Income Inequality and Income Mobility,” Journal of Economic Theory,
19, 376–393.
(1978b): “The Measurement of Mobility,” Econometrica, 46, 10143–1024.
Solon, G. (1999): “Intergenerational Mobility in the Labor Market,” in Handbook of Labor Eco-
nomics Volume 3, ed. by O. Ashenfelter, and D. Card, pp. 1761–1800. Elsevier.
(2002): “Cross-Country Differences in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 16(3), 59–66.
Sommers, P., and J. Conlisk (1979): “Eigenvalue Immobility Measures for Markov Chains,”
Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 6, 253–276.
Stinebrickner, T., and R. Stinebrickner (2006): “What Can Be Learned About Peer Effects
Using College Roommates? Evidence from New Survey Data and Students from Disadvantaged
Backgrounds,” Journal of Public Economics, 90(8/9), 1435–1454.
(2008): “The Causal Effect of Studying on Academic Performance,” B.E. Journal of
Economic Analysis and Policy, 8(1), 1868–1868.
Terreblanche, S. (2002): A History of Inequality in South Africa. University of Natal Press,
Pietermaritzburg.
Todd, P., and K. Wolpin (2006): “Assessing the Impact of a School Subsidy Program in
Mexico: Using a Social Experiment to Validate a Dynamic Behavioral Model of Child Schooling
and Fertility,” American Economic Review, 96(5), 1384–1417.
van den Berg, S., and M. Louw (2007): “Lessons Learnt From SACMEQII: South African
Student Performance in Regional Context,” Discussion Paper 16, Stellebosch University.
Vigdor, J., and T. Nechyba (2007): “Peer Effects in North Carolina Public Schools,” in Schools
and the Equal Opportunity Problem, ed. by L. Woessmann, and P. Peterson, pp. 73 – 102. MIT
Press.
Wildeman, A. (2008): “Reviewing Eight Years of the Implementation of School Funding Norms,”
Idasa Economic Government Programme Research Paper.
Yatchew, P. (1997): “An Elementary Estimator of the Partial Linear Model,” Economics Letters,
57, 135–143.
139
Zimmerman, D. (2003): “Peer Effects in Academic Outcomes: Evidence From a Natural Experi-
ment,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(1), 9–23.
140
